Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

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Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
15 November 2006

UNCLASSIFIED
SUMMARY of CHANGE

AR 190-11
Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

This major revision, dated 15 November 2006--

- Changes the proponent to The Provost Marshal General (title page and para 1-4).
- Assigns responsibility to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Installation Management Command and garrison commanders for securing arms, ammunition, and explosives (para 1-4).
- Assigns responsibilities and provides procedures for the security of arms during initial entry training (para 1-4).
- Assigns responsibility to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to enforce procedures for security of weapons and ammunition assigned to initial entry training Soldiers (para 1-4).
- Assigns responsibilities and provides guidance on the submission of physical security waivers and exceptions to the standards of this regulation (para 2-4).
- Provides guidelines for the security of ammunition and explosives deployed to the field for training or operational purposes (para 2-5).
- Authorizes commanders to delegate responsibilities for conducting background checks of personnel who have access to Army arms, ammunition, and explosives to directors/managers who are responsible for the supervision of the personnel and the arms, ammunition, and explosives (para 2-11).
- Assigns responsibilities to persons issued or in possession of arms (para 4-1).
- Revises table 4-1.
- Authorizes the use of portable armories (para 4-2).
- Provides revised guidance on the use of modified and locally fabricated arms racks (para 4-2).
- Provides additional guidance on the use of consolidated arms rooms (para 4-4).
- Requires armed guards to be posted on Categories I and II arms, ammunition, and explosives facilities upon failure of the intrusion detection system (para 5-2).
- Changes frequency of security guard checks at Category I and II facilities from once every 2 hours to once every 24 hours (para 5-2).
o Deletes requirement for security guard checks at facilities with an operational intrusion detection system (para 5-2).

o Provides minimum requirements for safeguarding and maintaining unit stocks of ammunition and explosives (para 5-2).

o Authorizes the storage of live ammunition in weapons magazines provided the magazines are color-keyed (para 5-8).

o Provides procedures for the movement of arms, ammunition, and explosives by unit or organization transportation (para 7-10).

o Provides new facility criteria for storage of Category I ammunition and explosives (para G-3).

o Provides existing facility criteria for storage of Category I ammunition and explosives (para G-4).

o Provides authorization to use portable explosive magazine (para G-5).

o Authorizes the use of the GOLAN-10 container for storage of explosives for military working dogs (para G-6).

o Deletes requirements for the security of arms, ammunition, and explosives at contractor-owned, contractor-operated facilities (app H).

o Prescribes physical security standards for sensitive conventional ammunition and explosives during production, manufacturing, renovation, and demilitarization operations at Government facilities (app H).

o Deletes appendix I that prescribed specific additional transportation security measures for use in shipments to and from activities affected by or under terrorist threat conditions.
Military Police

Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

History. This publication is a major revision.

Summary. This regulation covers the physical security of arms, ammunition, and explosives, to include the security of arms, ammunition, and explosives deployed to the field for training or operational purposes; the security of arms during initial entry training; the use of modified and locally fabricated arms racks; and the security policy of ammunition and explosives during production.

Applicability. This regulation applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. During mobilization, procedures in this publication can be modified to support policy changes as necessary.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation is The Provost Marshal General. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of the expected benefits and must include formal review by the activity's senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through their higher headquarters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR 25–30 for specific guidance.

Army management control process. This regulation contains management control provisions, but does not identify key management controls that must be evaluated.

Supplementation. Supplementation of this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without prior approval from The Provost Marshal General (DAPM–MPD–PS), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–2800.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to The Provost Marshal General (DAPM–MPD–PS), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–2800.

Distribution. Distribution of this publication is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Section I
Information

1–1. Purpose
This regulation prescribes standards and criteria for the physical security of sensitive conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E), including nonnuclear missiles and rockets, as set forth in appendix B, in the custody of any Department of the Army (DA) component. This regulation also prescribes policy, procedures, and standards, and assigns responsibilities for the effective implementation and application of physical security of AA&E. Consistent with operational and safety requirements and this regulation, physical security requirements for production and manufacturing operations at Government facilities will be in accordance with appendix H.

1–2. References
Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms
Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary.

Section II
Responsibilities
This regulation does not relieve responsible or accountable officers of their responsibility to account for property. Persons issued or holding AA&E are responsible for properly securing such property while it is charged or entrusted to their care.

1–4. The Provost Marshal General
The Provost Marshal General (PMG) will—
   a. Have overall Army Staff responsibility for physical security (PS) of sensitive conventional AA&E.
   b. Establish overall policy for the PS aspects of the program.
   c. Function as the Army Staff focal point for PS matters.
   d. Establish minimum PS standards, criteria, and procedures for protecting AA&E.

1–5. Commanding Generals, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units
Commanding Generals, Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) will—
   a. Support the AA&E PS program according to prescribed responsibilities in AR 190–13 and this regulation.
   b. Apply enough human resources and funds to AA&E PS programs at all levels.
   c. Provide oversight of the mission AA&E program.
   d. Provide assistance to mission commanders in correcting deficiencies by advocating for mission resources and funding.
   e. Coordinate the submission of PS waivers and exceptions from mission commander to the appropriate Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) staff proponent.
   f. Provide credentials to mission PS inspectors.

1–6. Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
The CG, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will—
   a. Enforce procedures for security of weapons and ammunition assigned to initial entry training (IET) Soldiers.
   b. Ensure that IET commanders coordinate with garrison commanders to ensure police response to an alarm or call for assistance.
   c. Ensure IET commanders conduct risk analysis and vulnerability assessments. As a minimum, IET commanders will—
      (1) Conduct a risk analysis and vulnerability assessment before weapons are issued to Soldiers.
      (2) Ensure the risks posed by insider personnel, criminals, or terrorists are acceptable and that reasonable measures are in place to mitigate identified vulnerabilities.
      (3) Ensure the risk analysis and vulnerability assessments are reviewed and validated at the beginning of each training cycle.
(4) Ensure a new risk analysis and vulnerability assessment is accomplished annually or when the HQDA or TRADOC commanders assessed or postulated threat changes.

(5) Ensure copies of risk analysis and vulnerability assessments are maintained on file until a new risk analysis and vulnerability assessment is accomplished.

1–7. Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command

The CG, U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) will—

a. Prescribe policies, procedures, and standards to physically secure AA&E manufacturing and production facilities and those AA&E under research, development, or being tested and evaluated under DA jurisdiction.

b. Coordinate through tri-Service the use of decision logic formulas (DLFs) (table B–1) and determine the appropriate risk categories for AA&E items. Security requirements for conventional ammunition and explosives during production and manufacturing operations at Government-owned, contractor-operated facilities are prescribed by the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group (DOD 5160.65–M, chap 12).

1–8. Commanding General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

The CG, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) will—

a. Conduct preliminary investigation into losses of all Category I and II AA&E items, regardless of dollar value, to determine if a crime was committed.

b. Conduct preliminary investigation into losses of Category III and IV items meeting the quantities listed in appendix E, regardless of dollar value, to determine if a crime was committed.

c. Conduct investigations of actual or attempted break-ins or armed robberies of AA&E storage facilities.

d. Provide copies of USACIDC serious/sensitive incident reports which may be prepared pertaining to a, b, and c, above, to HQDA, PMG (DAPM–MPD–PS), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–2800.

e. Conduct a complete investigation and provide HQDA PMG (DAPM–MPD–PS), upon request, copies of such investigation reports if a crime was committed.

f. Coordinate with the proper law enforcement activity (LEA), provost marshal (PM), Director, Emergency Services (DES), or security office to ensure assignment of a PS specialist to the investigation, if needed.

g. Assist HQDA PMG (DAPM–MPD–PS) and the commander concerned in evaluating existing security measures and recommending corrective action to improve security of such items using the results of completed investigations.

1–9. Chief of Engineers

The Chief of Engineers (COE) will ensure that construction plans for new or modified AA&E storage facilities meet the minimum standards prescribed by this regulation.


Commanding General (CG), U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM) will—

a. Support the AA&E PS program according to prescribed responsibilities in AR 190–13 and this regulation.

b. Apply enough human resources and funds to AA&E PS programs at all levels.

c. Provide oversight and support of AA&E program consistent with this regulation using IMCOM region offices.

d. Establish an AA&E program for providing oversight and support to IMCOM installations at the IMCOM region office by—

   (1) Providing oversight of garrison AA&E program.

   (2) Providing assistance and assessments on the installations for the garrison commander.

   (3) Providing assistance to the garrison commander in correcting deficiencies by advocating for Base Operating System resources and funding and coordinating with the ACOM, ASCC, and DRU commanders for mission resources and funding.

   (4) Coordinating the submission of PS waivers and exceptions from the garrison commander through headquarters, IMCOM to the appropriate HQDA staff proponent.

   (5) Providing credentials to installations for PS inspectors.

1–11. Garrison commanders, Chief, Army National Guard/Chief, Army National Guard of the United States

Garrison commanders, Chief, Army National Guard (ARNG)/Chief, Army National Guard of the United States will—

a. Support the AA&E PS program according to prescribed responsibilities in AR 190–13 and this regulation.

b. Apply enough human resources and funds to AA&E PS programs at all levels.

1–12. Commanders and custodians of arms, ammunitions, and explosives

Commanders and custodians of AA&E will—

a. Comply with this regulation.
b. Ensure necessary measures are taken to safeguard AA&E at all times. This includes providing specific instructions in writing on individual responsibility for AA&E during operational and field training conditions, care and maintenance, competitive marksmanship meets, and storage on, or when mounted on, vehicles and aircraft. Appendix I provides a guide that may be used to quickly check for compliance with physical security requirements.

c. Ensure timely submission of Serious Incident Reports, per AR 190–40.

d. Report all losses (actual or suspected) or recoveries within 2 hours of initial detection to the proper law enforcement agencies.

e. Conduct prompt investigation of losses after a decision of the USACIDC that criminal acts were not involved.

f. Fix responsibility when negligence is determined and take proper corrective action to prevent further loss.

g. Publicize AA&E security and loss prevention through command information and unit training programs.

h. Plan, program, budget, and allocate resources for the implementation of required policies outlined in this regulation.

i. Ensure that AA&E storage facilities are checked, inventoried, and inspected as required by this regulation.

j. Appoint, in writing, a commissioned officer, warrant officer, or noncommissioned officer as the unit PS/arms room officer to ensure that PS requirements pertaining to the accountability and security of AA&E are met or exceeded.

k. Maintain an updated notification roster. The roster will list the names and telephone numbers of personnel to be notified in the event of an alarm system malfunction or breach of security.

l. Ensure the security of any nonsensitive AA&E that that does not meet the criteria in this regulation for sensitive items by—

   (1) Safeguarding from pilferage, theft, and wrongful destruction. Although this regulation does not prescribe security criteria for these items, AR 190–13 assigns commanders the responsibility to ensure reasonable security measures are taken to safeguard property and facilities that may be vulnerable to criminal acts or other disruptive activities.

   (2) Ensuring that the security measures taken provide enough security based on an assessment of the threat and vulnerability of the items concerned. Such security measures can include use of fences, lighting, lock and key control, security patrols, and any other measures deemed suitable by the commander responsible for the security of the items involved.

1–13. Garrison commanders, Reserve Component commanders, and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps unit commanders

Garrison commanders, Reserve Component (RC) commanders, and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) unit commanders will—

a. Coordinate PS plans with local LEAs, DES, supporting military intelligence (MI) and USACIDC elements.

b. Set up a liaison at the local level with the agencies per chapter 3 of this regulation.

c. Ensure that agreements governing consolidated AA&E storage facilities and the storage of AA&E property of Federal, State, contractor agencies, and foreign government agencies contain definite assignment in writing of responsibility for the items stored.

d. Ensure construction programming documents involving AA&E facilities have been coordinated with the responsible PM or security officer.

1–14. Commanders or directors of activities and units on Active Army installations or sub–installations

Commanders or directors of activities, and units on Active Army installations or sub–installations will—

a. Coordinate PS plans for standard operating procedures (SOP) once a year with the installation PM, DES, or security office.

b. Ensure their security procedures are current and in keeping with the command and HQDA PS directives.

c. Include provisions in security procedures for applying PS measures for storage areas in keeping with the host commander’s assessment.

1–15. Commanders or directors of tenant activities (located both on and off the installation)

Commanders or directors of tenant activities (located both on and off the installation) will—

a. Identify their security requirements to the host installation.

b. Ensure funding provisions are considered in proper budget programs.

1–16. Installation planning boards

Installation planning boards will—

a. Include a PS representative from the LEA, PM, DES, or security office as a voting member on all actions.
b. Ensure that the provisions of this regulation are considered and made a matter of record during the planning process by the representatives.

Chapter 2
Policy

2–1. General

a. Physical security systems should incorporate technology and equipment available within the Federal Government and the private sector to provide cost–effective protection, automated accountability, and inventory control. Physical security equipment management policy is established in AR 190–13, chapter 4. Security criteria will be included in initial plans for research and development, as well as all new or modified construction projects.

b. To minimize the cost of PS inventory control, and to reduce theft vulnerability, the quantities of AA&E and the number of storage facilities for AA&E should be reduced. Storage should be consolidated to the maximum extent consistent with operational, safety, and training requirements.

(1) The AA&E should be removed from designated storage areas as briefly as possible. The quantity to be removed should be as small as possible to support specific missions or projects. Storage areas should be as small as possible and be consistent with safety standards, security, and mission requirements.

(2) Further reduction of costs for protection and inventory control can be effected by grouping the consolidation of AA&E into smaller storage areas by assigned risk category and providing the degree of PS protection needed for that category. Priority attention will be given to demilitarization or disposal of obsolete and unserviceable AA&E to avoid unnecessary storage, security, and inventory–related costs.

(3) The provisions of this regulation are intended to provide adequate storage security for AA&E at most DA activities. There may be a few unusual activities, such as large depots or remote storage areas without existing electrical service, where not all criteria in this regulation can be directly applied in a cost–effective manner. At these unusual or unique facilities, local conditions must be carefully evaluated, and the security system must be tailored to the local conditions.

2–2. Construction of facilities

a. The provisions of this regulation are mandatory for construction of new permanent storage structures at land–based installations that store sensitive AA&E. Modification to existing facilities will be accomplished in accordance with the criteria set forth in this regulation.

b. The tearing down and rebuilding of facilities will not be undertaken unless the concerned command and IMCOM has determined that existing security measures cannot be supplemented to provide the required degree of protection. When nonstandard structures or facilities provide equivalent or better protection, modifications will not be undertaken. Exceptions to this policy will be granted under paragraph 2–4.

c. Upgrading of existing storage structures must be consistent with approved plans for future development and new construction plans. The type, planned use, modification costs, and remaining economic life of storage structures must be considered. Additionally, in determining upgrade requirements, ammunition and explosives will be consolidated by risk category to the maximum extent consistent with operational, safety, and training requirements. Compensatory security measures will be established for AA&E storage structures that do not meet minimum construction standards. Definitive drawings and specifications for new construction, upgrade, or modification of AA&E storage structures will be coordinated with the engineer office, safety office, and LEA, PM, DES, or security police office to ensure safety and PS requirements are met.

d. Qualified engineer personnel will verify the structure composition of AA&E storage facilities (for example, walls, ceilings, roofs, floors, and doors). Statements will be prepared on DA Form 4604 (Security Construction Statement). Statements will indicate the highest construction category met for storage of AA&E (for example, Category I, II, III, or IV AA&E items) and date of applicable regulation (see para 2–4 for procedures when structural deficiencies exist). The DA Form 4604 will be affixed to the interior wall of each AA&E storage facility. A blanket statement on DA Form 4604 may be issued at an installation for all facilities, such as ammunition magazines, constructed according to the same specifications. Under these circumstances, a copy of the DA Form 4604 need not be affixed to the interior wall of each individual storage structure, but must specifically identify the facilities by number and location and be readily available for inspection. Security construction statements will be reviewed during PS surveys and inspections. The statements will be revalidated by engineer personnel every 5 years.

e. Physical security personnel will monitor construction of new facilities and renovation of existing facilities. Engineer personnel will coordinate new construction and renovation projects with the local PM or security officer. In addition to meeting construction standards, storage of AA&E will meet PS criteria, such as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), locks and hasps, lighting, and security patrols, as necessary, for the particular category of AA&E involved.
2–3. Intrusion Detection System priority lists
   a. Priority of installation of the IDS is as follows:
      (1) Facilities storing Category I items, when protection is inadequate. Those having the largest quantity will receive initial attention.
      (2) Facilities storing Category II items.
      (3) Facilities storing Category III items.
      (4) Facilities storing Category IV items.
   b. Deviations from these priorities will be permitted only when IMCOM has determined that a local threat dictates these deviations.

2–4. Security Criteria Deviation Program
   a. Purpose. The purpose of the AA&E security criteria deviation program is to—
      (1) Ensure that prescribed security requirements are properly observed and implemented at all AA&E facilities.
      (2) Provide a management tool to monitor corrective actions.
      (3) Ensure that deviations from established security requirements are systematically and uniformly identified and approved at the proper level of command. Waivers and exceptions are deviations from specific security requirements prescribed in this regulation.
   b. Waivers. A waiver may be approved for temporary relief from a specific requirement prescribed in this regulation pending actions to conform to the requirement.
      (1) A waiver may be approved for a period not to exceed 12 months and extended only after a review of the circumstances that necessitate the extension.
      (2) Compensatory security measures are required in the interim. Compensatory security measures approved by the AA&E facility commander/director will remain in effect pending formal review and final approval by the approving authority.
      (3) Deficiencies correctable within 60 days do not require a waiver; however, ensure compensatory security measures are taken during the interval. In such cases, the compensatory measure must be in writing, approved by the AA&E facility commander/director and the next higher commander in the chain of command.
   c. Exception. An exception may be approved for permanent relief from a specific requirement prescribed in this regulation.
      (1) Approve exceptions only when correction of the deviation is adjudged to be not feasible or cost–effective and only after a most careful and critical evaluation of the facts in the case.
      (2) Notify the approving authority through command channels when the exception is no longer needed.
      (3) Review all exceptions during PS inspections or when a major change in site configuration or mission offers the opportunity for corrective action to terminate the exception.
      (4) The AA&E facility commander/director, to whom the exception was granted, will conduct the review. Forward all reviews through command channels to the approving authority granting the exception.
      (5) Compensatory security measures are required in the interim. Compensatory security measures approved by the AA&E facility commander/director will remain in effect pending formal review and final approval by the approving authority.
   d. Exceptions and waivers. Exceptions and waivers will not be used to reduce or eliminate minimum security requirements in this regulation. Evaluate each waiver or exception on a case–by–case basis.
   e. Compensatory measures.
      (1) Institute compensatory measures for each deficiency.
      (2) One compensatory measure may suffice for more than 1 deficiency.
      (3) Security measures will compensate for the specific vulnerability created by a deficiency when a minimum security requirement in this regulation cannot be met. A security requirement directed by this regulation cannot serve as a compensatory measure for a deficiency.
      (4) Compensatory measures may include additional security forces, procedures, and/or PS devices such as additional locks, alarms, lighting, and delay devices. Design the criteria for accepting compensatory measures to specifically enhance the security posture in light of the deficient situation.
      (5) Compensatory measures that consist primarily of instructions to the security force to increase their alertness do not provide a comparable level of security.
      (6) The AA&E sites lacking an installed IDS, will conduct a thorough assessment to determine compensatory measures most reasonable to ensure near–real time assessment of an attempted facility intrusion. The assessment will include a full explanation of the factors considered in formulating the compensatory measures.
   f. Arms, ammunition, and explosives security considerations.
      (1) The AA&E facility commander/director will ensure that prescribed compensatory measures are implemented as required.
      (2) Security forces will be advised of all standing deviations and compensatory measures in assigned duty areas.
(3) Prescribed compensatory measures for individual deficiencies must not, when considered in total, unrealistically task the security forces.

g. Approval procedures. Requests for waivers and exceptions are initiated by the AA&E facility commander/director and forwarded through appropriate command channels to HQDA, PMG (DAPM–OPS), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–2800.

h. Waiver and exception requests. All waiver and exception requests will include the following:

(1) Subject of request. An example includes, Request for Waiver at Dugway Proving Grounds – Intrusion Detection System.

(2) Reasons for request. State the problems and/or deficiencies that constitute requirements below those cited in this regulation (cite references and state requirements).

(3) Reasons for noncompliance. Explain why the unit, facility, or installation cannot comply with the requirements of this regulation. For waivers, show what actions have been taken planned or scheduled to correct the deficiencies.

(4) Detailed information. Provide detailed information on current compensatory measures.

(5) List of all waivers and exceptions currently in effect for the site. Explain why these deviations, collectively, will not establish an overall site vulnerability greater than the stated compensatory measures.

(6) Coordination. Show coordinated efforts with the affected staff agencies (PM/security officer, supporting judge advocate of the installation or activity, and supporting engineers).

(7) Commander's evaluation of the requests. Commanders (in the chain of command) will review and endorse each waiver or exception request. The IMCOM region commanders may delegate the review and endorsement to a civilian division chief assigned to that headquarters and responsible for PS matters in the region. The Commanding General, IMCOM may delegate the review and endorsement to a civilian division chief assigned to that headquarters and responsible for PS matters. The ACOM, ASCC, and DRU commanders may delegate this authority to a division chief within the organization in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Each chain of command's endorsement will include comments assessing the adequacy of compensatory measures, taking into consideration the required criteria for waivers and exceptions.

i. Exceptions previously granted. Exceptions previously granted under the criteria of the previous AR 190–11 remain valid under the provisions of this regulation. Such exceptions need not be resubmitted for approval. However, such exceptions will be reviewed as indicated above.

2–5. Security of arms, ammunition, and explosives during training and aboard ships

All AA&E deployed in the field for training or operational purposes will be secured at all times. Field level munitions storage area (FLMSA) will be designated by the commander and used to temporarily hold unit level munitions in a field environment to meet training requirements (for example, ammunition holding area, ammunition transfer point, or field ammunition resupply point). After firing, the FLMSA will be used to reconcile the munitions prior to turn–in to the installation ammunition supply point (ASP). The following guidelines apply:

a. Access to the FLMSA will be strictly controlled. The 2–person rule will apply to Category I missiles and rockets at these locations.

b. Perimeter barriers, either temporary or permanent, must be in place to preclude unauthorized entry into the storage area.

c. Storage areas will be posted as a restricted area.

d. Armed guards will be posted at the FLMSA to control entry, to protect the AA&E, and in the event Category I missiles and rockets are stored there, to enforce the 2–person rule. The guards will be equipped with a primary and alternate means of communications. At a minimum, armed guards will be checked every 4 hours by an individual appointed by the commander.

e. Positive measures (for example, security lighting or additional guards so that visibility between guards is maintained, and so on) will be implemented during hours of darkness or reduced visibility.

f. Accountability procedures will be established at the FLMSA to record expenditures. Inventory results will be reconciled daily until return to the installation ASP.

g. Category I missiles and rockets stored in open areas are vulnerable to theft. The commander responsible for the FLMSA should consider placing these Category I missiles and rockets in either an approved container (military van (MILVAN), SEAVAN (see glossary), or container express (CONNEX)), or in a totally enclosed storage building. The following additional PS measures apply if the container or building is used:

(1) Doors will be secured with 2 general field service padlocks (see glossary, under locks).

(2) Access to, or possession of, both keys to the building by 1 person is prohibited.

(3) A key control system will be established so that no 1 person will be allowed to have access to keys to installed A and B locks.

h. Commanders of units that routinely deploy for field training and live firing should consider having the supporting engineer activity construct a storage building to be used at the FLMSA. This building need not meet the minimum construction standards for Category I storage buildings in this regulation (earth covered), but should provide a degree
of security necessary to enforce 2–person access and provide shelter from the weather. The approval authority for construction standards will be IMCOM. A Type 2 outdoor magazine may also be used as a temporary storage structure.

2–6. Inspections and audits
Security measures including theft or loss reporting and inventory and accountability procedures for AA&E will be examined during inspections and audits. The status of existing waivers and exceptions will be examined for compliance and continuing necessity.

a. The garrison commander will ensure that PS inspections are conducted in accordance with AR 190–13 for AA&E governed by this regulation. Additionally, conduct PS inspections as follows:
   (1) For new AA&E storage facilities, and before and immediately after occupancy.
   (2) On significant change in facility structure.
   (3) After a forced entry or attempted forced entry with or without theft.
   (4) When units have received an unsatisfactory rating on PS inspection, reinspection will be within 6 months. A copy of an unsatisfactory PS inspection concerning RC and ROTC units will be furnished the installation commander providing logistical report. The follow–up report will include written comments to show what elements have received copies.

b. Physical security inspections of AA&E deployed in the field for training and operations will be conducted to ensure these items are properly protected.

c. Results of PS inspections will be briefed to the commander responsible for the security of the facility or area inspected.

d. Inventory, accountability, issue, and turn–in procedures will be included in PS inspections to ensure the procedures support the PS program. Supply operations below the wholesale level area applied in AR 710–2, chapter 2. Physical inventory controls at the wholesale level are established by AR 740–26, chapter 2.

e. Persons authorized by the commander to exchange custody of an arms storage facility will conduct a physical count of the weapons and ammunition stored therein during the custody exchange per requirements in AR 710–2.

2–7. Prohibition

a. Gun clubs and activities under the responsibility of the Director of Marksmanship are not authorized to possess or store Category I or Category II AA&E.

b. The ARNG and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) are not permitted to permanently store operational quantities of Category I AA&E.
   (1) The ARNG and USAR are authorized to temporarily store training quantities of Category I AA&E at ASP for training of ARNG and USAR units provided the ASP meets all requirements for Category I storage in chapter 5.
   (2) Additionally, ARNG and USAR units are authorized temporary custody (not to exceed 14 days) of Category I AA&E for training on military installations. Storage requirements in paragraph 2–5, above, and transportation requirements in paragraph 7–10, below, will be strictly adhered to.

c. The ROTC/Junior ROTC units are not authorized to possess or store Category I AA&E. With the exception of Norwich University, Virginia Military Institute, Texas A&M, the Citadel, and North Georgia College, ROTC units are not authorized to permanently possess or store Category II AA&E.
   (1) The ROTC units may retain temporary (overnight/weekend) custody of AA&E for training purposes. This temporary custody will not exceed 72 hours. Chapter 4 PS measures will be adhered to.
   (2) The ROTC units may use Category II weapons for familiarization training and field training exercises or marksmanship, on or off a military reservation. Active Army and RC units and installations are encouraged to provide support to ROTC units when requested.

2–8. Requisition
The HQDA (DALO–SMP–S) will establish procedures for item managers to ensure necessary requisition verification of AA&E items. Commanders will include instructions to ensure AA&E requisitions are authorized by designated personnel and released only to properly identified authorized personnel. The procedures will include positive steps for rejecting excess and unauthorized requisitions (see AR 710–2 for policy on requisitioning).

2–9. Investigations
A thorough investigation will be made of lost, stolen, or missing AA&E to determine the circumstances surrounding the loss or theft and to fix responsibility as necessary. Inventory and accountability losses will be investigated thoroughly. Before any loss can be attributed to any inventory or accountability discrepancy, it must be determined through investigation that the loss was not the result of theft or wrongful appropriation per AR 735–5.

a. Guidance on actions to be taken. Active Army and RC commanders, or their designated representatives, having direct responsibility for AA&E lost, stolen, or missing or the receiving unit or agency will—
   (1) Notify the supporting military LEA or security office as soon as the incident is discovered. The notice will be as complete as possible, but will not be delayed because of incomplete data. The USAR will notify the military law
enforcement activity responsible for the geographical area. In the continental United States (CONUS), this notice will include the proper Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office having area jurisdiction. Civil authorities in overseas areas will be notified according to local policy.

(2) Conduct a preliminary investigation when sensitive AA&E are reported lost by the USACIDC to determine criminality before beginning any administrative action (see para 1–11).

(3) Start administrative action per AR 735–5 if the USACIDC investigation determines a crime was not committed. The report of survey or equal procedures will not be used as a disciplinary or punitive measure. The use of this administrative procedure will not prevent recourse to disciplinary measures when proper.

(4) Determine accountability for recovered property per AR 735–5. A person may be held responsible and be required to pay for a loss. If so, he or she will not be allowed to claim title or obtain ownership of the item if it is recovered.

(5) Consider relative investigative findings in violation of this or other applicable regulations. Take proper punitive action if events warrant.

(6) Request, through the proper channels, that an AR 15–6 investigation be initiated for loss/theft of AA&E identified in appendix E. Ensure financial liability investigations are conducted in accordance with AR 735–5.

b. Property overages. Property overages will be handled in the same way as stated in a, above.

c. The investigation. Facts must be presented by the requesting person. The installation, depot, or community commander may then direct that an investigation be initiated. The officer appointed to conduct the investigation will follow procedures per AR 15–6 and this regulation.

d. In–transit losses. Consignees of AA&E shipments will report in–transit losses to the supporting LEA, PM, DES, or security office.

e. Inventory adjustments. Inventory losses or overages may be determined as administrative, computer, or other type accountability errors and not actual losses. This determination will be made only after investigative action has established the cause of the discrepancy. (In no case may a weapon, ammunition, or explosive loss or overage be attributed to inventory error unless the responsible agency, unit, or activity conducts an investigation that, beyond a doubt, excludes the possibility of theft or loss.) When such a decision has been made, DA Form 3056 (Report of Missing/Recovered Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives) will be submitted. The form will explain—

(1) The rationale for such a decision.
(2) The type of inventory adjustment action taken.
(3) The name, grade, and duty position of the approval authority.

f. Transportation losses. Transportation officers, or their designated representatives, will inform the supporting LEA, PM, DES, or security office when claims or other data reflect the loss of AA&E from shipment or storage. This report will include household goods and losses of privately–owned weapons.

g. Criminal investigation reports. The CG, USACIDC will provide HQDA (DAPM–MPD–PS), upon request, copies of completed criminal investigation reports. The reports will describe the loss or theft of AA&E. Reports prepared by the FBI will be included as attachments.

2–10. Training

a. Commanders responsible for AA&E will establish a training program for those personnel responsible for the accountability of these items. The training program will be designed to—

(1) Provide training in inventory and accountability procedures as outlined in applicable 700–series Army regulations.

(2) Fit the requirements of different groups of personnel responsible for accountability.

(3) Indoctrinate personnel in the principles, criteria, and procedures for accountability and inventory, including disciplinary actions against individuals responsible for violating security requirements as prescribed in this regulation.

b. Commanders will initiate an aggressive training program to ensure all unit personnel are aware of their responsibilities for the security and accountability of AA&E. A training program will also be established to ensure requirements of AR 190–56, chapter 4 are met and to ensure continued proficiency of the guard force. As a minimum, this training will include—

(1) Care and use of weapons, to include qualification firing with assigned weapons within the past 12 months.

(2) Legal authority, responsibility, and jurisdiction of guards on duty, to include apprehension, search and seizure, and use of force.

(3) Physical fitness training.

(4) Guard orders, to include communications and duress procedures.

(5) Duties in the event of emergencies, such as alerts, fire, explosion, civil disturbance, intrusion, attempted seizure, or terrorist incident.

(6) Current criminal threat to AA&E.

(7) Crime prevention.

(8) Common forms of sabotage and espionage, to include current threat situation.
(9) Location of hazardous and vulnerable equipment and materiel, to include high security risk AA&E requiring special attention or more frequent security checks.

(10) Location of fire protection equipment, decontamination stations, electrical circuit breakers and main cut–off switches, and first–aid facilities.

(11) Operation and monitoring of IDS.

(12) Additional training subjects as listed in AR 190–13, paragraph 2–5.

c. Commanders will take continuing action through annual update refresher briefings to ensure that all personnel are aware of their responsibilities for the control and safeguarding of AA&E.

2–11. Personnel

a. Commanders/directors will be selective in assigning personnel to duties involving control of all categories of AA&E. Only personnel who are mature and stable and have shown a willingness and capability to perform assigned tasks in a dependable manner will be assigned to duties, which involve responsibility for the control, accountability, and shipment of all categories of AA&E. The commander may delegate this responsibility to directors/managers who are responsible for the supervision of the personnel and the AA&E. As part of this selection process, personnel assigned duties involved in the control, accountability, and shipment of AA&E will be screened and evaluated using DA Form 7281 (Command Oriented Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Security Screening and Evaluation Records). Completed forms will be retained on file within the command until the individual departs or is relieved of his or her AA&E–oriented duties. In addition, the senior mission commander and/or IMCOM will implement procedures to ensure the following:

(1) Personnel assigned custody, maintenance, disposal, or security responsibilities for AA&E on military installations in the United States and its territories, or U.S. citizens assigned to such duties overseas, will be subject to 1 of the following investigations and periodic reinvestigations as set forth in DOD 5200.2–R:

(a) Military personnel— National agency check, local agency check, credit check.
(b) DOD civilian personnel— National agency check with written inquiries and credit.
(c) Contractor personnel (including subcontractors)— National agency check, local agency check, credit check.

(2) Prior to assumption of such duties (and at least annually thereafter), personnel responsible for the accountability of AA&E will be made aware of the importance of accurate receipt, dispatch, and inventory records. Adherence to the requirement for scheduled inventories will be stressed, as well as procedures for processing inventory adjustment gains and losses.

(3) Personnel operating a vehicle or providing security to a vehicle transporting Category I and II AA&E (including contractor personnel transporting such items on military installations in the United States and its territories or U.S. citizens assigned to such duties overseas in direct support of installation requirements) will be subject to an investigation as provided above, except as follows:

(a) Officers of U.S. flag carriers will be licensed in accordance with United States Coast Guard requirements.
(b) Designated commercial carrier employees providing protective security service for the transportation of items classified secret must possess a Government–issued secret clearance, as provided for in DOD 5220.22–M (reference (l)), and carrier–issued identification.
(c) Foreign national personnel providing services in overseas locations will be investigated in accordance with the policy and procedures governing locally hired employees under Status of Forces Agreements, export licenses or laws of the host government. The DOD components assume responsibility for permitting access to DOD systems, information, material, and areas when an investigation conducted by the host country does not meet the investigative standards in DOD 5200.2–R.

(d) Within CONUS, commercial carrier employees transporting Category I through Category IV AA&E will be subject to an investigation and/or Government security clearance as prescribed in DOD 4500.9–R, chapter 205.

b. Commanders/directors will determine the reliability and trustworthiness of the following personnel before they are assigned duties involving control of AA&E. The commander may delegate this responsibility to directors/managers who are responsible for the supervision of the personnel and the AA&E—

(1) Personnel authorized unaccompanied access to arms and Category I and II ammunition and explosives storage facilities.

(2) Personnel authorized to receive, store, or issue arms and Category I and II ammunition and explosives at such storage facilities.

(3) Personnel authorized to issue or control keys to AA&E storage facilities in (1) and (2), above.

(4) When personnel report for temporary duty at another station and work directly with AA&E, they are required to provide a copy of the DA Form 7281 from their primary station. In the event that temporary duty personnel are from another military department, they will present evidence of reliability and trustworthiness.

(5) Commanders/directors/managers who are responsible for the supervision of the personnel and the AA&E will prohibit access to personnel specified in paragraphs a and b, above, when doubt exists as to their reliability or trustworthiness. All personnel will be required to undergo a command–oriented security screening or an equivalent foreign country check before access is authorized. The security screening check will be designed to provide the
commander reasonable assurance that personnel with character traits that raise significant doubt as to their honesty or stability are not afforded access. At a minimum, the command–oriented security screening will include—

1. A personal interview of the individual conducted by his or her immediate commander or supervisor.
2. A request for medical file check of active duty military personnel.
3. A personnel records check.
4. A records check of the PM, DES, or security office.
5. A records check of local civilian law enforcement agencies in the area of the person’s residence if permitted by State or local laws.

\textit{d.} Commanders/directors/managers who are responsible for the supervision of the personnel and the AA&E will deny access to the above personnel when doubt exists as to their reliability or trustworthiness. The following disqualifying factors will be considered:

1. Record of alcohol abuse.
2. Record of unauthorized use, sale, or possession of drugs and narcotics.
3. Record of mental instability or disorders.
4. Record of judicial or nonjudicial punishment.
5. Pattern of behavior or actions which are reasonably indicative of a contemptuous attitude toward the law.
6. Personnel with qualifying conviction under the Lautenberg Amendment (Staff Judge Advocate coordination required).
7. Any other character trait, a record of conduct, or adverse information, which, in the commander’s/director’s/manager’s judgment, would be prejudicial to reliability or trustworthiness.

\textit{e.} Continuing evaluation of all personnel is essential to the success of the AA&E security screening policy. All personnel involved in AA&E will be fully cognizant of their responsibilities to observe and report promptly to the commander any incident or condition which might result in temporary or permanent disqualification of such personnel. Security screening checks in \textit{c}, above, will be repeated every 3 years.

\section*{Chapter 3

Physical Security Planning}

\subsection*{3–1. General}

In assessing local requirements for protection, the following factors should be considered:

\textit{a.} All AA&E storage rooms, facilities, or areas to include AA&E manufacturing, rebuilding, or demilitarizing facilities will be designated as mission essential vulnerable areas. The garrison commander will assume responsibility for coordinating PS efforts of all tenants having AA&E storage rooms, facilities, or areas, regardless of the components represented, as outlined in the support agreements and the host activity security plan. Applicable provisions will be included in, or be an appendix to, the support agreement. A formal agreement will contain definite assignment of PS responsibility for the items stored. The agreement should address—

1. Physical safeguards to be used.
2. Frequency of, and responsibility for, physical inventories or reconciliations.
3. Procedures for authorization and identification of individuals to receipt for, and physically take custody of, Army property.

\textit{b.} Threat assessment based on information furnished by local intelligence, criminal investigative, or law enforcement agencies.

\textit{c.} Types of AA&E, other sensitive assets, property maintained, and mission of the facility.

\textit{d.} Location, size, and vulnerability of storage facilities.

\textit{e.} Vulnerability of AA&E to theft and loss.

\textit{f.} Geographic location within the installation and relative to surrounding population centers.

\textit{g.} Availability and responsiveness of security forces.

\textit{h.} Availability or existence of security enhancing systems, including—

1. Perimeter barriers.
2. Security lighting.
3. Communication systems.
4. Key and lock controls.
5. Stringent construction criteria for storage areas and armories.
6. Personnel and vehicular entry control.
7. Security training programs.
8. IDS (including closed circuit television (CCTV)).
3–2. Coordination

a. In developing a security plan, coordination and close liaison should be effected between the military commander and—
   (1) Adjacent installations or units.
   (2) Federal agencies.
   (3) State and local agencies.
   (4) Similar host country agencies.

b. To the extent permissible, such interaction should allow for an exchange of intelligence information on security measures being employed, contingency plans, and any other information to enhance local security.

c. On an installation, the host activity will assume responsibility for coordinating PS efforts of all tenants, regardless of the DOD components represented, as outlined in the support agreements and the host activity security plan. Applicable provisions will be included in, or be an appendix to, the support agreement.
   (1) Bilateral storage agreements will be used when—
      (a) The AA&E are stored on the installations or facilities of other U.S. or foreign government agencies or other DOD services.
      (b) Consolidated storage facilities are used to store AA&E belonging to more than 1 unit or organization.
   (2) A formal agreement, signed by both commanders, will contain definite assignment of PS responsibility for the items stored. The agreement will address—
      (a) Maximum quantities to be stored.
      (b) Physical safeguards to be used.
      (c) Frequency of, and the responsibility for, physical inventories or reconciliations.
      (d) Reporting of losses for investigations.
      (e) Key control procedures.
      (f) Unit that has overall responsibility for the storage facility.
      (g) Procedures for authorization and identification of individuals to receipt for physically taking custody of AA&E.
      (h) Risk categories of items to be stored.

d. The formal agreement concerning PS requirements for AA&E can be implemented by an appendix to a host/tenant activity support agreement or by a letter of instruction.

e. The purpose of such coordination is protection in–depth. Authority, jurisdiction, and responsibility must be set forth in a manner that ensures protection and avoids duplication of effort.

3–3. Contingency plans

In most instances, it will be necessary to increase security for AA&E and other sensitive property, assets, and facilities during periods of natural disasters, natural emergencies, or periods of increased threat from terrorist or criminal elements. Therefore, contingency plans should include provisions for increasing the PS measures and procedures for storage areas based on the local commander’s assessment of the situation. These provisions should be designed for early detection of an attempted intrusion, theft, or interruption of normal security conditions.

3–4. Security threats

a. The security plan will provide for the identification of local threats and should make full use of the investigative resources available in the geographic area to anticipate criminal activities that threaten the PS of AA&E assets. At a minimum, a liaison will be established with the following agencies:
   (1) Local FBI field office.
   (2) Local law enforcement agencies.
   (3) Intelligence and investigative agencies of the Uniformed Services.
   (4) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) field office.
   (5) Host country agencies where applicable.

b. Installation plans will address actions to counter thefts by employees. These actions include personnel screening (see para 2–11) and the monitoring to minimize opportunities for employee theft and to detect concealed shortages.

c. The USACIDC is designated as the single command for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating data on the criminal threat to the security of the Army. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) will perform a similar function as related to terrorist, hostile intelligence, demonstrator, and hostile special operation threats.

d. Commanders responsible for storage of AA&E will—
   (1) Coordinate with local USACIDC and MI elements to receive current data on any threat to the security of these items.
(2) Conduct periodic visits by USACIDC and MI personnel with commanders or their designated representatives. These visits should provide updated threat analysis data based on observed vulnerabilities.

(3) Assess the local requirements for PS protection.

(4) Incorporate into local security plans or SOPs, procedures for providing the following essential elements of criminal data to the nearest military police (MP) and USACIDC representatives as the data become available:
   (a) Any intent to steal AA&E.
   (b) Suspicious acts indicating that a storage area is being targeted by criminal elements.
   (c) Alleged offers to buy or barter for AA&E.
   (d) Losses of AA&E, including alleged inventory or administrative errors, together with the events surrounding individual losses.

3–5. Implementation of physical security planning

Commanders at each installation, unit, or activity will—
   a. Issue instructions regarding all phases of security operations pertinent to the installation, unit, or activity. These instructions will be reviewed at least annually for relevance and currency.
   b. Develop and implement an effective security awareness program based on current PS plans.
   c. Develop effective countermeasures to prevent or reduce the risk posed by potential threats.
   (1) Countermeasures should be consistent with the current PS plan and the requirements of Army PS regulations.
   (2) Physical security countermeasures consist of measures and procedures designed to reduce risk by—
      (a) Providing means of alerting response forces to the presence of intruders as soon as possible.
      (b) Providing means of delaying intruders long enough to prevent intruders from completing the purpose of the intrusion.
   (3) Physical security measures and procedures are specified in Army regulations and include—
      (a) Area patrols.
      (b) Continuous surveillance.
      (c) Security fences, doors, walls, and locks.
      (d) Security vaults.
      (e) Security lighting and emergency power supply.
      (f) IDS.
      (g) CCTV.
      (h) Clear zones.
      (i) Response forces.
   d. Sensitive or critical items or equipment should be stored in inner zones of an installation. This may require inventory, segregation, and restorage, where practical by risk categories.
   e. Security protection requirements for AA&E will be based on the highest category item stored in magazines or other structures.

3–6. Intrusion Detection System

The IDS is an essential part of the PS system. The IDS consists of the combination of electronic components, including sensors, control units, transmission lines, and monitoring units integrated to be capable of detecting all types of intrusion into an area protected by the system including the stay–behind threat. An IDS includes both interior and exterior systems. The system will be a DOD standardized system or DA approved commercial system. The following policy applies:
   a. Central monitoring station.
      (1) A central monitoring station (CMS) will be provided at which alarms will present audible and visual alerts and from which a response force will be dispatched. The response force is not required to be collocated with the CMS.
      (2) The CMS will alarm with audible and visual alerts whenever the system detects possible intrusion into the protected area or when the system is turned off, malfunctions, or is placed in maintenance mode.
      (3) Some means of communication will be provided between the protected area and the CMS to coordinate status changes. Telephone communication should be considered.
      (4) Where IDS is used in civilian communities, arrangements will be made to connect alarms to civil police headquarters, private security companies, or a monitoring service from which immediate response can be directed. A commercial answering service is not authorized. Coordination is required with civil authorities to ensure a response force can be directed immediately.
   b. Response force. The response force should respond to an activated alarm as soon as possible, but in no case may arrival at the scene exceed 15 minutes.
   c. Alarm circuitry.
(1) Circuitry will be used that requires alarm signals to be cleared either at the CMS or from inside the protected area.

(2) Circuitry will be configured to ensure that alarms that announce intrusion detection have priority over other events announcements such as a power or communication change.

(3) Use of alarm delay switches at RC facilities is prohibited.

(4) On and off, access, maintenance mode, and secure switches not located at the CMS will be located within the protected area.

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d. Sensors.

(1) All AA&E storage facilities (other than bulk storage facilities) that require IDS will be protected by at least a heavy-duty, industrial-grade balanced magnetic switch and a volumetric sensor such as a passive infrared sensor.


(3) Walk-test lights should be disabled.

(4) Boundary sensors, such as vibration sensors, are encouraged.

(5) Dual- and tri-technology sensors, without need for independent alarm condition sensing, are authorized.

(6) Additional levels of protection, when practical, are encouraged (duress signaling components, for example) and will be considered for Category I and II arms storage facilities.

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e. Personal identification numbers.

(1) A separate personal identification numbers (PIN) will be issued to each person whose duties require the ability to operate the IDS.

(2) The PINs will not be shared.

(3) The PINs will not be written anywhere except for official record maintained by the facility manager or designee.

(4) The PINs that have been or believed to be compromised will be immediately replaced.

(5) The PINs will be withdrawn immediately when the individual to whom it was issued departs the organization or no longer requires the ability to operate the IDS.

(6) The PINs will be secured to the same degree as afforded to IDS keys and to keys and combinations used to access the protected area.

(7) The PINs and IDS point of contact call rosters will be reviewed semiannually by the facility manager or designee to ensure the information is current and will document this in writing with an informal memorandum retained on file for 1 year.

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f. Signs.

(1) Signs will be prominently displayed announcing the presence of IDS.

(2) All IDS signs will be affixed at general eye-level (when possible) on the exterior of each interior wall of the protected area that contains an entrance.

(3) All IDS signs will be affixed on exterior walls of the building only if the exterior wall contains an entrance to the protected area.

(4) Specifications for IDS signs are per appendix F.

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g. Power supply.

(1) A protected, independent, backup power supply will be used that provides a minimum of 4 hours of uninterruptible power.

(2) The backup power supply will be maintained at full charge by automatic charging circuits.

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h. Event logs. A daily log will be maintained of all alarm events, and at a minimum will include—

(1) The nature of the alarm such as system failure or nuisance alarm.

(2) The date and time the alarm was received.

(3) The location and action taken in response to the alarm.

(4) Any other information that will aid technical analysis.

(5) Logs will be maintained for a minimum of 1 year and will be reviewed periodically to identify, monitor, and correct system reliability problems.

(6) Logs will be generated and maintained at the CMS. Optionally, DA Form 4930 (Alarm/Intrusion Detection Record) may be used.

(7) Serious or recurring problems will be described in writing and expeditiously sent through command channels to HQDA PMG (DAPM–MPD–PS), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–2800.

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i. Data transmission.

(1) Electrical line supervision.

(a) Data transmission lines for the alarm circuits will have line supervision to detect and report evidence of tampering or malfunction.

(b) Visible lines will be inspected weekly.

(2) Dual data transmission.
If line supervision is not available, 2 independent means of alarm signal transmission will be used from the protected area to the CMS.

One of the 2 independent means of alarm signal transmission must be either a long–range radio or cellular telephone link.

Two non–dedicated, hardwire telephone links are not acceptable.

The dual transmission equipment must continuously monitor the integrity of both the telephone wire line and the wireless link.

Upon loss of either communication path, the system must immediately notify the CMS via the other communication link.

The dual transmission equipment must be able to seize control of the communication links (line seizure), even if that link is already in use.

j. Tamper protection.

Communications equipment and connections, including cellular equipment, will be mounted in tamper protected enclosures or protected by sensors.

Communications equipment, including cellular wireless where possible, will be located within the protected area.

Systems will be tested quarterly and a log maintained for at least 1 year for recording all tests.

Visible lines will be inspected on a regular basis.

The tamper detection will be continuously monitored whether the system is in a secure or access mode of operation.

All intrusion detection equipment enclosures with removable covers will be equipped with tamper switches. These equipment enclosures are not required to be locked. Keyed–alike locks are authorized if the commander decides to lock the enclosures.

Enclosures that are not routinely opened for maintenance purposes (such as pull boxes) need not have tamper switches installed if they contain no connections or splices and the covers are held in place by tack welding, brazing, or tamper resistant security fasteners.

k. Electrical conduit.

Data transmission lines that are located inside the protected area may be installed in electric metallic tubing that complies with UFGS 26 20 00, paragraph 2.2.4. The electric metallic tubing couplings and connectors will be compression type.

When data transmission lines exit the protected area but are still located interior to the building, they may be enclosed in intermediate metal conduit that complies with UFGS 26 20 00, paragraph 2.2.3.

When transmission lines exit the building, they will be enclosed in rigid metal conduit that complies with UFGS 26 20 00, paragraph 2.2.1.1.

Data transmission lines installed in other configurations of metallic conduit prior to the date of this publication are acceptable and do not have to be replaced to comply with this requirement.

l. Personnel.

Only authorized personnel should be allowed access to unclassified IDS installation wiring diagrams for a specific facility or location. This also applies to information on known, specific vulnerabilities or countermeasures affecting the IDS.

Civilian employees whose duties involve the design, operation, or maintenance of IDS require completion of a favorable national agency check with written inquiries prior to appointment to such noncritical, sensitive positions. Civilian contractor employees must possess a minimum security clearance of confidential, granted in accordance with AR 380–67.

A check of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) for installers and maintainers of unclassified IDS is a command decision. The decision will be based on the sensitivity of the area to be protected and the need for quality control over personnel having access.

Installers, maintainers, and operators of unclassified IDS will undergo a command–oriented security check. The security check should be made with the area PM or other agencies that might have information bearing on the honesty or stability of the individual. The requirement for command–oriented security checks should be based on local jurisdiction policies, the local threat and sensitivity, and vulnerability of the protected facility.

m. Maintenance.

Monthly operational checks will be conducted to ensure sensor activation and to visually inspect components and conduit for evidence of tampering.

Commercial intrusion detection systems employing sensors equipped with a remote–test feature that activate the same sensing phenomenology as would an actual intruder do not require operational checks by organization personnel.

Each zone component will be checked and tested by alarm maintenance personnel a minimum of every 6 months during routine preventive maintenance.

Maintenance will be provided by personnel who are qualified to install and repair IDS. Maintenance will be performed consistent with operational requirements to ensure continuous operation and reliability of each system.
n. Physical security inspectors. The PS inspectors will—
   (1) Review event logs for areas of concern during inspections.
   (2) Check the IDS during security inspections to verify proper operating condition. Checks will include inspection of components and conduit for evidence of tampering.

o. System acceptance.
   (1) Prior to accepting a newly installed IDS into operation, an inspection will be conducted by qualified technical personnel to ensure the system meets minimum acceptable standards.
   (2) A statement of verification will be recorded on DA Form 4604 and maintained in the using unit or organization files.

p. Security classification. An IDS will be considered for security classification if it meets the specific classifying criteria per AR 380–5. An appropriate personnel security clearance will be obtained if the IDS is classified.

q. Intrusion Detection System key security. Keys associated with IDS components will be safeguarded and controlled according to paragraph 3–8, below.

3–7. Security forces
A security patrol, guard patrol, or unit personnel will periodically check facilities and areas used to store sensitive or critical items or equipment as prescribed herein and as dictated by a threat and vulnerability analysis. Checks will be conducted on an irregular basis during non–duty hours to avoid establishment of a pattern. Security checks will be made to ensure unauthorized personnel are not in the area and the structures are intact and have not been breached. During periods of increased vigilance because of a threat situation, security patrols will physically inspect doors and locks on all storage structures in their area of responsibility. Selection of personnel to perform guard duties will be closely monitored by commanders to ensure only properly trained and reliable individuals are assigned duty. Supervisory checks will be conducted to ensure guard duties are being performed properly.
   a. Security patrols may be conducted by military personnel; civilian security personnel, including contract personnel; U.S. Marshal Service; or State, local, or campus police.
   b. Security forces that are DA controlled, will be provided with adequate means of communication.
   c. Security forces personnel (for example, guards, security patrols, security reaction forces) will be armed with appropriate weapons and ammunition. If such personnel are armed, provisions of AR 190–14 apply.
   d. Guard procedures will be reviewed at least annually and revised if necessary to provide greater application of security measures and will place special emphasis on guard post locations and guard orientation concerning duties to be performed.
   e. Inspections and guard checks will be increased during nights, weekends, and holidays to provide for deterrence of violations and early detection of loss. These checks will be recorded and will consist of an inspection of the building or facility including all doors and windows. Records of these checks will be maintained in an active file for a minimum of 90 days and then destroyed.
   f. Law enforcement patrol plans will be coordinated and integrated with the guard plan or other security plans and programs to the maximum extent possible. When facilities are located in civilian communities, a liaison will be established with local civil police agencies to ensure that periodic surveillance is conducted and that a coordination plan for security exists.

3–8. Key and lock controls
   a. Only approved locks and locking devices (including hasps and chains) will be used (see glossary definition of locks for a list of DA approved locks and hasps). All questions regarding the identity of approved commercial equivalent locks and locking devices (including hasps and chains) meeting military specifications will be addressed to the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC), Port Hueneme, CA 93043–5000, (805) 982–1212 (DSN 551–1212) and the DOD Lock Program Office at https://portal.navfac.navy.mil/go/locks.
   b. Keys will be signed out to authorized personnel, as needed, on a key control register. The DA Form 5513 (Key Control Register and Inventory) will be used to meet the requirements of this regulation. When not in use, the key control register will be kept in a locked container that does not contain or store classified material and to which access is controlled.
   c. Keys and combinations to locks for AA&E storage facilities, arms racks, IDS (operational or maintenance), or key containers will not be removed from the installation except to provide for protected storage elsewhere.
   d. Keys to locks securing key containers will be afforded physical protection equivalent to that provided by the key container itself. Keys to AA&E storage buildings, rooms, racks, containers, and IDS will be maintained separately from other keys and accessible only to those individuals whose official duties require access to them.
      (1) A current roster of these individuals will be kept within the unit, agency, or organization. The roster will be protected from public view.
      (2) The roster will be signed by the designated official and contain the names of those individuals authorized to receive keys from the key custodian.
      (3) At no time will keys be in the custody of a person not listed on the roster.
e. A key control register will be maintained at the unit level to ensure continuous accountability for keys, ensure positive control of keys, and establish responsibility for the custody of stored AA&E. Key control registers will contain printed name and signature of the individual receiving the key, date and hour of issuance, serial number or other identifying information of the key, printed name and signature of the person issuing the key, date and hour key was returned, and the printed name and signature of the individual receiving the returned key. Completed key control registers will be retained for 1 year.

f. Keys to AA&E storage buildings, rooms, racks, containers, and IDS may be secured together in the same key container. However, keys required for maintenance and repair of IDS, including keys to the control unit door and monitor cabinet, will be kept separate from other operational IDS keys and access permitted only to authorized maintenance personnel. Under no circumstances will IDS or AA&E keys or locks or alternate keys or locks be placed in any security container that contains or stores classified material. The primary and secondary room keys may be placed in separately locked metal containers and secured with an approved locking device. The secondary/alternate keys will be stored at the next higher command in a secure location, that is, multiple drawer security container.

g. When arms and ammunition are stored in the same areas, keys to those storage areas may be maintained together, but separately from other keys that do not pertain to AA&E storage. The number of keys will be held to the minimum essential. Keys may not be left unattended or unsecured at any time.

h. When not attended or in use, keys will be secured in a locked key container. Any General Services Administration (GSA) approved security container, or equivalent container or key container of at least 20-gauge steel, is acceptable for storing such keys. An appropriate locking system will be used to lock the key container. The key container will be located in a room where it is kept under surveillance or in a room that can be locked during non-duty hours. Procedures will be established to preclude access of stored keys which require 2-person control.

i. An automated, lockable key container is authorized provided the container meets GSA standards and generates a record of key usage. Ensure the electronic key container is properly programmed permitting only authorized personnel access to duty specific keys. The printed record will contain the name of the individual receiving the key, date and time of issuance, and date and time returned. A printed record will be produced each time a key is removed and returned. In case of a system failure, detailed instructions will be included in the lock and key SOP on how accountability will be maintained and emergency access to the keys stored in the automated container.

j. When combinations, codes, or electronic equipment are used in lieu of keys, the control procedures used for keys will apply to maintain the integrity of the combinations, codes, or electronic equipment.

k. In the event of lost, misplaced, or stolen keys, a commander’s inquiry will be conducted immediately. Replacement of reserve locks, cores, and keys will be secured to preclude access by unauthorized individuals. The use of a master key system or multiple key systems is prohibited.

l. A key and lock custodian, where duties include assuring proper handling of keys and locks, will be appointed in writing. Only the commander and the key custodian (or alternate, if appointed) will issue and receive keys to and from individuals on the key access roster (d, above). Personnel listed on the roster may transfer custody, in writing, among themselves. The key and lock custodian’s duties will also include procurement and receipt of keys and locks, and investigation of lost or stolen keys. The key and lock custodian will maintain a record to identify each key and lock and combinations to locks used by the activity, including replacement or reserve keys and locks. The record will show the current location and custody of each key and lock. The key and lock custodian will ensure that individuals who are designated to issue, receive, and account for keys in his/her absence, clearly understand local key control procedures.

m. Padlocks will be locked to the staple or hasp when the area of container is open to preclude theft, loss, or substitution of the lock.

n. Locks and their keys will be inventoried by serial number semiannually. Padlocks and keys which do not have a serial number will be given one. This number will be inscribed on the lock or key as appropriate. The inventory records will be retained in unit files for a minimum of 1 year. A key and lock inventory will contain a record of keys, locks, key serial numbers, lock serial numbers, location, and the number of keys maintained for each lock. This record will be secured in the key depository.

o. When individuals are charged with the responsibility for safeguarding or otherwise having keys immediately available, they will sign for a sealed container of keys. A sealed container is a locked and sealed key container, or a sealed envelope (SF 700 (Security Container Information) per AR 380–5) containing the key or combination to the key container. When the sealed container of keys is transferred from 1 individual to another, the unbroken seal is evidence that the keys have not been disturbed. The seal need not be broken for inventory of keys. However, evidence of tampering with a sealed container will require an inventory of the keys and such other action as may be required by the commander concerned. If the keys are not placed in a sealed container, an inventory of keys will be made by serial number or other identifying information of the key (for example, stamped number on key). The inventory and change
of custody will be recorded on the DA Form 5513 (see para 2–11 for requirements to determine reliability of personnel authorized to issue and control keys to arms and Category I and II ammunition and explosives storage facilities).

p. Combinations to locks on vault doors or GSA approved Class 5 or Class 6 security containers will be changed annually or upon change of custodian, armorer, or other person having knowledge of the combination, or when the combination has been subject to possible compromise. Combinations will also be changed when a container is first put into service. The combination will be recorded using SF 700, sealed in the envelope provided, and stored in a container meeting storage requirements per AR 380–5. No other written record of the combination will be kept. Controls will be established to ensure that the envelopes containing combinations to locks or containers are not made available to unauthorized personnel.

q. Replacement of lock cylinders and broken keys for high security locks may be requested through normal supply channels. Requests will be coordinated through the key control custodian.

r. The use of master or keyed alike locks is prohibited.

Chapter 4
Protection of Arms

4–1. General
This chapter prescribes the criteria and standards for the protection of arms in custody of DA components, arms, including firearms in rod and gun club facilities, will be stored in an arms room, modular vault, or an arms storage building per the requirements of this chapter.

a. When storage in an arms storage room, modular vault, or building impedes training or operational requirements, arms may be stored or installed on the Naval craft, vehicle, or aircraft to which assigned or in other configurations per this regulation and as specified by HQDA PMG (DAPM–MPD–PS). Weapons stored or installed in tanks, vehicles, or aircraft will be protected as part of the overall system in which they are stored or installed.

1) Commanders will establish appropriate security measures to ensure weapons stored or installed in tanks, vehicles, or aircraft are protected at all times, particularly when tanks, vehicles, or aircraft are unmanned. The following guidance applies:

(a) When not in use, tanks, vehicles, or aircraft containing weapons will be parked inside a secure motor pool or an aircraft park area. Level III security measures in AR 190–51, paragraphs 3–3 and 3–5, apply.

(b) When operational readiness permits, weapons mounted on tanks, vehicles, or aircraft that are accessible and easily removable will be dismounted and secured inside the locked tank, vehicle, aircraft, or other secure location. Weapons that are dismounted and secured inside the locked tank, vehicle, aircraft, and weapons that remain installed on board will be made inoperable by removal of barrels or other essential firing components. Such components will be secured in a locked metal container inside the tank, vehicle, or aircraft, or other secure location. The container will be secured to the tank, vehicle, aircraft, or other secure structure with bolts or chains equipped with secondary padlocks. Spare barrels may be stored inside a locked, totally enclosed armored combat vehicle when the other essential firing components are secured in an arms storage room and the vehicle is parked inside a motor park which provides continuous surveillance by guards and Level III security measures per AR 190–51, paragraphs 3–3 and 3–5.

(c) Weapon systems that are impractical to dismount, due to operational readiness or damage to the weapon system will be made inoperable by the removal of essential component or components. Such components will be secured as in (b), above. Electrical power may be considered an essential component on the 20mm and 30mm weapon systems.

(d) When electrical power is the only essential component removed from the weapons systems, ammunition for those weapons systems will not be stored on board the tank, vehicle, or aircraft. Level II security measures per AR 190–51, paragraphs 3–3 and 3–5 apply.

(2) Large weapons (for example, crew served weapons and mortar tubes) that cannot be secured in arms rooms or other arms storage facilities because of inadequate storage space, may be stored in a locked, totally enclosed armored vehicle. In such cases, security requirements in (1), above, apply.

(3) Large weapons that cannot be secured in arms rooms, as stated above, may also be secured in other secure locations, such as a room made secure by compensatory measures. In such cases, protection and surveillance by guard or other personnel will be provided according to the risk category of the weapons involved. Such weapons will be rendered inoperable according to the requirements prescribed in (b), above.

(4) During maintenance support operations, weapon components may be stored in a storage facility meeting security requirements according to the risk category of the items involved.

(5) Commanders may authorize storage of small quantities of Category IV arms in a GSA approved Class 5 security container not storing classified documents or materials without IDS, security lighting, and security patrol requirements. Commanders will decide the number to be stored on the basis of mission and operational requirements in conjunction with an assessment of vulnerability and threat conditions. Provisions above apply only to small units (for example, USACIDC detachment) that must store a small quantity of prescribed weapons for operational requirements.
b. Individuals issued or in possession of arms are responsible for security of this property while it is entrusted to their care.

(1) Each weapon issued for training, operations, or any other reasons will be carried on the person of the individual to whom issued at all times or it will be properly safeguarded and secured. Except during emergencies, weapons will not be entrusted to the custody of any other person except those responsible for the security of operational weapons. These persons will comply with issue and turn-in procedures. Local procedures will be established to secure and account for the weapons of personnel medically evacuated during training and operations.

(2) During field exercises and training, pistols and revolvers issued to persons will be secured to the person by either a locally made lanyard or military issued field lanyard (national stock number (NSN) 8465–00–965–1705).

(3) Pistols or revolvers that lack a device to affix the lanyard will be secured by running the lanyard through the pistol/revolver trigger guard during field and training exercises when drawing the pistol/revolver is not contemplated. If drawing the pistol/revolver is contemplated, such pistol/revolver is exempt from the lanyard requirements.

(4) Pistols and revolvers issued for operational purposes need not be secured by a lanyard except where specified in other regulations.

(5) Local commanders will prescribe in writing specific accountability and security measured to prevent the loss of other weapons assigned to persons.

(6) The USACIDC may authorize individuals to retain their assigned weapons in their private quarters if the necessity is dictated by operational requirements. In such instances, USACIDC will establish accountability safeguards and security measures.

4–2. Storage and supplemental controls

a. Storage and supplemental controls.

(1) New facilities built for storage of Category II arms will meet the facility criteria in appendix G.

(2) An existing facility in which Category II, III, and IV arms are stored together will meet the criteria for facilities storing Category II arms in appendix G.

(3) Category II arms stored in arms storage buildings or rooms that do not meet or exceed the criteria for Category II arms may be stored in GSA approved Class 5 security containers not containing classified documents or materials, or in a safe–type steel file container not containing classified documents or materials, having a 3–position, dial–type, combination lock providing forced entry protection as approved by GSA (Fed Spec AA–F–363D as amended) or in approved modular vaults not containing classified documents or materials with GSA approved Class 5 vault doors or GSA approved Class 5 armory doors. Modular vaults meeting Fed Spec AA–V–2737 may be used to meet this requirement. Vaults, containers and safes will be under 24–hour armed guard surveillance or protected by an approved IDS, and the facility will be checked by a security patrol at least once every 8 hours. Modular vaults are not approved for exterior use unless specifically designed for exterior applications. Modular vaults used in exterior applications are subject to the same additional controls as for the portable armories.

(4) Category III and Category IV arms will be stored in facilities meeting or exceeding the criteria in appendix G.

(5) Categories III and IV arms that are stored in facilities that do not meet or exceed the criteria for Categories III and IV arms may be stored in a GSA approved Class 5 security container, not containing classified material or documents, or a safe–type steel file cabinet not containing classified material or providing forced entry protection as approved by GSA (Fed Spec AA–F–363D, as amended). Containers weighing less than 500 pounds will be secured to the structure.

(6) Category IV arms that are stored in unmanned facilities not equipped with an IDS will be checked by a security patrol or guard patrol at irregular intervals not to exceed 24 hours.

(7) Portable armories are authorized for the storage of Category II through IV arms provided they are built to U.S. Government specification (Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) 3046–93.2. Additional information can be obtained from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 300 Highway 361, Crane, IN 47522–5001 (telephone 812–854–5615). Implement the following additional controls:

(a) Intrusion Detection System. Portable military armories storing Category II through IV arms will be provided with an approved IDS. Facilities without an operational IDS require constant surveillance by armed guards.

(b) Security patrols. Facilities will be checked by a security patrol periodically as dictated by any threat and by the vulnerability of the facility. The intervals between checks will not exceed 8 hours.

(c) Security lighting. Exterior lighting will be provided for all portable armories. The lighting will be sufficient to allow guards (or individuals responsible for maintaining surveillance) to see illegal acts such as forced entry, or the unauthorized removal of arms during hours of reduced visibility. Lighting will provide a minimum of 0.2 foot–candles (2lux) illumination measured on the horizontal plane at ground level.

(d) Locks and hasps. Doors used for access to the portable armory will be locked with an approved high security locking device or high security padlock and hasp providing comparable protection to the locks.

b. Arms racks and storage containers.

(1) When not in use, arms will be stored in banded crates, metal containers, approved standard issue racks or locally fabricated arms racks, and secured in approved weapons storage facilities. Standard issue approved metal wall lockers
or metal cabinets may be used. Crates or containers will be banded, locked, or sealed in a way that will prevent weapon removal without leaving visible signs of tampering. Screws or bolts used in assembling containers, lockers, or cabinets will be made secure to prevent disassembly.

2) Standard issue DA approved arms racks will be obtained through Government supply channels. Consider all arms racks that have a NSN and are not a part of a shipping container as DA approved. Weapons without a specific standard issue arms rack may be secured in a DA approved Universal Arms Rack (NSN 1095–01–454–6320, rack, storage, small arms, incorporated). The continued use of existing locally fabricated arms racks is prohibited unless certified as security equivalent to standard issue racks by DA. Modifications to existing DA approved arms racks, which have assigned NSNs, are prohibited without prior approval from DA. A Tank–Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) logistics assistance representative and a battalion command–level representative will jointly perform certification authorizing the continued use of prior locally fabricated arms racks. The joint certification will serve as verification of the security adequacy of such arms racks. The AMC executive agent for small arms logistics and demilitarization (EA–SALD) office at Rock Island, IL, will provide the certification training and administer the certification process and issue certificates required. Locally fabricated arms racks that are logistics assistance representative and battalion representative certified will be considered DA approved EA–SALD; stamped with a serial number, identifying the type of weapon rack; and tracked in a local database maintained by the EA–SALD office. The using unit will maintain the certification on file where such racks are used, as it will serve as security verification of the adequacy of such racks. The minimum requirements for certification of previously locally fabricated arms racks are—

(a) Fabrication and/or modification constructed of metal having an inherent strength that would prevent an individual from manipulating components (without tools) such that the weapon, receiver, or barrel could be removed.

(b) Overall design of fabrication and/or modification such that a weapon, receiver, or barrel cannot be removed by disassembly of the weapon/component and/or the rack without damage to the rack.

(c) Hinged locking bars for racks have the hinge pin welded or otherwise secured to prevent disassembly.

(d) Bolts or machine screws used for fabrication or modification are a minimum of 3/8-inch diameter. The bolt and nut will be tack welded, brazed, or peened to prevent disassembly.

(e) When all features in (a) through (d), above, are adequate, apply certification serial number provided by the EA–SALD to the rack in an appropriate location. Metal stamps, indelible marker, or paint stencil may be used.

3) Requests for certification of locally fabricated or modified arms racks will be submitted to: Commander, U.S. Army Tank–Automotive Command, ATTN: EA–SALD (AMSTA–LC–CSL), Rock Island, IL 61299–6000.

4) All arms racks or containers will be locked with approved secondary padlocks. In facilities that are not manned 24 hours a day, rifle racks and containers weighing less than 500 pounds will be fastened to the structure (or fastened together in groups totaling more than 500 pounds) with bolts or with chains equipped with secondary padlocks. Bolts used to secure racks will be spot welded, brazed, or peened to prevent easy removal. Chains used to secure racks (and containers) will be heavy-duty hardened steel, welded, straight links steel, galvanized of at least 5/16-inch thickness, or of equivalent resistance to force required to cut or break a secondary padlock.

5) When weapons are in transit, stored in depots or warehouses, or held for contingencies, the weapons crates or containers need not be fastened to the structure. However, such crates or containers will be banded or locked and sealed in a way that will prevent weapon removal without leaving visible signs of tampering. The facilities and buildings in which these weapons are stored will meet the structure and other security requirements of this regulation. Arms being unpacked or packed for shipping or in assembly–line configuration in a maintenance repair or rebuild facility do not require storage in racks or containers. However, the facilities in which they are stored will meet the structure and other security requirements of this regulation.

c. Security lighting.

1) Interior and exterior lighting will be provided for all arms storage buildings, buildings in which arms storage rooms are located, and arms storage rooms. The lighting will be sufficient to allow guards (or individuals responsible for maintaining surveillance) to see illegal acts, such as forced entry or the unauthorized removal of arms during hours of reduced visibility.

2) Areas appropriate for lighting include entrances to buildings, corridors, and arms rooms. When an arms room is located inside a building, the entrance door to the arms room will be illuminated. Arms rooms that are located within another room (for example, a supply room), do not require security lighting over the arms room door. When an arms room is located inside another secured room, the exterior door to that room will be illuminated.

3) Security lighting will also be provided for motor pools, hangars, and outdoor parking areas for vehicles or aircraft that have weapons installed or stored on board.

4) Switches for exterior lights will be installed so that they are not accessible to unauthorized individuals.

5) Exterior lights will be covered with wire mesh screen or equipped with vandal resistant lenses that will prevent the lights from being broken by thrown objects.

d. Doors, locks, and locking devices.

1) Except for GSA approved Class 5 steel vault doors with built–in, 3–position, changeable combination locks, doors used for access to arms storage rooms or structures will be locked with an approved high security locking device or high security padlock and hasp providing comparable protection to the locks. An approved high security shrouded
hassp will be used to secure Category I and II AA&E storage facilities to enhance their security. Doors used for access to arms storage rooms will be locked with approved locks and hasps. On existing storage facilities equipped with double-door protection, high security padlocks and hasps will be used on the most secure door. Secondary padlocks will be used to secure the other door of the double-door concept. Other doors that cannot be secured from the inside with locking bars or dead bolts will be secured on the inside with approved secondary padlocks (for example, issue window or portals). When high security hasps are installed, locking bars and T-pins should be left in place to aid in opening and closing doors and prevent any future misalignment of the hasps. Panic hardware, when required, will be installed to prevent opening the door by tampering from the outside. Panic hardware will meet safety, fire, and building codes and be approved by the Underwriters Laboratory or host country requirements as applicable.

2) Key and lock controls will be established per paragraph 3–8.

3) Facilities in which vehicles or aircraft are stored with sensitive items aboard will be secured by approved secondary padlocks. Aircrafts will be secured with manufacturer-installed or approved modification work order door-locking devices when not in use. All hatches and other openings to track vehicles which cannot be secured from the inside will be secured from the outside with approved secondary padlocks.

e. Additional controls.

1) Intrusion Detection System for arms storage facilities. Arms room storing Category II arms, GSA approved Class 5 weapons storage cabinets, and GSA approved security modular vaults will be provided with an approved IDS. Facilities without an operational IDS require constant surveillance by armed guards for Category II arms while Category III and IV facilities require a check by security patrol at irregular intervals not to exceed 24 hours. In the event that the arming of guards off a military installation is prohibited by State or territorial law, a request for exception to this requirement according to paragraph 2–4 is required. The exception will include the rationale and justification for not utilizing armed guards and the compensatory security measures taken.

2) Security patrols.

(a) Facilities will be checked by a security patrol periodically as dictated by any threat and by the vulnerability of the facility. For Category II IDS protected facilities, the intervals between checks will not exceed 8 hours. For Category III and IV facilities, the intervals between checks will be once every 24 hours and once every 48 hours for IDS protected storage facilities.

(b) Facilities storing arms outside a military installation will be checked by a security patrol on an irregular basis at an interval not to exceed 24 hours.

3) Rendering weapons inoperable. If the facility is not located on a military installation, weapons will be rendered inoperable by the method shown in table 4–1 under any of the following conditions below:

(a) A facility does not meet structural criteria.

(b) A threat is received.

(c) An IDS is inoperative for a period of 24 hours or longer.

(d) During periods of annual field training, if arms are left in the facility.

(e) Decision of the commander having direct security responsibility for the facility.

4) Storing removed items. The items removed for the purpose of rendering a weapon inoperable will be tagged with the weapons serial number to ensure return to the same weapon and secured in a separate building. Etching of weapon’s serial number on the removed parts is prohibited. The removed items will be stored in a locked container in a secure area away from the arms storage facility. If a secure area is not available for separate storage of these items, the container will be stored in the arms storage facility and secured to the structure with an approved lock and chain or equal methods when the container weighs less than 500 pounds.

Table 4–1
Methods for rendering small arms inoperable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon: Carbine, Caliber .30 M1</th>
<th>Method: Remove bolt assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Gun, Auto 25mm M242</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt and track assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Launcher, grenade 40mm M79</td>
<td>Method: Remove barrel assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Launcher, grenade 40mm M203</td>
<td>Method: Remove barrel assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: MG, Caliber .50 M2 series</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt assembly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon: MG, 7.62mm M60 series</th>
<th>Method: Remove breech block</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: MG, 7.62mm M73 series</td>
<td>Method: Remove breech block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: MG, Caliber .50 M85</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: MG, 7.62mm M219</td>
<td>Method: Remove breech block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: MG, 7.62mm M240 series</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt and operating rod assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: MG, 5.56mm 249</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt and slide assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: MG, 40mm MK19 Mod 3</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Pistol, semi–auto, Caliber .45 M1911A1</td>
<td>Method: Remove firing pin and spring. Leave stop installed to prevent damage of firing pin hold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Pistol, semi–auto, Caliber .22</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt or slide assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Pistol, semi–auto, 9mm M9</td>
<td>Method: Remove firing pin assembly, recoil spring, and the spring guide from the spring assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Rifle, Caliber .22—all types</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Rifle, Caliber .30 M1 series</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Rifle, 7.62mm M14 series</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Rifle, 5.56mm, M16 series</td>
<td>Method: Remove firing pin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Rifle, Caliber .30 M1918</td>
<td>Method: Remove firing pin series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Shotgun, 12–gauge, riot type</td>
<td>Method: Remove barrel assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Sub MG, Caliber .45 M1 series</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Sub MG, Caliber .45 M3 series</td>
<td>Method: Remove bolt assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Sub MG, 5.56mm M231</td>
<td>Method: Remove firing pin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Recoilless rifle, 90mm M67</td>
<td>Method: Remove breech block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Revolver, Colt</td>
<td>Method: Remove cylinder and crane assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Revolver, Ruger</td>
<td>Method: Remove strut assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon: Revolver, Smith and Wesson</td>
<td>Method: Remove cylinder and yoke assembly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
f. Reserve Component weapons. The Army policy of close cooperation between Active Army and RC activities is an essential element in eliminating the theft or loss of AA&E. At times, RC activities may need to use local Active Army facilities for the temporary storage of AA&E as the result of emergency situations (for example, during vehicle breakdown when transporting weapons) when an increased threat situation is forecast or present and during rifle matches. Active Army facilities are authorized and encouraged to assist in temporarily securing RC items. However, the receiving unit will ensure the accountability (number and type items, including serial numbers) of those items accepted for storage. The above policy also applies between RCs as well as the temporary storage of Active Army stocks at Reserve storage facilities.

4–3. Storage of classified weapon trainers
Because of security classification, nuclear weapon trainers, or other classified weapon trainers may be stored in separate locked containers or wire cages in arms storage facilities when alternate facilities are not available per AR 380–5, chapter 5. Commanders will prescribe supplementary measures and controls to prevent unauthorized access and ensure the items are accounted for at all times.

4–4. Consolidated arms rooms
   a. Arms belonging to more than 1 unit or organization may be stored in the same arms room or arms storage facility.
   b. One commander will be designated as having responsibility for the overall security of the consolidated storage facility.
   c. Procedures will be established to fix responsibility for issue, receipt, and physical accountability for arms, including ammunition, and all other sensitive items, stored in the consolidated storage facility per AR 710–2 and DA Pam 710–2–1.
   d. Access controls will be established to ensure protection of each unit’s arms.
   e. Arms and other sensitive items will be segregated by unit.
      (1) Expanded metal mesh screening will be utilized (see USACE STD design drawing 40–21–01 at http://www.usace.army.mil).
      (2) Units with small quantities of arms may use locked metal containers instead of separation by security cage.
      (3) Cages will be locked. Each cage will be identified with unit designation (name).
   f. Procedures for such consolidated arrangements will be established in SOP of the consolidated storage facility, or in the SOP of the higher headquarters. In addition to those procedures as mentioned in 4–4b, the SOP will establish who will obtain the operational load of ammunition, type/quantity, and the accountability of same for armed guard. It will also establish procedures for who is responsible for the armed guard in case of IDS failure for short and extended periods of time. The SOP will also include a plan for testing of the IDS. (Reserve Components should also include in the plan who will take over such duties in the event of mobilization and who will be responsible for weapons left behind by mobilized unit.)

4–5. Privately–owned weapons and ammunition
   a. Commanders will establish procedures and publicize punitive policies that regulate privately–owned weapons, explosives, or ammunition on the installation. Such policies will provide for—
      (1) Registration of firearms belonging to personnel living on the installation.
      (2) Procedures for the carrying and use of weapons by hunters and marksmanship shooters using installation firing ranges.
      (3) Identification of prohibited weapons, such as crossbows, nunchucks, swords, throwing stars.
   b. The carrying of privately–owned weapons, explosives, or ammunition on military installations are prohibited unless authorized by the installation commander or his designated representative.
      (1) Signs will be posted at installation access control points depicting this prohibition.
      (2) This prohibition does not apply to the lawful performance of official duties by an officer, agent, or employee of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, who is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of law or security duties.
   c. Commanders will ensure privately–owned arms and ammunition (including authorized war trophies) are protected on their installations and facilities. Commanders will—
      (1) Secure arms and ammunition belonging to Soldiers living on the installation in the installation armory or unit arms rooms in approved locked containers separate from the military AA&E. Storage requirements in this regulation apply.
      (2) Installation commanders may authorize storage of these items in other locations on military installations, provided they are properly secured.
      (3) Account for and inventory the privately–owned arms and ammunition by conducting inventories when inventorying Government arms and ammunition.
(a) A DA Form 3749 (Equipment Receipt) will be issued for each privately–owned weapon secured in the arms rooms.

(b) Privately–owned weapons will be inventoried in conjunction with, and at the frequency of, the inventory of Government weapons.

(c) Commanders will establish limits on the quantity and type of privately–owned ammunition stored in the arms room, based upon availability of space and safety considerations.

(d) Post applicable local regulations and State and local law information on ownership, registration, and possession of weapons and ammunition on unit bulletin boards.

(e) Conduct inspections per AR 190–13 and this regulation to ensure proper storage and control.

(f) Process unauthorized AA&E in accordance with AR 195–5.

(g) Prohibit retention and storage of incendiary devices and explosives.

(h) Brief all newly assigned persons on this regulation and subordinate command guidance. All personnel will be made aware of changes.

(d) Personnel keeping or storing privately–owned arms and ammunition (including authorized war trophies) on military installation will—

(1) Comply with Federal, State, and local laws and regulations on ownership, possession, registration, off–post transport, and use.

(2) Store both arms and ammunition in the unit arms room or other locations authorized by the installation commander.

(3) Follow local security and safety regulations. Safeguard the unit issued DA Form 3749 for turn–in to the unit armorer when the weapon is withdrawn from the arms room.

(4) Withdraw privately–owned weapons and ammunition from the unit arms rooms only upon approval of the unit commander or the commander’s authorized representative.

(i) Comply with the National Firearms Act and other relevant laws and regulations when receiving or bringing arms into the United States. Automatic arms must be turned over to the BATF or brought under Army control.

4–6. Weapons and ammunition for marksmanship matches and other special purposes

(a) Weapons and ammunition for marksmanship matches and other purposes will be protected at all times.

(b) When not in use, marksmanship weapons used in matches or ceremonies away from a military installation will be stored in authorized Active Army, ARNG, USAR, or ROTC arms rooms. Weapons and ammunition may be stored in a civilian police station under police control. If these facilities are not available, weapons and ammunition will be stored in locked containers or rooms attended at all times by at least 1 team member or designated person.

(c) The storage of automatic weapons in other than an authorized arms room is prohibited.

(d) Exceptions to (b), above for marksmanship weapons are authorized for ARNG, USAR, and ROTC marksmanship personnel when firing as persons away from their teams. Exception criteria are as follows:

(1) Eligibility is limited to persons who are active members representing an ARNG, ROTC region, a major USAR command, or higher–level team. Eligibility is limited only for a specified period of marksmanship participation. Weapons will be returned to the proper authorized arms rooms for storage upon completing the marksmanship match.

(2) Exceptions will be held to a minimum. Each written request for exception will include a statement that other secure facilities are not available. Each request will outline compensatory measures to be applied. If weapons are to be stored in private homes, the weapons will be secured in a locked, metal container. The container will not be prominently displayed. It will be secured to a firm structure in the home.

(3) Arms used during matches or practice away from the facility and not secured will be stored under (b), above.

(4) All requests will be submitted through command channels to PMG.

4–7. Commercial weapons and ammunition

(a) Commercial arms and ammunition in stock or maintained by nonappropriated fund activities and installation approved private organization activities will be protected according to security and accountability procedures equal to those prescribed in this regulation for military arms and ammunition. Commanders will prescribe specific inventory accountability procedures to ensure protection of these items against theft or loss.

(b) Commands will discontinue the sale or possession of weapons and ammunition by nonappropriated fund activities failing to comply with this regulation.

(c) During non–duty hours, commercial arms and ammunition will be stored in facilities meeting the requirements of this chapter. The storage area will be protected by a certified, approved IDS.

(d) When displayed, arms and ammunition will be under the surveillance of sales personnel. Arms and ammunition will be secured in such a way as to prevent loss or theft as follows:

(1) Ammunition equal to 1 day’s estimated sales may be displayed in a locked showcase or security case or fixture. If possible, empty boxes will be displayed in the showcases and sales will be made from reserve stock.
(2) Gun and ammunition fixtures will be locked except when merchandise is presented to the customer for inspection.

4–8. Contract guard weapons and ammunition

a. Protection of contract guard weapons and ammunition not U.S. Government property is the responsibility of the contractor unless stated elsewhere in the relevant contract. If granted permission by the installation commander to store on military reservations, these items will be protected in accordance with this regulation. In addition, these weapons and ammunition will be accounted for at all times. These weapons and ammunition are not authorized to be stored in AA&E storage facilities containing Government weapons and ammunition.

b. Commanders will prescribe the specific accountability procedures for contract guard weapons and ammunition.

4–9. General officer weapons and ammunition

Small arms and ammunition issued to general officers are exempt from all provisions of this regulation except loss and investigations requirements. The items will be stored in a manner deemed appropriate by the general officer.

4–10. United States Military Academy weapons

a. Weapons and ammunition will be protected at all times.

b. Weapons will be stored in accordance with the storage requirements of this chapter when not assigned to individual cadets.

c. Weapons issued to each cadet are granted an exception to the storage security requirement in this chapter. The Superintendent, United States Military Academy will set up proper security for these weapons to ensure weapons are safeguarded at all times.

4–11. Demilitarized weapons

Demilitarized weapons, although not classified as sensitive, will be secured as commanders may direct.

4–12. Foreign weapons and ammunition

Arms and ammunition of foreign origin in custody of the Army for intelligence, research, development, test, evaluation, or other purposes will be controlled and safeguarded in the same way as that prescribed for U.S. military weapons and ammunition.

4–13. Museums arms and ammunition

a. General.

(1) Arms, 19th century or older and not requiring metallic cartridges are classified as museum artifacts and are excluded from the PS requirements for storage of arms. Security requirements for these artifacts will be determined per AR 190–51, appendix B.

(2) All operable and inoperable arms not on display will be secured according to this regulation.

(3) Live ammunition will not be used for museum displays. Display ammunition, arming pins, caps, or other detonating devices will be rendered temporarily inoperable.

b. Transportation. Museum weapons in transit will be protected according to this regulation.

c. Arms storage facilities. The provisions of this regulation apply for the storage of museums arms and ammunition.

d. Arms on display.

(1) Ready–to–fire weapons containing self–primed metallic cartridges will be modified to make them temporarily inoperable. Removal of firing pins, internal mechanisms, or parts will satisfy this requirement; however, parts must be secured against pilferage. Modifications will not detract from the display value of the item. Under no conditions will any weapon be permanently altered by welding or cutting without written approval of the chief, Military History.

(2) Weapons on display in exhibit or display cases will be secured to prevent their easy removal. Security measures will be as inconspicuous as possible so as not to detract from the aesthetic appearance of the display.

(3) Classified component parts will be removed before any nonnuclear missiles, rockets, or other AA&E are displayed.

e. Accountability. All museum weapons are subject to the following requirements:

(1) A current inventory by serial number will be maintained.

(2) All weapons, with or without serial numbers, will be marked with a catalog number. Numbers should be easy to find, legible, and placed on the weapon in a position where they do not interfere with the display or study value of the weapon.

(3) Commanders should consider photographing unique museum items as an identification aid in case of theft. Color photographs often preserve a more complete and accurate record than black and white photographs. Negatives should be kept separate from the original photographs.

(4) A serial or catalog number list of weapons stored in banded or sealed containers will be fastened to the outside of each container. The contents will be authenticated with the signature of the curator or other responsible person.
Banded containers will be examined quarterly for tampering and their contents inventoried annually. When seals are used, they will be controlled as stated in AR 190–51, appendix D.

(5) All museum weapons will be visibly inventoried, except weapons stored in banded containers as follows:
   (a) Museum personnel will inventory weapons by physical count weekly and serial or catalog number done quarterly.

   (b) A disinterested officer will conduct a semiannual inventory of all weapons except those stored in banded containers. The results of this inventory will be kept for 1 year.

   (c) Inventory records will be kept on DA Form 2609 (Historical Property Catalog) according to AR 870–20, chapter 4. Inventory files will be maintained for at least 1 year.

f. Small Arms Serialization Program. All weapons with serial numbers will be registered with the DOD Central Registry according to AR 710–3, paragraph 4–11. A manual recording system should be used for those weapons that the Small Arms Serialization Program will not accept because they are foreign, have nonnumeric serial numbers, and so forth. Questions concerning registry should be directed to the DOD Central Registry at USAMC Logistics Support Activity, ATTN: AMXLS–MN (National Channel), Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898–7466 (DSN 645–9972 or commercial (256) 955–9972).

g. Missing or recovered museum weapons. Procedures for reporting missing or recovered weapons are contained in this regulation.

4–14. Arms parts
Major parts for arms, such as barrels and major subassemblies, will be afforded at least the same protection as Category IV arms. The frame or receiver of an arm constitutes a weapon and such parts, therefore, must be stored according to the correct category (for example, the receiver of a .30 caliber machine gun will be stored as a Category II weapon).

4–15. Restricted area designation
   a. Commanders of military installations and facilities have the authority to publish and enforce regulations for safeguarding personnel, facilities, and property. This authority is derived from Title 50 United States Code section 797 (50 USC 797) (Internal Security Act of 1950), implemented by DODI 5200.08 and DOD 5200.8–R.

   b. Except when such action would tend to advertise an otherwise concealed area or when in conflict with host nation agreements. Signs or notices will be posted in conspicuous and appropriate places to identify the AA&E facility a restricted area. This includes signs posted at each entrance or approach to the area and on perimeter fences or boundaries of the area.

   c. Post signs or notices in conspicuous and appropriate places to identify a restricted area (except when such action would tend to advertise an otherwise concealed area, or when in conflict with host nation agreements).

   d. Post signs so as not to provide concealment of an intruder or obstruct visual assessment.

   e. Post conspicuous signs and notices to give people approaching a restricted area actual knowledge of the restriction. Failure to do so may seriously hamper any resulting criminal prosecution. Each sign or notice will be marked with the words “RESTRICTED AREA,” and include the following warning notice: THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN DECLARED A RESTRICTED AREA BY AUTHORITY OF THE OF THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON 10 December 2005, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21, INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950. UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY IS PROHIBITED. ALL PERSONS AND VEHICLES ENTERING HEREIN ARE LIABLE TO SEARCH. PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE FACILITIES IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION FROM THE COMMANDER. DEADLY FORCE IS AUTHORIZED.

   f. Post warning signs that contain the local languages besides English in areas in which English is not the only common language.

   g. Continue to post existing signs containing essentially the same wording as above until replacement is necessary at which time the required wording above will be used.

4–16. Intrusion Detection System signs
Arms storage facilities having IDS will have signs prominently displayed announcing the presence of IDS (see app F). Such signs will be affixed at eye level, when possible, on the exterior of each interior wall that contains an entrance to the arms storage room, vault, or building. Signs will be affixed on exterior walls only when the exterior walls contain an entrance to the arms storage facility.

4–17. Fences
Arms storage buildings, bulk storage areas, and outside areas where vehicles and aircraft are routinely parked with weapons aboard may be surrounded with fencing when determined necessary by the commander concerned. Such
4–18. Security of tools and high–value items

a. Tools such as hammers, bolt cutters, chisels, crowbars, hacksaws, cutting torches, and similar items which could be used to assist in gaining unauthorized access to an arms storage facility must not be readily accessible to intruders. Tools of this type should be removed from the vicinity of the arms storage facility or room. When an arms storage facility is the only security location available, such tools will be stored in a locked container within the facility. When the access door to an arms storage room is located within the unit supply room, tools will not be stored in the supply room.

b. When other secure storage facilities are reasonably available high–value items will not be stored in arms storage facilities. Such items include field glasses, compasses, watches, and highly valuable items subject to pilferage. In the absence of secure facilities, commanders may authorize, in writing, those sensitive items to be stored in arms storage facilities. In the absence of secure facilities, commanders will authorize, in writing, those sensitive items to be stored in arms storage facilities. These items should be placed in a lockable container and keys to cages and/or weapons racks/containers should not be on the same ring as these keys. Keys to weapons racks/containers should not be issued if only the high dollar value items are to be access. The same rule should apply if only weapons are to be issued the keys to the high dollar value containers should not be issued.

4–19. Access control

a. Unaccompanied access by personnel to arms storage facilities will be limited to the least practical number of responsible persons designated by the unit commander. The names and duty positions of these persons will be posted inside the arms room. These persons will be authorized unaccompanied access to the arms storage facilities only after they have satisfactorily undergone a command–developed background check that has been verified by a review of personnel records (see para 2–11).

b. An exception to a, above, is unit officer personnel. Unit officer personnel with the unit commander’s approval, may be permitted routine unaccompanied access. However, those officers authorized unaccompanied access will be designated in writing by the commander. The list will be posted as above.

c. In addition to the requirements above, a 2–person rule may be established for access to arms storage facilities. At the option of the commander concerned, 2 authorized persons may be required to be present during any operation which affords access to these facilities. If the 2–person rule is used, commanders should establish appropriate lock and key control procedures to preclude defeat of the 2–person rule concept.

d. Routine access by personnel to arms storage facilities will be limited to the least practical number of responsible persons designated by the unit commander. Personnel will not enter the arms room to receive their weapons.

e. Weapons will be issued as follows:

(1) The unit armorer must keep a master authorization list (MAL). The MAL will contain the names and unit of the personnel who will receive issues and the number of the equipment receipts. Keep the MAL updated to show personnel changes. Before a weapon is issued, the armorer must check each Soldier’s DA Form 3749 with the MAL to make sure there is no unauthorized issue of weapons.

(2) When individually assigned weapons are issued for 24 hours or less, only the turn–in of DA Form 3749 is required. An entry on the control sheet or log is not required for issues of 24 hours or less.

(3) When individually assigned weapons are issued for periods over 24 hours, the receiving individual must turn in the DA Form 3749 for the weapon to the person making the issue. The individual will also make an entry on the control sheet or the log that contains the date of the issue. The individual will enter, in ink, the nomenclature and serial number of the item received, the time of issue, and his or her signature. Enter the signature as it appears on the DA Form 3749.

(4) When weapons are turned in, close out the control sheet. Return the individual’s DA Form 3749. The person receiving the weapon will enter the date, time, and his or her initials on the control sheet.

(5) Keep the weapons control sheet in the unit active file. Keep it until completion of the next monthly (quarterly for ARNG and USAR) inventory by serial number. Then destroy the control sheet.

(6) When a single weapon is needed for issue to more than 1 Soldier, prepare DA Form 3749 for each person authorized to use the weapon. Issue the weapon per paragraphs (1) through (4), above, except that control sheet entries are required regardless of the time period for which the weapon is issued.

(7) When other than individually assigned weapons are issued, use hand receipt or temporary hand receipt procedures. Control sheet entries are also required.

4–20. Security of Class 5 storage containers

a. Class 5 security containers authorized for use instead of arms rooms must be adequately protected. The following factors must be considered for each container:

(1) The vulnerability when it is left unattended for extended periods of time.
(2) The vulnerability of the location where the container is placed.
(3) The accessibility and ease of removal of the container.
(4) The position where the container will be least vulnerable to unauthorized access by heavy lifting equipment (for example, forklifts, dollies).
(5) The position from which unauthorized persons would find it extremely difficult to remove the container.

b. Positive overall security of the arms stored in the container will be achieved. Commanders will ensure that structure protection provided by the storage container is adequately increased by the PS measures specified in this regulation.

4–21. Arming of unit arms rooms armorers
Depending on the local threat, environment, and location of unit arms rooms or other arms storage facilities, commanders concerned will determine the need to arm unit armorers or other on–duty personnel during the performance of their duties to prevent the possible armed robbery or forcible theft of weapons and ammunition. If such personnel are armed, provisions of AR 190–14 apply.

4–22. Security of arms during initial entry training
The following policy prescribes the minimum criteria for the security of arms and blank ammunition in the custody of Soldiers in IET.

a. Individuals issued or in possession of arms and blank ammunition are responsible for security of this property while it is entrusted to their care.
(1) Each weapon issued will be carried on the person of the individual to whom issued at all times or it will be properly safeguarded and secured as designated below.
(2) Except during emergencies, weapons will not be entrusted to the custody of any other person except those responsible for the security of operational weapons. These persons will comply with issue and turn–in procedures. Local procedures will be established to secure and account for the weapons of personnel medically evacuated during training.

b. Initial entry training commanders will—
(1) Designate barracks facilities used in the weapons immersion training program as restricted areas.
(2) Ensure access to barracks facilities and platoon bays by unauthorized personnel is strictly enforced.
(3) Establish and enforce procedures for temporarily (not to exceed 2 hours) security of Soldier’s weapons for situations where a Soldier may be separated from his or her weapon.
(4) Ensure the following physical security measures to mitigate theft of arms and blank ammunition are in place.
(a) Provide weapons racks or other security devices such as cable locks to assist Soldiers in securing their weapons during non–duty hours. If weapons racks are used, they will be locked with approved locks. If cable locks are utilized, the weapon will be secured to the Soldier’s bunk.
(b) Security lighting will be installed at all barracks entry points.
(c) Vegetation around the barracks will be trimmed or pruned to eliminate concealment.
(d) Post guards in barracks areas where Soldiers are sleeping. These guards will maintain visibility of weapons secured in arms racks or other areas and will have a positive means of contacting emergency personnel.
(e) Arms racks and containers weighing less than 500 pounds will be fastened to the structure (or fastened together in groups totalling more than 500 pounds) with bolts or with chains equipped with secondary padlocks. Bolts used to secure racks will be spot welded, brazed, or peened to prevent easy removal. Chains used to secure racks (and containers) will be heavy–duty hardened steel, welded, straight links steel, galvanized of at least 5/16–inch thickness, or of equivalent resistance to force required to cut or break a secondary padlock.
(f) Keys and locks used to secure weapons racks in the barracks will be controlled in accordance with paragraph 3–8, above.
(5) Develop procedures to assist Soldiers in securing issued blank ammunition.

b. For inventory and physical counts, IET commanders will—
(1) Conduct a monthly serial number inventory.
(2) Conduct a physical count of weapons and blank ammunition twice per day.

Chapter 5
Protection of Nonnuclear Missiles, Rockets, Ammunition, and Explosives

5–1. General
a. Nonnuclear missiles, rockets, ammunition, and explosives listed in appendix B will be protected in accordance
with this chapter. Individuals issued or in possession of missiles, rockets, ammunition, or explosives are responsible for security of such property while it is charged or entrusted to their care.

b. All unused ammunition and explosives will be turned in to the proper authority per AR 710–2.

c. Ammunition and explosives deployed in the field for training or operational purposes will be protected at all times as prescribed in paragraph 2–5. Missile, rocket, ammunition, and explosive items installed in vehicles and aircraft are considered in use and will be protected as part of the overall system in which they are installed.

d. Other criteria in this chapter do not apply to such missile, rocket, ammunition, and explosive items.

e. Commanders will ensure that necessary security measures are taken to protect ammunition and explosives stored in vehicles and aircraft as prescribed in paragraphs 5–3 and 5–4.

f. Portable explosive magazines, as specified in NSWC 3046–93.2, are authorized for the storage of limited quantities of Category II through Category IV ammunition and explosives. Quantities of the ammunition and explosives to be stored inside the magazine will be coordinated with the installation’s Army Safety Office. Additional PS measures in 5–2, below, apply for the category of the ammunition and explosives stored (that is, IDS, security lighting, fencing, and so on).

5–2. Bulk storage areas

a. Category I and Category II.

(1) Bulk storage. Bulk storage areas are considered to be depot activities, prestock points, and ammunition supply points at which bulk quantities of missiles, rockets, ammunition, and explosives are stored. Storage is usually in original containers. Storage structures acceptable for storage of Category I and II ammunition and explosives are those earth–covered magazines and igloos listed in DA Pam 385–64, appendix G.

(2) Supplemental controls.

(a) Intrusion Detection System. Category I and II storage facilities and structures will be protected by IDS. Facilities without an operational IDS will have armed guards posted 24 hours a day to maintain constant, unobstructed observation of the storage structures, prevent any unauthorized access to the protected structure, make known any unauthorized access to the structure.

(b) Security patrols. Storage facilities and structures will be checked by a security patrol periodically as dictated by any threat and by the vulnerability of the facility. Checks will be conducted on an irregular basis during non–duty hours. For Category I and II facilities protected by an operational IDS, the intervals between checks will be once every 24 hours. For facilities without an operational IDS, the intervals between checks will be hourly for Category I and once every 2 hours for Category II facilities.

b. Category III and Category IV.

(1) Bulk storage. Ammunition and explosives listed under Category III and IV will be stored in structures that meet the criteria in DA Pam 385–64, appendix G.

(2) Intrusion Detection System. Category III and IV facilities and structures are optional for IDS. New IDS will not be programmed for Category III and IV facilities (structures) unless it is determined necessary based on an assessment of the local threats, vulnerabilities, and cost–effectiveness.

(3) Security patrols. Storage facilities and structures will be checked by a security patrol periodically as dictated by any threat and by the vulnerability of the facility. For Category III and IV facilities protected by an operational IDS, the intervals between checks will be 72 hours and once every 48 hours for facilities not protected by an operational IDS.

(4) Inert devices. Inert and expended launcher tubes, inert mines, inert rocket launcher training devices, and practice rockets are vulnerable to pilferage, misuse, or possible conversion to live ammunition. Such items will be clearly marked to prevent accidental turn–in or turn–in as live fire residue. Those items that can be converted to operable weapons will be accounted for and secured as Category IV live ammunition and explosives.

5–3. Fences

a. Category I and II missile, rocket, ammunition, and explosive storage areas will be surrounded with security fencing constructed and configured as set forth below. New chain–link fencing will not be programmed for Category III and IV storage facilities unless it is determined necessary based on an assessment of local threats, vulnerabilities, and cost effectiveness. Standard details for chain–link security fences are covered in USACE DEF design drawing 872–90–01.

b. Fence fabric will be of chain–link (galvanized, aluminized, or plastic coated woven steel) 2–inch square mesh 9–gauge diameter steel wire, including coating. In Europe, fencing may be North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard designed fencing (2.5–3mm gauge, 76mm grid opening, 2 meter height, and 3.76 meter post separation).

c. Posts, bracings, and other structural members will be located on the inside of the fence fabric. Galvanized or aluminized steel wire ties equal in gauge to fence fabric will be used to secure the fence fabric to posts and other structural members.

d. The minimum height of the fence fabric will be 6 feet with or without an outrigger.

e. The bottom of the fence fabric will extend to within 2 inches of firm ground. Surfaces will be stabilized in areas.
where loose sand, shifting soils, or surface waters may cause erosion and thereby assist an intruder in penetrating the area. Where surface stabilization is not possible, or is impracticable, concrete curbs, sills, or other similar type anchoring devices, extending below ground level will be provided.

f. Modifications to chain–link fencing will not be made to conform to the requirements of this paragraph if the existing fencing provides an equivalent or greater penetration resistance, as determined by the commander concerned.

g. The barrier will have a minimum number of vehicular and pedestrian gates, consistent with the operational requirements. These gates will be structurally comparable, provide penetration resistance equivalent to the adjacent fence, and be designed so that the traffic through them will be under the positive control of the security force. Unless manned 24 hours a day, gates will be provided with an approved lock. Hinge pins and hardware will be welded or otherwise modified to prevent easy removal.

h. Drainage structures and water passages penetrating the barrier be barred to provide penetration resistance equivalent to the fence itself. Openings to the drainage structures having a cross–sectional area greater than 96 square inches and a smallest dimension greater than 6 inches will be protected by securely fastened welded bar grills. As an alternative, drainage structures may be constructed of multiple pipes, each pipe having a diameter of 10 inches or less, joined to each other and to the drainage culvert. Multiple pipes of this diameter may also be placed and secured in the in–flow end of the drainage culvert to prevent intrusion into the area.

i. Building walls may be incorporated into the barrier system if they provide penetration resistance equivalent to the perimeter barrier and are subject to observation.

j. Clear zones will extend 12 feet on the outside and 30 feet on the inside of the perimeter fence, if it is practical to do so. Clear zones for Categories I through IV AA&E will be free of all obstacles, topographical features, and vegetation exceeding 8 inches in height which reduce the effectiveness of the physical barrier, impede observation, or provide cover and concealment of an intruder.

1. Vegetation or topographical features, which must be retained in clear zones for erosion control, passive defense, or for legal reasons will be trimmed or pruned to eliminate concealment and checked by security patrols at irregular intervals.

2. Perimeter light poles, fire hydrants, steam pipes, or other similar objects; barricades for explosives safety purposes; and entry control buildings within the clear zone that represent no aid to circumvent the perimeter barrier or do not provide concealment to an intruder do not violate the requirements of clear zones.

k. Fencing needs will be evaluated and determined for each installation on a case–by–case basis. The installation of new security fencing around an outer perimeter may not be cost–effective. The following will be considered:

1. If the storage area perimeter has adequate security fencing, fencing of inner zones may not be required.

2. If the storage area outer perimeter has barbed wire fencing or no fencing, security fencing of inner zone storage areas may be more practical and cost–effective.

3. If the storage area outer perimeter is partially fenced, it may be more cost–effective to complete the loop rather than to install fencing around inner zone storage areas.

4. If natural barriers, such as mountains, cliffs, rivers, seas, or other difficult–to–traverse terrain form portions of the perimeter and provide equivalent or more security than fencing, security fencing of inner zone storage areas may not be required.

5–4. Security lighting

a. Security lighting will be provided for Category I and II storage facilities. New security lighting systems will not be programmed for Category III and IV facilities unless determined necessary based on an assessment of the local threats and vulnerabilities.

b. Security lighting will—

(1) Be provided for exterior doors of all Category I and II items storage rooms and magazines.

(2) Have switches for exterior lights installed so that they are not accessible to unauthorized individuals.

(3) Have all exterior lights covered with wire mesh screen that will prevent their being broken by thrown objects. Vandal resistant lenses may be used instead of wire mesh screen.

(4) Be provided for motor pools, hangars, and outdoor parking areas for vehicles and aircraft that have Category I and II ammunition and explosives stored on board and for such items located in open storage areas.

(5) Be provided along storage site perimeter barriers determined necessary by the commander. Commanders will determine perimeter lighting needs depending on the threat, perimeter extremities, and surveillance capabilities.

c. The following requirements apply:

(1) Perimeter lighting.

(a) Perimeter lighting will be positioned and designed to enable the detection of persons in the entire clear zone and outside the outer perimeter fence.

(b) When CCTV is the primary means of perimeter assessment, the lumen output throughout the clear zone may be varied as needed to accommodate the operation of the CCTV or other electronic imaging system. Primary emphasis
will focus on detection capability in the clear zone. A detailed discussion of CCTV–camera lighting requirements and guidelines for minimum lighting levels and lighting uniformity is provided in UFC 4–020–04FA.

(2) **Clear zone.** To facilitate human visual assessment, the clear zone, 30 feet outside the outer perimeter fence, will be provided with a minimum of 0.2 foot candles (2 lux) illumination measured on the horizontal plane or a minimum of 0.4 foot candles (4 lux) illumination measured on the vertical plane. This measurement will be taken 6 inches above the ground during normal visibility conditions at a point 30 feet from the outer fence.

(3) **Vehicular and pedestrian gates.** Vehicular and pedestrian gate lighting will be of sufficient intensity and designed for personnel identification and detection of unauthorized items. Such gates will be provided with 5.0 foot candles (50 lux) horizontal illumination measured during normal visibility conditions, measured 6 inches above ground level.

(4) **Exterior doors.** Security lighting will be provided for exterior doors of AA&E storage structures. Lights will be of sufficient intensity to allow detection of persons at the exterior doors with at least a 1 foot candle (10lux) illumination on the horizontal plane at ground level. Switches for exterior lights will be installed so they are not accessible to unauthorized persons. Exterior lights will be covered with wire mesh screen or vandal resistant lenses to protect the lights from being broken by thrown objects.

(5) **Restart capability.** The security lighting system will have a restart capability and produce required lumen output within 3 minutes after primary or emergency power is applied.

(6) **Perimeter lighting circuits.** Perimeter lighting circuits will be designed so that failure of 1 or more lights will not affect operation of the remaining lights.

(7) **Patrol roads.** Patrol roads or paths should not be lighted (incidental lighting is acceptable).

(8) **Lighting fixtures.** Whenever possible, lighting fixtures will be positioned to avoid blinding of guards from glare and silhouetting of guards.

(9) **Turning off site security lights.** The site PS plan may provide for turning off the site security lights to defend the site under anticipated or actual emergency conditions. This includes turning off the lighting over storage structure doors. A sweep will be conducted of the area immediately after restoring the site security lights.

(10) **Non–emergency conditions.** Perimeter lighting will not be turned on and off on a random basis during non-–emergency conditions. Perimeter lighting may be turned off during security force exercises; however, appropriate security measures will be taken for the lack of such lighting. In such cases, a sweep will be conducted of the area immediately after restoring the site security lighting.

a. Field manual (FM) 3–19.30, chapter 5, will be used as a guide in deciding lighting descriptions, layouts, lighting patterns, and minimum protective lighting intensities and requirements. Emergency lighting and standby power are not required, but will be considered when the threat and vulnerability warrant.

5–5. **Guard protection and surveillance**

Protection and surveillance by guards or other personnel together with other PS measures will be established for facilities or temporary open storage areas as set forth in this regulation and otherwise as needed to ensure protection at the facilities. At a minimum, entrance and exit points into magazine and holding areas where vehicles, railcars, or aircrafts with missiles, rockets, ammunition, or explosives aboard are parked will be controlled by guards or other personnel. When duty personnel are not present or IDS or CCTV are not used, enough security patrols will be provided to allow physical inspection of each aircraft, railcar, or vehicle at a frequency determined by the commander concerned, based on the category of AA&E, the threat, and the location.

5–6. **Locks and keys**

a. **Locks.** A GSA Class 5 steel vault door with a built–in, 3–position, dial–type, changeable combination lock or a key operated high security padlock and hasp will be used on doors to structures housing classified material per AR 380–5, chapter 5. Otherwise, each ammunition magazine or room constructed in accordance with chapter 4 will be secured with an approved high security padlock and high security hasp. Storage facility hasps and locking hardware will provide comparable protection to that afforded by the locks approved or other high security locking hardware (see glossary definition of lock for a list of approved DA locks and hasps). Facilities in which aircraft or vehicles are stored with ammunition aboard will be secured with an approved security padlock (see para 3–8, above, for further guidance).

b. **Key and lock control.** Key and lock control will be established in accordance with paragraph 3–8. Use of master key system or multiple key system is prohibited.

c. **Category I storage facilities.**

(1) Doors used for access to Category I storage facilities will be locked with a high security padlock and hasp and 1 secondary padlock.

(2) Access to, or possession of, both keys to Category I storage facilities by 2 person is prohibited. A key control system will be established so that no one will be allowed to interchange access to keys to installed A and B locks.

(3) Key control officers and locksmiths will not be authorized access to information concerning the specific locations of installed locks protecting Category I structures at the site (for example, specific storage igloos within a site).

(4) Keys and locks subject to the 2–person rule will not be placed in use at the facility by the key control officer.
Such keys and locks will be placed in use by the respective key control custodians. Additionally, the key control officer is not authorized access to such keys while the locks are in use under the 2–person rule.

(5) The rotation of padlocks will not be required when 2 locks are installed on each Category I structure and a system is set up for separating these locks into A and B locks. Personnel will be identified and authorized access only to either A or B keys or locks, but not both. The system will preclude an individual from interchanging access to the A and B keys.

5–7. Communications
Reliable and efficient primary and backup means of external and internal communications, at least 1 of which is radio, will be established at magazine areas to permit notification of emergency conditions. The communication system will be easily accessible to guard and security personnel on their posts and will be tested daily by supervisory security personnel. The backup system will be of a mode other than that of the primary communication system. Both primary and backup guard (security) communications will be tested at least once during each shift.

5–8. Protection of missiles, rockets, ammunition, and explosives at unit level

a. Unit level stocks are those stored in basic load quantities (quantities stored in tactical configuration for readiness and emergency purposes) or which are on hand for operational purposes.

b. A typical facility for storage of operational quantities of ammunition is a building used to store ammunition for an MP or guard (security) arms room. Such facilities will comply with the requirements in appendix G.

c. Commanders may authorize, in writing, the storage of small quantities of ammunition in unit arms storage rooms for operational purposes. This authorization will be posted in the arms room. Storage will be consistent with operational requirements.

(1) Ammunition authorized for storage in unit arms storage rooms will be secured in banded crates, approved metal containers, or cabinets. Approved standard issue metal wall lockers may be used. Crates will be banded or sealed in a way that will prevent ammunition removal without leaving visible signs of tampering. Ammunition stored in metal containers, or cabinets, will be secured with secondary padlocks. Screws and bolts used in assembling containers, lockers, or cabinets, will be made secure to prevent disassembly.

(2) Containers weighing less than 500 pounds will be fastened to the structure (or fastened together in groups totaling more than 500 pounds) with bolts or chains equipped with secondary padlocks.

(3) Security containers (GSA approved Class 5) not storing or containing classified documents or material may also be used.

(4) Weapon magazines containing live ammunition can be stored in the arms room provided the magazines are color-coded (diagonal red striped). Weapon magazines will not be left in the weapon.

d. The following are minimum requirements for safeguarding and maintaining unit level stocks:

(1) Depending upon tactical and contingency considerations, unit level stocks will be stored in ammunition storage rooms or magazines that are equivalent to the structural standards prescribed in paragraph 5–2.

(2) When operational and training requirements preclude storage of unit level stocks or explosives in ammunition storage magazines, these stocks may be stored in or on combat vehicles, aircraft, ships, trailers, or in other configurations required by the operational environment.

(3) Ammunition and explosives may be stored aboard vehicles or aircraft provided the vehicle or aircraft is located inside a motor pool or park or aircraft park area. When stored in this configuration, supplemental security measures in AR 190–51, paragraphs 3–3 and 3–5 apply.

(4) Vehicles or aircraft with missiles and rockets in a ready–to–fire configuration will be provided 24 hour armed guard surveillance.

e. Ammunition and explosives in open storage (such as, FLMSA vehicle holding area, ASP, and aircraft cargo area) are especially vulnerable to theft or sabotage. The following guidelines apply:

(1) Access will be strictly controlled. The 2–person rule will apply to Category I missiles and rockets at these locations.

(2) Perimeter barriers, either temporary or permanent, must be placed to preclude unauthorized entry into the storage area.

(3) Storage areas will be posted as a restricted area.

(4) Armed guards will be posted to control entry, to protect the AA&E, and in the event Category I missiles and rockets are stored there, to enforce the 2–person rule. The guards will be equipped with a primary and alternate means of communications. At a minimum, armed guards will be checked every 4 hours by an individual appointed by the commander.

(5) Positive measures (for example, security lighting or additional guards so that visibility between guards is maintained, and so on) will be implemented during hours of darkness or reduced visibility.

(6) Accountability procedures will be established.

(7) Category I missiles and rockets stored in open areas are vulnerable to theft. The responsible commander should consider placing these Category I missiles and rockets in either an approved container (MILVAN, SEAVAN, or
CONNEX), or in a totally enclosed storage building. The following additional PS measures apply if the container or building is used:

(a) Doors will be secured with 2 approved medium security or low security locks.
(b) Access to, or possession of, both keys to the building by 1 person is prohibited.
(c) A key control system will be established so that no 1 person will be allowed to have access to keys to installed A and B locks.

(8) Commanders of units that routinely deploy for field training and live firing should consider having the supporting engineer activity construct a storage building to be used at the FLMSA. This building need not meet the minimum construction standards for Category 1 storage buildings in this regulation (earth covered), but should provide a degree of security necessary to enforce 2-person access and provide shelter from the weather. A Type 2 outdoor magazine may also be used as a temporary storage structure.

(9) When more than 1 unit uses the same area, stocks will be separated and identified by unit. One unit will be designated as responsible for the security of the entire area, including access control.

5–9. Entry control

a. Vehicular and personnel gates will be secured and strict key control accountability will be observed. A pass, badge, or access roster plus a registration system will be used to admit properly identified authorized personnel to storage areas.
   (1) Vehicle and personnel gates will be secured except when it is necessary to allow authorized entry into or exit from the area.
   (2) Keys and locks to gates will be controlled and accounted for per paragraph 3–8.
   (3) Entry and exit procedures will include searches of personnel and vehicles for unauthorized material.
   (4) Persons requiring frequent recurring entrance to the area will either be listed on an entry control roster, prepared by the responsible storage commander, or issued a photographic security badge which clearly establishes the authority to enter. The roster will contain a minimum, the name, grade, and unit or organization of each authorized person.
   (5) Privately-owned vehicles and leased vehicles will not be permitted inside storage facilities and areas. Government vehicles and vehicles operated by DOD contract personnel on official business are authorized entry.
   (6) Upon exiting, all vehicles will be thoroughly inspected to ensure that only authorized material is being removed.
   (7) Vehicles leased by Government agencies are considered to be Government vehicles for the contracted period. Rental vehicles obtained by Government employees for official use during periods of temporary duty will be allowed entry when the employee’s official duties require such entry.

b. Personnel, including guards or host country guards, whose duties require unescorted access to storage facilities containing classified missiles, rockets, or other classified items will have a security clearance commensurate with the classification of the items involved.

c. A 2-person rule will be established for access to storage facilities containing Category I missiles and rockets. No 1 individual can have access.

5–10. Restricted area designation

a. Commanders of military installations and facilities have the authority to publish and enforce regulations for safeguarding personnel, facilities, and property. This authority is derived from 50 USC 797, implemented by DODI 5200.8, and DOD 5200.8–R.

b. Except when such action would tend to advertise an otherwise concealed area, or when in conflict with host nation agreements, signs or notices will be posted in conspicuous and appropriate places to identify the AA&E facility a restricted area. This includes signs posted at each entrance or approach to the area and on perimeter fences or boundaries of the area.

c. Position signs so not to provide concealment of an intruder or obstruct visual assessment.

d. Failure to post conspicuous signs and notices to give people approaching a restricted area actual knowledge of the restriction, may seriously hamper any resulting criminal prosecution. Each sign or notice will be marked with the words “RESTRICTED AREA,” and include the following warning notice: THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN DECLARED A RESTRICTED AREA BY AUTHORITY OF THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON 10 December 2005, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21, INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950. UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY IS PROHIBITED. ALL PERSONS AND VEHICLES ENTERING HEREBIN ARE LIABLE TO SEARCH. PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE FACILITIES IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION FROM THE COMMANDER. DEADLY FORCE IS AUTHORIZED.

e. In areas in which English is not the only common language, warning signs will contain the local languages besides English.

f. Existing signs containing essentially the same wording as above may continue to be used until replacement is necessary, at which time the required wording above will be used.
5–11. Intrusion Detection System signs
Signs clearly announcing the presence of an IDS will be displayed on ammunition storage rooms, magazines, or perimeter barriers using such a system. Signs will be affixed at eye level, when possible. They will be affixed on the exterior walls containing an entrance to the ammunition or explosives storage room, vault, building, or magazine or, in the case of alarmed barrier fences, on the outside of the fence at about 100-meter intervals. Signs will be placed at a location where they will not hinder observation or fields of fire. Signs will not be placed where they may be used by intruders to gain entry. Alarm signs will not create nuisance alarms. Otherwise, the signs will be posted outside the perimeter fence. The IDS signs meeting the specifications of appendix F will be used.

5–12. Storage of classified items
Classified AA&E storage facilities will comply with standards set forth in paragraph 4–2 or AR 380–5, appendix H. Classified missiles, rockets, or other classified items will be segregated from unclassified items stored in the same storage facility. Strict access and accountability control procedures will be established by the commander (see para 5–9 for 2–person rule requirement for access to Category I missiles and rockets). Personnel whose duties require access to above storage facilities will have a security clearance commensurate with the classification of the items involved. Classified AA&E material manuals and documents should normally be stored separately from the ordnance items per AR 380–5, paragraph 5–24.

5–13. Additional security measures for igloos and magazines
a. Additional security measures may be used to enhance overall security of ammunition and explosives stored in unalarmed igloos and magazines or to increase the delay time of alarmed igloos and magazines.
   b. King Tut blocks may be placed in front of igloo or magazine doors to increase the difficulty and the delay time associated with opening them after locks have been defeated.
   c. Expanded metal cages may be placed in front of igloo or magazine doors to provide an additional barrier to entry. Where the igloo or magazine is to have an IDS, sensors may be placed on the cage to provide detection prior to the aggressor reaching the door.

Chapter 6
Accountability, Disposition, Disposal, and Demilitarization

6–1. Nonnuclear missiles and rockets (Category I)
a. Each commander having custody of nonnuclear missiles and rockets will establish and maintain records which will provide for continuous accountability. This will include those issued for training by requiring the return of unexpended missiles and expended residue. When possible, such records will be maintained by serial number. Incoming shipments will be inventoried promptly after receipt to ensure that all items have been received. All contracts for the procurement of nonnuclear missiles and rockets will provide for individual serialization.
   b. In addition to the inventory requirements in AR 710–2, the following apply:
      (1) Unit level. A 100 percent serial number inventory will be taken monthly for active Army units. For ARNG and USAR activities, a physical count will be taken monthly and a 100 percent physical inventory by serial number will be taken quarterly.
      (2) Depot, post, or base level. A 100 percent inventory will be taken semiannually.

6–2. Arms
a. Arms serial number registration and reporting.
   (1) Department of Defense Central Registry. A DOD Central Registry will be maintained to record, by serial number, the ownership account of all arms. AR 710–3, chapter 4 establishes policies and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for serial number registration and reporting of arms belonging to Army units, organizations, activities, and installations which maintain property books and stock record accounts. Questions concerning registry and arms losses, thefts, or recoveries, will be directed to the DOD Central Registry at USAMC Logistics Support Activity, ATTN: AMXLS–MN (National Channel), Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898–7466 (DSN 645–9972 or commercial (256) 955–9972).
   (2) Delineation of responsibilities. The Department of the Army is the assigned agency responsible for operating and maintaining the DOD Central Registry. This registry maintains control over serial numbers of arms and a file of those arms that have been lost, stolen, demilitarized, or shipped outside the DOD.
   (3) Lost, stolen, or recovered weapons. When the DOD Central Registry receives an inquiry concerning a lost, stolen, or recovered weapon that is listed with the registry as DOD property, or as missing from a DOD activity, the Central Registry will inform the affected commander. Commanders will establish procedures to ensure that such losses, thefts, or recoveries are, or have been, appropriately investigated per paragraph 2–9 and reported as outlined in chapter
8 of this regulation. Commanders will also ensure that AA&E recovered by police or investigative agencies are returned to Army control for disposition upon completion of investigative and prosecutive action.

(4) Exclusions. Privately-owned arms and arms purchased with nonappropriated funds are exempt from being reported to the DOD Central Registry. However, each post, camp, or station having nonappropriated fund arms will establish procedures to identify such weapons by type and serial number.

b. The DOD component registries will reconcile inter-Service transfers of weapons on a transaction-by-transaction basis.

6–3. Ammunition and explosives

a. All items included in the definition of the terms ammunition and explosives will be subject to physical inventory control procedures per AR 710–2. Upon receipt, a check will be made to verify that all items shipped have been received.

b. Detailed policy and procedures for physical and inventory control of ammunition and explosives are per AR 710–2, chapter 2. The nature and sensitivity of ammunition control dictates strict adherence to all provisions with respect to the following:
   1. Physical inventories.
   2. Research of potential inventory adjustments.
   3. Reversal of inventory adjustments.
   4. Retention of accountable documentation.
   5. Quality control.
   6. Inventory effectiveness reporting. The special provisions for controlled inventory items are important in the control of ammunition and explosives.

6–4. Physical inventory control

a. All items included in the definition of the term arms will be subjected to physical inventory control per AR 710–2, table 2 and DA Pam 710–2–2, chapters 9 and 10. All provisions requiring a high degree of protection and inventory control specified for sensitive items apply. Policy and procedures for physical inventory control are per AR 740–26, chapter 4.

b. The special provisions for controlled inventory items are important to the control of arms. In addition to AR 740–26, the following minimum requirements will be met:
   1. Unit level.
      a. By serial number, 100 percent inventory will be taken monthly, except for boxed and banded arms. In this latter case, the count and inventory will consist of a 100 percent count as reflected by the number of items listed on the boxes. Any evidence of tampering will be cause for that box to be opened and 100 percent count to be taken of the weapons in the box.
      b. The ARNG, USAR, and AMC, Research and Development (AMC R&D) units/activities will conduct physical counts monthly and inventory by serial number quarterly.
      c. Change of custody of arms room. Incoming and outgoing custodians who have custody of the arms storage facility keys and who have been tasked by the unit/activity commander to either issue or receipt for arms will physically count weapons, ammunition, and parts for arms, such as barrels and subassemblies. For consolidated arms storage facilities, verify a physical count has been conducted by each person having access to the weapons and ammunition.
      d. The inventory records will be maintained for a minimum of 2 years for inventories that do not reflect discrepancies. Records of inventories that reflect discrepancies will be maintained for a minimum of 4 years.
   2. Depot, post, or base level. Those arms not already entered into the DOD Central Registry will be completely inventoried in conjunction with the serialization reporting program. Therefore, the inventory will be taken once each fiscal year at depot and semiannually at post or base level. These inventories will consist of a 100 percent count as reflected by the number of items listed on the boxes. A complete count will be made of the contents of every box that is opened or damaged. The inventory records will be maintained as required in (1), above.

6–5. Inventory losses

Accounting and inventory losses of AA&E will be processed per AR 735–5 and this regulation.

6–6. Disposal and demilitarization

Disposal of all excess and surplus arms, arms parts, ammunition, and explosives is governed by the provisions of DOD 4160.21–M–1 and the demilitarization of AA&E will be accomplished in accordance with the aforementioned DOD instruction. Any AA&E undergoing demilitarization must be transported and stored in accordance with this regulation until demilitarization is completed. Any AA&E being disposed of without demilitarization (foreign military sales (FMS)), transfer to law enforcement agencies, and the like) will be transported and stored in accordance with this regulation until accountability is transferred. The following applies:
a. Arms. A report (transaction) by serial number will be made to the DOD Central Registry upon the demilitarization of each arm that has been previously entered into the DOD Central Registry.

(1) A report (transaction) will be furnished to the DOD Central Registry in the case of each arm disposed of other than by demilitarization.

(2) A demilitarization certificate will be completed by a technically qualified U.S. Government representative before residue from the demilitarization process is released from U.S. control.

b. Ammunition. Defense Reutilization Marketing Offices (DRMO) are not permitted to receive live ammunition items. The DRMO may receive inert ammunition components.

(1) In the United States, ammunition will be demilitarized by a DOD component activity having such a capability.

(2) Overseas, where U.S. forces do not have the capability to demilitarize ammunition items, demilitarization may be performed by approved contractors who are licensed or controlled by the government of the country in which the contractor operates.

(3) The military departments are responsible for the economical and effective demilitarization of ammunition under their accountability. A certificate will be executed by a technically qualified U.S. Government representative for all items demilitarized (DOD 4160.21–M–1, chapter 2).

c. Explosives. In addition to the requirements above, sales of surplus explosives in the United States are limited to individuals and companies holding a valid user’s or dealer’s license issued by the BATF and explosives, U.S. Department of Justice. Overseas sales are limited to companies controlled or licensed by the respective government. Purchasers of explosives must provide a Certificate Regarding End Use of Explosive Materials. (DOD 4160.21–M, chapter 2).

6–7. Disposal of abandoned and confiscated privately–owned firearms

The Anniston Army Depot, ATTN: SDSAN–DSP–PPC, Anniston, AL 36201–5000, is the CONUS disposal facility for shipping abandoned and confiscated privately–owned firearms. The following procedures apply:

a. Prior to shipment, register firearms in the DOD Central Registry per TM 38–214.

b. Use DD Form 1348–2 (Issue Release/Release Document with Address Label) to accomplish supply turn–in transactions with Anniston Army Depot.

c. Ship firearms via registered mail, return receipt requested.

d. Prior to shipment, clear firearms from PM registry files.

Chapter 7
Transportation

7–1. General

This chapter prescribes transportation security standards and procedures to be used in safeguarding categorized AA&E as described in appendix B.

a. Classified AA&E will be stored and transported in accordance with this regulation, DOD 4500.9–R, chapter 205, part II, and per AR 380–5, chapters 5 and 8. Where specific individual requirements differ between these 2 documents, the more stringent requirement will be followed.

b. Explosive ordnance disposal teams responding to off–station accidents or incidents will transport necessary explosive ingredients in accordance with requirements established by the senior mission commander concerned, based on the philosophy contained in this chapter.

c. Any AA&E in transit via the Defense Transportation System or its approved carrier will be provided security in accordance with the transportation security requirements enumerated in DOD 4500.9–R, chapter 205, part II and this regulation. Where specific individual requirements differ between these 2 documents, the more stringent Army requirement will be followed.

d. Any AA&E awaiting shipment in military terminals will be protected as specified in appendix D.

e. Army activities involved with AA&E shipments will implement a seal control program in accordance with AR 190–51, appendix D, to ensure accountability/control of seals. Such activities will appoint a seal custodian to manage the program. Seal control will include—

(1) Procurement.

(2) Storage.

(3) Accountability.

(4) Installation.

(5) Inspection.

(6) Response to seal anomalies.

(7) Removal and Inspection.
Disposal.

Accounting.


7–2. Responsibilities relating to transportation

The Commander, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) will—

a. Ensure that the transportation protective measures used for AA&E items are established in applicable tariffs, government tenders, agreements, or contracts.

b. Negotiate with commercial carriers for establishment of transportation protective measures to meet shipper requirements.

c. Determine the adequacy of the services provided by commercial carriers for movement of AA&E items.

d. Develop, administer, and maintain Joint transportation security procedures for the commercial movement of AA&E.

e. Serve as the DOD focal point for security and performance monitoring and oversight relative to the security of AA&E in transit in the custody of commercial carriers.

7–3. Standards

a. When used for transporting AA&E, the doors of approved intermodal containers (MILVANs, SEAVANs, or CONNEXs) will be securely closed and sealed. End–opening containers will be placed door–to–door during rail shipments. Barriers on the rail cars will be used to protect side–opening containers and deter the opening of such cars. The AA&E will be placed in the rear of containers behind nonsensitive items to reduce the opportunity of theft.

b. In the event of contingencies, exercises, or rotational unit movements where it is not practical to use containers, only armored vehicles that are locked and sealed will be used to ship AA&E. The AA&E will be provided double barrier protection by placing it in separate, locked, and sealed containers, affixed to the interior of the locked/sealed armored vehicles in a manner that precludes easy removal.

c. The AA&E shipments will normally be processed through military–operated and managed air and ocean terminals or through DOD approved commercial air and ocean terminals. A listing of such terminals is available from SDDC.

d. The in–transit protection of AA&E at commercial and military terminals will be in accordance with the DOD 4500.9–R, chapter 205 and applicable SDDC freight traffic rules.

e. Shipments of AA&E as defined in appendix B of this regulation will be prepared, inspected, sealed, released, and provided in–transit surveillance in accordance with DOD 4500.9–R, chapters 204 and 205. Shipments will be checked upon receipt by the receiving activity (consignee) to ensure that seals are intact and for any signs of theft, tampering, or damage. If there are such signs, an immediate inventory will be performed to determine the extent of theft/loss, tampering, or damage.

f. If the seals are intact, and there are no signs of damage or tampering, inventory quantity verification of Category I and II shipments will be conducted within 24 hours upon receipt.

g. Category III and IV shipments will be subjected to inventory quantity verification within 48 hours of receipt.

h. Instructions will be provided to rail carriers transporting Category I and II items requiring them to immediately notify consignees of shipment arrivals at rail yards serving the consignees and/or of the arrivals at the consignees’ activities.

i. The following factors will be considered also:

(1) Every effort will be made to consolidate shipment into truckload or carload quantities. Less than truckload shipments are considered more vulnerable to theft.

(2) Small arms repair technicians may travel to support facilities to effect on–site repairs instead of shipping of small arms for repair.

(3) When practical, arms and ammunition of the same caliber will not be shipped in the same container or conveyance.

(4) Shipments of arms and ammunition scheduled for demilitarization and retrograde shipments will receive the same protection as other shipments of AA&E.

(5) Security provided for AA&E at commercial and military terminals will conform to the standards set forth in appendixes C and D. The standards will be provided to the commercial carriers by SDDC.

(6) When possible, strap cutters should not be attached to palletized unit loads of ammunition prior to arriving at ammunition storage areas. The strap cutters should be shipped separately from the palletized ammunition.

(7) Shipments must be checked immediately upon receipt to ensure that the seals are intact and for any signs of damage or tampering. If there are any such signs, there must be an immediate inventory to verify quantities received and to determine the extent of any damage or tampering on all Category I and II AA&E and classified AA&E shipments. If the seals are intact, quantity verification must take place no later than the next working day. The
requirement to check seals and verify quantities received includes shipments of all categories of sensitive or classified AA&E and uncategorized Class A and B ammunition and explosives.

7–4. Special consideration for Category I items

a. Missile rounds will be packaged separately from launch and control equipment. Missiles will not be shipped in the same conveyance with launch and control equipment when shipment is by commercial motor carrier. Missiles and launch and control equipment may not be loaded into the same freight container (for example, MILVAN). Category I items on board pre-positioned ships are exempt from this restriction. Separately packaged launch and control equipment may be transported in the same aircraft or on the same ocean vessel. Missile and launch and control equipment in the possession of military units may be transported together at the discretion of the unit’s higher headquarters. Where satellite monitoring is not available, missile shipments will be provided by security escort vehicle service.

b. Serial number accountability will be maintained at all times from shipper to consignee. Each container will be checked, sealed, and locked by 2 agents of the shipper (in each other’s presence) before delivery to the carrier. This 2-person integrity is required at each trans-shipment point and terminal whenever the shipment loses its original identity (for example, when 2 or more shipments are consolidated into another container for further movement or if repacking is required).

c. Overseas commands may use local nationals for security surveillance to accompany U.S. personnel when Status of Forces Agreements prohibits the arming of U.S. personnel.

7–5. Special considerations for water shipments

a. The Defense Transportation System will transport AA&E using MSC-controlled vessels or U.S. flag vessels (with at least 2 ship’s officers who are U.S. citizens accepting security responsibility for the AA&E). When the above vessels are not available, MSC may approve use of foreign flag chartered vessels, provided—

   (1) Full responsibilities placed upon the carrier for the shipment must be delineated in applicable tariffs, tenders, agreements, or contracts between the carrier and SDDC.

   (2) The carrier and ship’s personnel are reasonably vetted in accordance with MSC-established guidelines and MSC specifies security and accountability measures which will compensate for lack of direct U.S. control.

   (3) There will be no port calls between departure port and port of destination.

   (4) After being off-loaded, AA&E will not be left unattended and will be taken into custody by U.S. personnel who will check the seals and the condition of the shipment.

b. Commanders at all levels will assess the threat and vulnerability of AA&E that transit through their area of responsibility. A risk assessment will be conducted and include the following safety and security risk factors:

   (1) The type of sealift assigned to the mission (U.S. Government, contractor, foreign flag carriers, and so on).

   (2) The security risk category of the AA&E.

   (3) The hazard classification of the ammunition and explosives.

   (4) The threat assessment and Force Protection conditions (FPCON). Commanders at all levels will employ appropriate threat mitigation actions to include—crew screening; use of electronic seals, transponders, or other technologies; and assignment of embarked security forces (mobile security force and/or fleet antiterrorist support teams, embarked security detachments; and combat escorts).

c. Prior to voyage, the shipping activity will provide a written stow plan detailing the location of the AA&E aboard ship and its protection requirements to the ship’s captain.

   (1) Stow plans must consider security concerns such as cargo compatibility segregation, securing of ordnance cargo in lock and sealed containers, and the stowage of SEAVANs and MILVANs so that doors are not accessible to stevedores or ship’s crew.

   (2) Break-bulk cargo should be stowed in this priority—

      (a) Lockers, reefer boxes, or deep tanks that can be locked and sealed.

      (b) Bins that can be boxed solidly with plywood or other appropriate materials and stowed in the upper decks of hatches immediately fore and aft of the ship’s house.

   (3) During ocean transit, AA&E will be stowed in separate, locked containers, inaccessible to unauthorized personnel. The containers will be subject to periodic surveillance by the vessel’s captain and/or the ship’s officers as prescribed in DOD 4500.9–R, chapter 205.

d. The AA&E shipments will be direct-voyage to destination. If the cargo must be off-loaded en route, it will be provided constant surveillance by DOD personnel, if available, or by U.S. citizen crewmembers pending reloading.

7–6. Special considerations for small quantity shipments

Small quantity shipments for the purposes of these provisions will be shipments of 200 pounds or less, or in the case of small arms, 15 or less Category II through IV individual weapons per shipment.

a. Arms. Small quantities, 15 or fewer, Category II through IV small arms may be sent via registered mail (return receipt requested) when the package size and weight meet U.S. Postal Service (USPS) requirements. Small quantities may also be shipped via DOD Constant Surveillance Service (CSS) (the only required protective service) when placed
in a locked container and the size, weight, and safety factors meet the carrier’s requirements. It is prohibited to ship Army weapons via the DOD Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA)—awarded—carriers under GSA schedule.

b. Ammunition. Small quantities, 200 pounds or less gross weight, of sensitive Category IV small arms ammunition and/or cartridge actuated devices.

c. Small arms and missile inert components. Small arms and missile components (excluding components containing live ammunition and explosive sub-assembling), may be sent by registered mail (return receipt requested) when the package size and weight meet USPS requirements.

d. Department of Defense Blanket Purchase Agreement—awarded—carriers under GSA schedule. An acceptable transportation alternative to DOD CSS for small quantities of Category IV small arms ammunition and/or cartridge actuated devices within the United States and its territories, is to ship via a DOD BPA—awarded—carrier under the GSA multiple award schedule and within the contract’s size and weight limitations. The following criteria applies:

(1) Ammunition must be less than .50 caliber.
(2) Individual requisitions are limited to 4,000 rounds or less.
(3) Maximum 4,000 rounds or less per unit package and each package must not exceed 150 pounds.
(4) Maximum 5 packages or 20,000 rounds per shipment per each conveyance with each package destined for a separate consignee.
(5) Unit packages not to exceed 200 pounds.
(6) Adhere to all other BPA contract shipping obligations including International Air Transportation Association and International Civil Aviation Organization safety certification regulations.
(7) The use of the DOD BPA option is prohibited for shipments of higher categories of ammunition and for shipment of arms and explosives.

7–7. Security of commercial shipments temporarily at Army installations and activities

a. After normal working hours, AA&E shipments arriving at Army installations and activities will be accepted by consignees and provided appropriate secure holding protection commensurate with the sensitivity category of the delivered items under such circumstances.

(1) Granting a holding area does not relieve the carrier of liability and it is within the prerogative of the installation commander or activity representative as to whether carrier personnel are to remain with the shipment to fulfill security requirements. Carrier is subject to pay for any additional expense incurred by the installation to accommodate their unscheduled, non–emergency arrival.

(2) Security measures, in excess of those required during transportation of the shipment are not mandated for carriers granted a holding area. Any decision to exceed transportation security standards prior to formal consignee receipt of the shipment rests with the installation commander or activity representative and are not mandated by DOD directive or Army regulation.

b. Army installation and activities will provide a secure holding area for AA&E shipments during emergency conditions (vehicle breakdowns, criminal/terrorist threats, and so on) in accordance with DOD 4500.9–R, chapter 205.

c. For deliveries of AA&E to DOD and DOD contractors from foreign contracts, the contract monitor will coordinate with applicable theater commands to arrange equivalent in–country security for delivery only to the nearest U.S. controlled port facility.

7–8. Overseas in–theater movements

Outside continental United States (OCONUS) commanders, based on host nation requirements, the local threat situation, and personnel staffing, will use discretion in providing adequate security in theater when transporting AA&E cargo. Transportation service outside of CONUS will adhere as closely as possible to the established requirements for CONUS shipments. When such service cannot be obtained, compensatory measures will be taken to achieve equivalent security standards.

7–9. Foreign military sales shipments

a. Foreign military sales shipments of AA&E will be made in accordance with DOD 5105.38–M.

b. Normally, FMS AA&E shipments will be shipped through the Defense Transportation System to military–controlled ports of embarkation. While in CONUS, such shipments destined to foreign governments, will be moved via SDDC–cleared commercial carriers.

c. Shipments subject to CONUS return for maintenance, testing, or coproduction agreements will contractually be provided equivalent security to that required by the DOD 4500.9–R and the Security Assistance Management Manual while in transit overseas and within CONUS.

d. Transportation plans for AA&E FMS shipments are required as part of the FMS negotiation process.

(1) Such plans will be coordinated in advance with the applicable Military Department Security Assistance Command or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as applicable.
(2) The SDDC will be contacted for assistance in developing the in–transit security portion of the transportation plan.

7–10. Movement of arms, ammunition, and explosives by unit or organization transportation

a. With the exception of weapons utilized by marksmanship weapons, it is prohibited to carry, move, or store AA&E in privately–owned vehicles either on– or off–installations.

b. Commanders will ensure that enough security measures are taken to protect AA&E being moved by unit or organization transportation, on– or off–installations. No AA&E items will be left unattended or unsecured at any time.

c. Categories I and II AA&E will be placed in the custody of a commissioned officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer (E–5 and above), or DOD civilian (GS–5 and above), or DOD contractor employee in a similarly responsive position. All movements of Category I and II AA&E require armed guards regardless of the FPCON.

d. Category III and IV AA&E will be under the continuous positive control of designated, responsible personnel.

e. Movement security criteria do not apply to AA&E issued to individual Soldiers or units performing mission requirements (see chapter 2 for PS requirements of AA&E deployed in the field for training or operational purposes).

f. Provisions of AR 190–14, paragraph 3–3, apply to transportation of individual weapons aboard commercial aircraft.

g. Bulk shipments of AA&E by unit transportation will be placed in approved shipping containers (for example, CONEX, MILVAN, SEAVAN). The container will be secured with approved locks.

(1) Containers will be placed door–to–door or door–to–immovable object to prevent unauthorized entry.

(2) A detailed packing list will be placed in the container for inventory purposes with serial numbered items listed by serial number.

(3) No AA&E will be left unsecured in vehicles.

h. Guard personnel are required to meet standards in accordance with AR 190–14 to include being briefed on rules for the use of force prior to escort mission. Transportation of sensitive conventional categorized AA&E, as defined in appendix B, off military installations during increased FPCON requires the following. Implementation of each successive FPCON will include the use of appropriate measures from the preceding condition.

(1) FPCON NORMAL. No discernable threat of terrorist activity. Routine security measures in a through h, above, apply.

(2) FPCON ALPHA. General threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel, nature and extent unpredictable.

(2a) Conduct daily liaison with supporting intelligence and security organizations.

(2b) Convene a special meeting of the installation PS council to review the threat situation and provide recommended actions to the installation commander.

(3) FPCON BRAVO. Increased or more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists.

(3a) Two drivers will accompany the shipment to ensure at least 1 driver maintains continuous observation of the shipment.

(3b) Required hazardous material (HAZMAT) placards, in accordance with Federal, State, and/or foreign regulations or laws, will be displayed on the vehicle.

(3c) Some type of communication (either radio or cellular telephone) is required for emergency purposes.

(3d) Approval of installation commander or designated representative (at location where ammunition supply point, weapons storage area, or armory where AA&E is stored) required for off–post shipments.

(4) FPCON CHARLIE. Terrorist incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating action against installations or personnel is imminent.

(4a) Postpone non–essential shipment of AA&E. Only shipments of AA&E required for force generations, contingency operations, execution of force protection/antiterrorism duties, explosive ordnance detachment teams responding to incidents, and training are authorized.

(4b) Commence use of armed guards for Category I through IV AA&E shipments (note that guards can be drivers).

(4c) Conduct liaison with State and local law enforcement prior to any shipment of AA&E to discuss support requirements, schedules, routes, and other information of mutual concern.

(4d) Approval of installation commander or designated representative (at location where ammunition supply point, weapons storage area, or armory where AA&E is stored) required for off–post shipments.

(5) FPCON DELTA. Applies when a terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence indicates likely terrorist action against a specific location.

(5a) For shipments deemed critical, ship by military air.

(5b) Commence use of a security escort vehicle with armed guards if unable to ship by military air.

(5c) Approval of HQDA, PMG is required for off–post shipments.
7–11. Provost marshal and security office support
The local or supporting PM and security office will provide assistance to installation transportation officers in matters relating to PS requirements for transportation and storage of AA&E.

7–12. Transportation of marksmanship weapons and ammunition
Marksmanship weapons and ammunition may be transported to, from, and between ranges, matches, and authorized storage locations in privately-owned vehicles in a secure manner as possible, consistent with the design of the vehicle. Such items must be protected from view and must not be left unattended during halts. Storage during overnight halts or matches must be in accordance with paragraph 4–6, above. Authorization to transport marksmanship weapons and ammunition in a privately-owned vehicle must be listed on travel orders or other official documentation.

Chapter 8
Reports, Investigative Aids, and Disposition of Records

8–1. General
The provisions of this chapter do not apply to privately-owned weapons.

8–2. Incident reports to components
a. The IMCOM and the ARNG will establish procedures to ensure receipt of a report of AA&E stolen, lost, unaccounted for, or recovered, including gains or losses due to inventory adjustments. Notification will be furnished in a manner commensurate with the seriousness or nature of the incident. The loss, theft, recovery, or inventory adjustment of the following will be reported:
   (1) One or more missiles, rockets, or Category II through IV arms.
   (2) One thousand rounds or more of ammunition smaller than 40mm and 1,000 rounds or more of 40mm automatic weapon ammunition.
   (3) Individual rounds of 40mm and larger nonautomatic weapon ammunition.
   (4) Individual mortar, grenade, and missile rounds.
   (5) Individual land mines, demolition charges, and blocks of bulk explosives.
   (6) Any other explosives, to include demolition explosives (for example, detonation cord, blocks of explosives (C–4)).
   (7) Any Category I or Category II item not otherwise included above.
   b. Commanders will—
      (1) Submit a Serious Incident Report if required by AR 190–40.
      (2) Within 72 hours, provide a report on DA Form 3056 (Report of Missing/Recovered Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives) (RCS Just–1010) on incidents meeting criteria in a, above. Inventory and in-transit losses or discrepancies of AA&E, not due to theft, recovered within 12 days, need not be reported on DA Form 3056.
      (3) Initiate a report of recovery on DA Form 3056 for AA&E items held as evidence by any local, State, or Federal law enforcement agency in the area. Notify the commander having lost the items.
      (4) Promptly submit appropriate report to the NCIC and DOD Central Registry (see para 8–3).
      (5) Conduct investigations per AR 15–6 when losses equal or exceed the amounts shown in appendix E. AR 15–6 investigations may be conducted for lesser amounts.
      (6) Reports will include incidents involving arms and ammunition meeting criteria in a, above, in the custody of a nonappropriated fund activity (such as an exchange, rod and gun club, or recreational marksmanship activity).
   c. The IMCOM and the ARNG will maintain records including, at the very minimum, all instances of thefts, losses, and recoveries of AA&E, including any reported under a, above.
   d. These records will include—
      (1) A summary of the circumstances in each instance.
      (2) Dates, locations, and units such as Active Army, ARNG, or USAR.
      (3) A statement regarding the loss or recovery based on the investigation, such as inventory, theft, in-transit, training, operational, or other.
   e. Prepare a consolidated report on all losses, thefts, recoveries, or inventory adjustment of AA&E for the calendar year. Submit this report to HQDA, ATTN: DAPM–MPD–PS, 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–2800, by 30 January of the following year.

8–3. Investigative aids
a. Lost, stolen, or recovered weapons will be entered in the NCIC per AR 190–27.
   b. The USACIDC will provide the BATF, Intelligence Division, BATF Headquarters, Department of the Treasury,
Washington, DC 20226–5000, information concerning theft or loss of AA&E falling within their investigative purview, within 72 hours of confirmed theft or loss.

c. Commanders/directors (without NCIC capabilities) and OCONUS installation commanders/directors, PMs, or their designated representatives, will send the completed DA Form 3056 to Director, Crime Records Center (CRC), 6010 6th Street, Building 1465, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060–5506. Lost, stolen, or recovered weapons entries into the NCIC from overseas commands will be made by Director, CRC.

d. Ammunition and explosive losses or recoveries will not be entered in the NCIC files.

e. Lost, stolen, or recovered weapons will be promptly entered in the DOD Central Registry per AR 710–3. Information on the source of the weapon report will be included. Recovered weapons will be cleared from the NCIC files.

f. Military weapons will be accepted from civil (local, State, and Federal) law enforcement agencies if both of the following conditions exist:

(1) The weapon can be identified as a military weapon. If the weapon satisfies the general specifications for a military weapon, assume that it is a military weapon. A serial number or other identification is desirable, but not required.

(2) The weapon is no longer required for evidence in criminal or administrative proceedings.

g. To identify weapon ownership, personnel may contact the DOD Central Registry at USAMC Logistics Support Activity, ATTN: AMXLS–MN (National Channel), Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898–7466. All OCONUS and CONUS agencies can call DSN 645–9972 or commercial (256) 955–9972.

h. Recovered weapons identified as property of another DOD agency will be returned to that agency only upon request of the agency concerned. Normally, the weapons will be considered Army property and treated as such. Serviceable weapons should be returned immediately to normal use if required by the activity. The weapon may be excess or not authorized to support the mission of the activity. If so, the weapon will be reported to the proper national weapons inventory manager for redistribution or reuse. If the national weapons inventory manager provides disposal instructions, the activity will dispose of the weapon according to existing disposal and demilitarization procedures.

i. Address inquiries on loss, theft, or recovery of firearms, ammunition, and explosives to HQDA (DAPM–MPD–PS).

8–4. Disposition of records
Department of the Army components (ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, IMCOM, and ARNG) will establish procedures to ensure that records reflect the final disposition of investigative action, including recoveries and disciplinary action, as appropriate. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to privately–owned weapons.
Appendix A
References

Section I
Required Publications

AR 15–6
Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers (Cited in paras 2–9, 8–2, E–1.)

AR 50–6
Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel, Chemical Surety (Cited in para B–2.)

AR 190–13
The Army Physical Security (Cited in paras 1–5, 1–6, 1–7, 1–12, 2–1, 2–6, 2–10, 4–5.)

AR 190–27
Army Participation in Criminal Justice Information Systems, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Cited in para 8–3.)

AR 190–40
Serious Incident Report (Cited in paras 1–12, 8–2.)

AR 190–51
Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive) (Cited in paras 4–1, 4–13, 5–8, 7–1.)

AR 190–56
The Army Civilian Police and Security Guard Program (Cited in para 2–10.)

AR 380–5
Department of the Army Information Security Program (Cited in paras 1–1, 3–6, 3–8, 4–3, 5–6, 5–12, 7–1, D–1.)

AR 380–67
The Department of the Army Personnel Security Program (Cited in para 3–6.)

AR 385–64
U.S. Army Explosives Safety Program (Cited in paras G–3, G–4.)

AR 710–2
Supply Policy Below the National Level (Cited in paras 2–6, 2–8, 4–4, 5–1, 6–1, 6–3, 6–4.)

AR 710–3
Asset and Transaction Reporting System (Cited in paras 4–13, 6–2, 8–3.)

AR 735–5
Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability (Cited in paras 2–9, 6–5, 8–3.)

AR 740–26
Physical Inventory Control (Cited in paras 2–6, 6–4.)

DA Pam 710–2–1
Using Unit Supply System (Manual Procedures) (Cited in para 4–4.)

Section II
Related Publications
A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read a related publication to understand this publication.

AR 190–14
Carrying Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties
AR 195–5
Evidence Procedures

AR 700 series
Logistics

AR 708–1
Logistics Management Data and Cataloging Procedures for Army Supplies and Equipment

AR 870–20
Museums and Historical Artifacts

DA Pam 385–64
Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards

DA Pam 710–2–2

DOD 4000.25–M
Military Assistance Program Address Directory (MAPAD) System

DOD 4145.26–M
DOD Contractors’ Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives

DOD 4160.21–M
Defense Materiel Disposition Manual

DOD 4160.21–M–1
Defense Demilitarization Manual

DOD 4500.9–R, chapter 205
Defense Transportation Regulation

DOD 5100.76–M
Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

DOD 5160.65–M
Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (Implementing Joint Conventional Ammunition Policies and Procedures)

DOD 5200.2–R
DOD Personnel Security Program

DOD 5220.22–M
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual

DOD 5220.22–R
Industrial Security Regulation

DOD 5105.38–M
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)

DOD 5200.8–R
Physical Security Program

DOD 6055.9–STD
DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards
DODD 3224.3

DODD 5100.76
Physical Security Review Board

DODD 5210.65
Chemical Agent Security Program

DODI 5200.08
Security of DOD Installations and Resources

CDA Pamphlet 18–1
Code Reference Guide

FM 3–19–30
Physical Security

NSWC 3046–93.2
Purchase spec portable vault

TDS–2078–SHR

TM 38–214
DOD Small Arms Serialization Program (DODSASP): Functional Users Procedures

USACE STD design drawing 40–21–21
Cage Security

USACE DEF design drawing 141–90–04
Arms Storage Room (Category II Arms) Design

USACE DEF design drawing 872–90–00
Chain-link security fence details

USACE DEF design drawing 872–90–1
Weapons Storage Area, Perimeter Warning Sign Design

UFC 4–020–04FA
Electronic Security Systems: Security Engineering

UFGS 26 20 00
Interior Distribution System

UFGS 28 20 01.00 10
Electronic Security System

GSA Fed Spec AA–D–600D
Door, Vault, Security

GSA Fed Spec AA–F–363D
Filing Cabinet, Security, Maps and Plans, General Filing Storage

GSA Fed Spec AA–V–2737
Federal Specification Modular Vault Systems
Section III
Prescribed Forms
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the APD Web site (http://www.apd.army.mil); DD forms are available on the OSD Web site (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm); Standard Forms (SF) and Optional Forms (OF) are available on the GSA Web site (http://www.gsa.gov).

DA Form 3056
Reporting of Missing/Recovered Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives (Prescribed in para 2–9.)

DA Form 4604
Security Construction Statement (Prescribed in para 2–2.)

DA Form 4930
Alarm/Intrusion Detection Record (Prescribed in para 3–6.)

DA Form 5513
Key Control Register and Inventory (Prescribed in para 3–8.)

DA Form 7281
Command Oriented Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Security Screening and Evaluation Record (Prescribed in para 2–11.)

Section IV
Referenced Forms

DA Form 2028
Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms

DA Form 2609
Historical Property Catalog

DA Form 3749
Equipment Receipt

DD Form 1348–2
Issue Release/Release Document with Address Label

DD Form 1907
Signature and Tally Record
Appendix B
Sensitive Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Security Risk Categorization

B–1. Application
The requirements of this regulation apply only to rounds of 40mm and larger, conventional, guided missile and rocket ammunition weighing 100 pounds or less per round and 1,000 or more rounds of ammunition smaller than 40mm. Blank ammunition, .22 caliber rimfire ammunition, and inert training ammunition are excluded from the requirements of this regulation. Further, artillery, tank, mortar ammunition exceeding 90mm are excluded from the requirements of this regulation.

a. On the basis of their relative utility, attractiveness, and availability to criminal elements, all AA&E will be categorized according to the risks involved. As a general rule, only arms, missiles, rockets, explosive rounds, mines, and projectiles that have an unpacked unit weight of 100 pounds or less will be categorized as sensitive for purposes of this regulation. Any single container that contains a sufficient amount of spare parts that, when assembled, will perform the basic function of the end item will be categorized the same as the end item.

b. The categories of missiles, rockets, and arms will be as stated in paragraph B–2. Nonnuclear missiles and rockets similar to those listed under Category I will automatically be included in that category as they come into the inventory.

c. Identifications, codings, corollary plans, and actions for PS accountability and transportation pertaining to sensitive conventional arms, rockets, missiles, ammunition, and explosives will be uniform throughout the DOD. These items will be integrated into standard catalog data by all services and will be included in applicable documents that address PS, accountability, storage, transportation, and other related functional activities. The Joint Ordnance Commander’s Group, through tri–Service coordination, will use the DLFs (tables B–1, B–2, B–3, B–4, B–5, and B–6) to determine the appropriate categories for ammunition and explosives items. Those responsible for the PS of facilities storing AA&E will look up the assigned categories in the Army Master Data File (AMDF). Examples of sensitive ammunition and explosive items are shown in paragraph B–2.

d. To ensure a uniform approach to sensitive item identification and coding, AMC will incorporate the criteria into its respective cataloging policies and procedures. The criteria will also become a part of the Federal Cataloging System. Sensitive AA&E items are identified by the controlled item codes per AR 708–1, chapter 7. These codes indicate the controls required for storing and transporting each category of AA&E and are listed in the AMDF. The AMDF is the official source of current security risk codification of all sensitive AA&E items. Codes assigned to specific AA&E items are shown in the monthly AMDF near the center of the microfiche under the column CIIC. The AMDF microfiche for AA&E and CDA Pamphlet 18–1 are available upon request from Chief, U.S. Army Materiel Command, Catalog Data Activity (AMXCA–DL), New Cumberland Army Depot, New Cumberland, PA 17070–5010. The basic responsibility for the assignment and correction of the codes rests with the designated data proponent. Per AR 708–1, chapter 5, the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command is primarily responsible for materiel management for weapons and ammunition, and the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command is primarily responsible for materiel management of large rockets and guided missiles. Further information or assistance regarding security risk codification may be obtained by contacting the AMC Logistics Assistance offices, which are located at selected installations Armywide.

e. The AMC will revise, as appropriate, ammunition and explosives codings by means of routine catalog data changes. The exception to applying the methodology in c, above will be when tri–Service agreement is reached on a case–by–case basis to place an item in a higher or lower security risk category than that indicated by the total numerical value.

B–2. Representative risk categories

a. Category I (missiles and rockets).

(1) Nonnuclear manportable missiles and rockets “in a ready to fire” configuration; for example, Redeye, Stinger, Dragon, Javelin, light antitank weapon (66mm), shoulder–launched multi–purpose assault weapon rocket (83mm), and AT–4 anti–armor launcher and cartridge (84mm). Also included are the tube–launched, optically tracked, wire–guided missile (TOW) weapon and the Hellfire missile.

(2) These weapons, when jointly stored or transported with the launcher tube and/or grip stock and the explosive round, though not in a ready–to–fire configuration will be considered Category I weapon items. moure is category also applies where the launcher tube and the explosive rounds are jointly stored or transported.

b. Arms.

(1) Category II. Light automatic weapons, including .50 caliber, M16A2 rifle, M4 rifle, Squad Automatic Weapon,
M60 machine gun, and 40mm MK 19 grenade launcher. Weapon components such as silencers, mufflers, and noise suppression devices will be treated as Category II items.

(2) **Category III.**

(a) Launch tube and gripstock for Stinger missile.

(b) Launch tube, sight assembly, and gripstock for Hamlet and Redeye missiles.

(c) Tracker for Dragon missiles.

(d) Mortar tubes up to and including 81mm.

(e) Grenade launchers.

(f) Rocket and missile launchers, unpacked weight of 100 pounds or less.

(g) Flame throwers.

(h) The launcher or missile guidance set or the optical sight for the ground–mounted TOW.

(i) Launch control unit for Javelin missile.

(3) **Category IV.**

(a) Shoulder–fired weapons, other than manportable missiles, rockets, and grenade launchers, not fully automatic.

(b) Handguns.

(c) Recoilless rifles, including 90mm.

c. **Ammunition and explosives.**

(1) **Category I.** Explosive complete rounds for Category I missiles and rockets (see a(1), above).

(2) **Category II.**

(a) Hand or rifle grenades, high explosive, and white phosphorus.

(b) Mines, antitank, or antipersonnel (unpacked weight of 50 pounds or less each).

(c) Explosives used in demolition operations (for example, C–4, military dynamite, and TNT).

(d) Critical binary munitions components containing “DF “ and “QL” when stored separately from each other and from the binary chemical munition bodies in which they are intended to be employed (see AR 50–6, chap 5).

(3) **Category III.**

(a) Ammunition, .50 caliber and larger, with explosive filled projectile (unpacked weight of 100 pounds or less each).

(b) Grenades, incendiary, and fuzes for high explosive grenades.

(c) Blasting caps.

(d) Supplementary charges (uninstalled, or installed in projectiles in a manner allowing easy removal without special tools or equipment).

(e) Bulk explosives.

(f) Detonating cord.

(4) **Category IV.**

(a) Ammunition with non–explosive projectile (unpacked weight of 100 pounds or less each).

(b) Fuzes, except for (3)(b), above.

(c) Grenades, illumination, smoke, and tear gas (CS)/chloroacetophenone (CN) (tear–producing).

(d) Incendiary destroyers.

(e) Riot control agents, 100 pound package or less.

(f) Ammunition for weapons in (3), above, not otherwise categorized.

### Table B–1
**Decision logic formulas (DLFs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor: 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utility:</strong> High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Casualty/Damage Effect:</strong> High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adaptability:</strong> Without modification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portability:</strong> Easily carried or concealed by 1 person.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor: 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utility:</strong> Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Casualty/Damage Effect:</strong> Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adaptability:</strong> Slight modification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portability:</strong> Can be carried by 1 person for short distances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table B–1
**Decision logic formulas (DLFs)—Continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Casualty/Damage Effect</th>
<th>Adaptability</th>
<th>Portability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Major modification</td>
<td>Requires at least 2 persons to carry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Impractical</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Impractical</td>
<td>Requires materials handling equipment (MHE) to move.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table B–2
**Risk factors—utility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High explosive, concussion, and fragmentation devices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Small arms ammunition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Ammunition items not described above—NONLETHAL, civil disturbance chemicals, incendiary devices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Impracticable</td>
<td>Practice, inert, or dummy munitions; small electric explosive devices; fuel thickening compound; or items possessing other characteristics which clearly and positively negate potential use by terrorist, criminal, or dissident functions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table B–3
**Risk factors—casualty/damage effect**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
<th>Casualty/Damage Effect</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extremely damaging or lethal to personnel; devices which will probably cause death to personnel or major material damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderately damaging or injurious to personnel; devices which could probably cause personnel injury or material damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Temporarily incapacitating to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Flammable items and petroleum based products readily obtainable from commercial sources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table B–4
**Risk factors—adaptability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
<th>Adaptability</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Without</td>
<td>Unusable as is; simple to function without modification use of other components.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B–4
Risk factors—adaptability—Continued

| Risk Factor: 2 | Adaptability: Slight Modification |
| Description: Other components required; or can be used with slight modification. |

| Risk Factor: 3 | Adaptability: Major Modification |
| Description: Requires the use of other components which are not available on the commercial market; or can be used with modification that changes the configuration. |

| Risk Factor: 4 | Adaptability: Impracticable |
| Description: Requires specified functions or environmental sequences which are not readily reproducible, or construction makes it incapable of producing high order detonation; for example, gas generator grains, and impulse cartridges. |

Table B–5
Risk factors—portability

| Risk Factor: 1 | Adaptability: High |
| Description: Items which easily can be carried by 1 person and easily concealed. |

| Risk Factor: 2 | Adaptability: Moderate |
| Description: Items whose shape, size, and weight allows them to be carried by 1 person for a short distance. |

| Risk Factor: 3 | Adaptability: Low |
| Description: An item whose shape, size, and weight requires at least 2 persons to carry. |

| Risk Factor: 4 | Adaptability: MHE Required |
| Description: The weight, size, and shape of these items preclude movement without MHE. |

Table B–6
Computation of risk factor numerical values

| Evaluation: High Sensitivity |
| Numerical Values of Risk Factors: (4–5) |
| Physical Security Risk Category Code: II |

| Evaluation: Moderate Sensitivity |
| Numerical Values of Risk Factors: (6–8) |
| Physical Security Risk Category Code: III |

| Evaluation: Low Sensitivity |
| Numerical Values of Risk Factors: (9–12) |
| Physical Security Risk Category Code: IV |

Notes:
1. The AMC will use the logic formula in table B–1, to determine the numerical values and the PS risk category codes as shown above. (Use only 1 factor value for each column and total the numbers for each column to obtain the security risk category.)

Appendix C
Physical Security Standards for Commercial Terminals

C–1. If the carrier service on the Government bill of loading is armed guard surveillance
Then the equivalent terminal standards are—
a. Stop must be at a carrier terminal, a State or local safe haven under 49 CFR or during emergencies, at a DOD safe haven or refuge location.
b. The vehicle or shipment must be under constant surveillance by an armed guard specifically dedicated to the shipment or shipments secured in an adequately lighted area that is surrounded by a chain–link fence, minimum height 6 feet, and continuously patrolled by an armed carrier or terminal employee who checks the shipment at least once every 30 minutes.

C–2. If the carrier service on the Government bill of loading is protective security service
Then the equivalent terminal standards are—
  a. If the shipment is unloaded from a conveyance, it must be at a facility cleared under the Defense Industrial Security Program or at a DOD safe haven and be placed under constant surveillance by a qualified carrier representative.
  b. As an alternative, the shipment may be placed in a closed area, vault or strong room approved by the Defense Investigative Service. Construction standards for closed areas, vaults, and strong rooms are contained in DOD 5220.22–M, appendixes IV and V.

C–3. If the carrier service on the Government bill of loading is dual driver protective service
Then the equivalent terminal standards are—
  a. Stop must be at a carrier terminal, a State or local safe haven under 49 CFR or, during emergencies, at a DOD safe haven or refuge location.
  b. The vehicle or shipment must be under constant surveillance by a qualified carrier or terminal representative who must keep the shipment in unobstructed view at all times and stay within 10 feet of the vehicle or the shipment must be secured in a fenced and lighted area under the general observation of a qualified carrier or terminal representative at all times.
  c. As an alternative, the shipment may be placed in a security cage.

C–4. If the carrier service on the Government bill of loading is Department of Defense constant surveillance service
Then the equivalent terminal standards are—
  a. Stop must be at a carrier terminal, a State or local safe haven under 49 CFR or, during emergencies, at a DOD safe haven or refuge location.
  b. The vehicle or shipment must be under constant surveillance by a qualified carrier or terminal representative who must keep the shipment in view at all times and stay within 100 feet of the vehicle or the shipment must be secured in a fenced and lighted area under the general observation of a qualified carrier or terminal representative at all times.
  c. As an alternative, the shipment may be placed in a security cage.

C–5. If the carrier service on the Government bill of loading is rail surveillance service
Then the equivalent terminal standards are—
  a. Within rail yards, rail surveillance service applies.
  b. If the carrier service on the Government bill of loading (GBL) is Within other terminals, shipment will be secured in a fenced and lighted area under the general observation of a qualified carrier or terminal representative at all times.

C–6. If the carrier service on the Government bill of loading is signature and tally record
Then the equivalent terminal standards are—
  a. Each person responsible for proper handling of a shipment during any terminal stop must sign the signature and tally record at the time they assume responsibility for a shipment.
  b. The shipment must always be in the custody of the last person signing the signature and tally record.

C–7. If the carrier service on the Government bill of loading is security cage requirements
The equivalent terminal standards will be in accordance with requirements identified in DOD 5220.22–M, appendixes IV and V.

Appendix D
Physical Security Standards for Military Terminals

D–1. Introduction
This appendix prescribes standards for protection of sensitive conventional AA&E at military transportation terminals. It also applies to sensitive classified AA&E that meet requirements of this regulation, as implemented by AR 380–5.
When a terminal has a separate, long-term storage mission, storage criteria of chapters 4 and 5 of this regulation apply to the long-term storage areas of the terminal. Criteria for commercially operated, in-transit transportation terminals are found in appendix B.

**D–2. Security priorities**

The provisions of this appendix are based on the following priorities for cargo and area security protection. The responsible command will ensure that security resources are allocated to meet the highest priority requirements first. The priorities, in descending order, are—

a. Category I cargo protection.

b. Pier and waterfront security.

c. Category II cargo protection.

d. Gates and perimeter security.

e. Category III and IV cargo protection.

f. Support activity security.

**D–3. Risk category identification**

Terminals will establish procedures to ensure prompt identification of the risk categories of arriving cargo in order to provide security protection required by this regulation. When cargo cannot be immediately identified upon arrival, it will be secured as Category I pending identification.

**D–4. Temporary storage**

a. Category I and II cargo.

   (1) **Fencing.** Category I and II cargo will be stored only in fenced and lighted areas dedicated to cargo storage. Fencing requirements in paragraph 5–4 apply.

   (2) **Supplemental controls.**

      (a) Category I temporary storage areas or individual conveyances will be equipped with IDS or provided constant surveillance. Pending installation of IDS, the intervals between checks may not exceed 1 hour. When IDS is used, patrol intervals may not exceed 8 hours.

      (b) Category II temporary storage areas or individual conveyances will be equipped with IDS or checked by a guard patrol at irregular intervals not to exceed 1 hour while in storage. When IDS is used, patrol intervals may not exceed 16 hours.

b. Category III and IV munitions cargo.

   (1) **Fencing.** Category III and IV cargo will be enclosed within barbed wire fencing where terminal perimeter fencing is not in place or does not meet the criteria of this regulation. New security lighting systems may not be programmed for Category III and IV storage areas unless determined necessary based on an assessment of the local threats and vulnerabilities.

   (2) **Supplemental controls.** IDS may not be programmed for Category III or IV storage areas unless determined necessary based on an assessment of the local threats and vulnerabilities. Cargo that is protected by IDS will be checked by a guard patrol at irregular intervals not to exceed 48 hours. Unalarmed cargo will be checked at least once each 24 hours.

   (3) **Placement of cargo.** Placement of cargo other than Category I and II in fenced or lighted areas will be in priority order based on the risk category of cargo.

**D–5. Cargo movement**

a. Category I and II.

   (1) Each Category I conveyance or integrated grouping of 5 or fewer conveyances moved within the terminal will be under continuous surveillance of at least 1 terminal employee or selected contractor employee under contract to the terminal to handle cargo. Where the terminal area is physically separated from a long-term storage area, movement between these areas will be under continuous armed guard surveillance, with 2 drivers for each conveyance.

   (2) Each Category II conveyance or integrated grouping of 5 or fewer conveyances moved within the terminal will be under continuous surveillance of at least 1 terminal employee or selected contractor employee under contract to the terminal to handle cargo. Where the terminal area is physically separated from a long-term storage area, movement between these areas will be under continuous employee surveillance, with 2 drivers for each conveyance.

b. Category III and IV cargo.

   (1) Category III and IV cargo will be moved within the terminal under the general surveillance of the terminal or contractor employees moving the cargo. There is no distance requirement for general surveillance. However, procedures for movement will ensure cargo is either within sight of employees or is provided the required guard patrol checks for storage areas.

   (2) Where the terminal area is physically separated from a long-term storage area, movement between these areas...
will be under continuous surveillance of at least 1 terminal employee or selected contractor employee for each conveyance.

D–6. Terminal area security
a. Waterfront and Ships at Berth. Piers and adjacent waterfront areas without cargo or ships will be patrolled at least hourly by an armed guard. When ships are at berth, piers will be patrolled by armed guard at irregular intervals not to exceed 30 minutes. The IDS may be used at the terminal commander’s discretion. When IDS is used, the patrol frequency may extend to 4 hours for piers or waterfront without ships or cargo. When cargo is present, armed guards, IDS surveillance, or patrol checks will be as prescribed for the highest category of cargo or at intervals not to exceed 30 minutes whichever is more stringent. Waterborne patrols will be used to augment land-based patrols where feasible.

b. Terminal Gates and Perimeter Areas. Terminal gates require continuous armed guard protection or surveillance while in use. Secured gates and perimeter areas require IDS protection or patrol checks at least once each 4 hours. When IDS is used, patrol intervals may extend to 24 hours.

D–7. Seals and twists
Terminals will install an approved seal on all AA&E conveyances on which the original shipper seal is removed. Additionally, all conveyances will have a No. 5 steel wire twist installed on door openings if the seal does not provide equivalent protection. Seal and twist checks for evidence of breakage or tampering will be made a part of regular patrol or surveillance procedures and of pier loading procedures. Category I and II seals will be verified by number once each shift.

D–8. Guard protection and surveillance
The requirements in paragraph 5–5, above, apply.

D–9. Terminal entry controls
a. Terminals will be closed areas with strict vehicle and pedestrian entry controls. All pedestrians or vehicles will be subject to search and a visitor control system will be established. When feasible, entry to the AA&E storage and processing areas will be separately controlled from the terminal administrative areas. Privately-owned vehicles may not be allowed into AA&E storage and processing areas of the terminal without the terminal commander’s permission. Hunting, if allowed, will be rigidly controlled and minimized.

b. Piers, waterfront, and AA&E storage and processing areas will be designated and posted as restricted areas.

Appendix E
Losses/Overages List for AR 15–6 Investigations

E–1. General
Appendix B describes in detail items that must be secured according to this regulation. When losses equal or exceed the amounts shown below, commanders will conduct investigations under AR 15–6, chapters 3 through 5, and as specified in chapter 2 of this regulation. AR 15–6 investigations may be conducted for lesser amounts.

E–2. Losses/overages list
a. Missiles and rockets. All nonnuclear missile systems in a ready-to-fire configuration or when the launcher tube and explosive rounds are jointly stored or transported.

b. Arms. One or more of the following:
(1) Machine guns and automatic weapons up to and including .50 caliber.
(2) Launch tube and gripstock for Stinger missile.
(3) Launch tube, sight assembly, and gripstock for Hamlet and Redeye missiles.
(4) Tracker for Dragon Missiles.
(5) Mortar tubes.
(6) Grenade launchers.
(7) Rocket and missile launchers, unpacked weight of 100 pounds or less.
(8) Flame thrower.
(9) Launcher and/or missile guidance set and/or the optical sight for the TOW.
(10) Shoulder-fired weapons, other than grenade launchers, not fully automatic.
(11) Handguns.
(12) Recoilless rifles up to and including 90mm.
(13) Major parts (for example, barrels, frames, receivers, major subassemblies).
(14) Subcaliber training aids capable of firing a projectile by means of a powder charge.
Other individually operated weapons that are—
(a) Portable and can be fired without special mounts or firing devices.
(b) Have potential use in civil disturbances.
(c) Vulnerable to theft.

2. Ammunition and explosives.
   (a) Explosive complete rounds or warheads for Category I missiles and rockets.
   (b) Hand or rifle grenades (fragmentation, high explosive, concussion, white phosphorus, or incendiary).
   (c) Mortar rounds up to and including 81mm.
   (d) Mines, antitank, or antipersonnel.
   (e) High–explosive complete rounds or war–heads for missiles and rockets other than Category I (unpacked weight of 50 pounds or less each).
   (f) Safety and arming device.
   (g) Incendiary destroyer.
   (h) 40mm grenades for grenade launcher.
   (i) Demolition kits.
   (2) Ten pounds or more of explosives used in demolition operations (for example, C–4; military dynamite, TNT, and so on).
   (3) 100 or more blasting caps, detonators, destruction or firing devices, primers, squibs, and igniters.
   (4) 100 or more fuses.
   (5) 100 or more supplementary charges.
   (6) 100 or more explosive bolts, explosive cartridges, and related devices.
   (7) 50 pounds or more bulk explosives.
   (8) 1000 feet or more detonating cord and safety fuse.
   (9) Two or more riot control agents, 100–pound package or less.
   (10) Two or more rounds of ammunition of 40mm and larger nonautomatic weapon.
   (11) One or more artillery, naval, tank, and mortar ammunition, 75mm and larger.
   (12) Ammunition for weapons in paragraph b, above, not otherwise categorized.
   (13) One box or more (normally 16 or more) grenades, illumination, smoke, and CS/CN (tear–producing).
   (14) End items of conventional and guided missile ammunition (except artillery rounds, bombs, and torpedoes) that—
      (a) Have an individual item (for example, unit of issue) container or package weight of 60 pounds or less.
      (b) Have potential use in civil disturbances.
      (c) Are vulnerable to theft.

Appendix F
Specification for Intrusion Detection System Signs

F–1. Specification for Intrusion Detection System signs
A sample IDS sign that may be used is shown below in figure F–1. The sign is flat with shape, size, and legend as shown. The sign face should consist of reflectorized sheeting bonded to an aluminum backing.

F–2. Sign composition
Sign backing is flat, degreased, etched, and unpainted aluminum alloy, type 6061T6, not less than $\frac{1}{16}$–inch thick. For interior posting, plastic or wood could be used.

F–3. Overseas areas
In non–English speaking overseas areas, a sign in the language of the host country should be mounted alongside the English language sign. In the United States and its possessions where a major minority language is spoken, similar signs may be posted as a safety precaution.
Appendix G
Criteria for Facilities Storing Sensitive arms, ammunition, and explosives

G–1. New facility criteria for the storage of Category II through Category IV arms
New facilities constructed to store Category II through Category IV arms will meet the following criteria:

a. Walls. Walls will be of 8 inches of concrete reinforced with No. 4 reinforcing bars at 9 inches on center in each direction in each face of the wall. Reinforcement in the 2 faces of the wall will be staggered on each face to form a projected grid approximately 4–1/2 inches square. Reinforcement in the walls will be tied into floors and ceilings in accordance with American Concrete Institute standards.

b. Ceiling and roofs. Ceilings and roofs will be of reinforced concrete construction. The thinnest portion may not be less than 6 inches. reinforcing bar spacing will form a grid so that the area of any opening does not exceed 96 square inches using No. 4 bars or larger.

c. Floors. Floors, if on grade, will be a minimum of 6–inch thick reinforced concrete construction reinforced with 6 inches by 6 inches, W4 by W4 welded wire fabric or equivalent steel reinforcing bars (based on area of steel per square foot). Where the floor slab acts as the ceiling of an underlying room or area, the ceiling standards will apply. Where equivalent steel reinforcing bars are used, bar spacing will form a grid so that the area of any opening does not exceed 96 square inches.

d. Doors and door frames. The door will be GSA approved Class 5 armory door per GSA Fed Spec AA–D–600D. A GSA approved Class 5 vault door is not encouraged due to its electromechanical lock. Double door protection for arms storage facilities is not required. Door frames will be per Fed Spec AA–D–600D.

e. Windows and other openings. Windows are not authorized. Ducts, vents, and other openings of 96 square inches or more with the least dimension greater than 6 inches will be secured in accordance with 1 of the following methods and otherwise limited to the minimum number and size that are essential —
(1) Sealed with material comparable to that forming the adjacent walls.

(2) Fitted with any of the barriers below with bars or steel mesh securely embedded in the structure of the building or welded to a steel frame that will be securely attached to the wall with fastenings inaccessible from the exterior of arms storage facility.

(a) Three-eighth inch or larger hardened steel bars with vertical bars not more than 4 inches apart and with horizontal bars welded to the vertical bars so that the openings do not exceed 32 square inches.

(b) A minimum of 8-gauge high carbon manganese steel mesh with 2-inch diamond grid.

(c) A 6-gauge cold drawn steel wire mesh with 2-inch diamond grid when 8-gauge mesh above is not available.

G–2. Criteria for existing facilities storing Category II through IV arms

The following exceptions to the new facility criteria are permitted for storing Category II through IV arms in an existing facility located on or off a military installation.

a. Doors and door frames. Door frames, for doors other than Class 5 doors specified in paragraph G–1, will be as follows:

(1) Door bucks, frames, and keepers will be rigidly anchored and provided with anti-spread space filler reinforced to prevent disengagement of the lock bolt by prying or jacking of the door frame. The frames and locks for both interior and exterior doors will be so designed and installed as to prevent sufficient removal of the frame facing or the built-in locking mechanism to allow disengagement of the lock bolt from outside a secured room when the door is closed and locked.

(2) Construction requirements for door frames and thresholds will be as exacting as those for the doors themselves. For example, where metal doors are used, the frame and thresholds will be of metal. Various types of hinges are commercially available. When choosing the proper type of hinge for secure area doors, hinges will be of the fixed pin security hinge type or equivalent; exposed hinge pins will be peened, spot welded, or otherwise secured to prevent removal; and hinge mounting screws may not be exposed to the outside of the arms room except for Class 5 steel vault door hinges.

b. Windows and other openings. Windows and other openings will be kept to a minimum. When required, windows and other openings will be secured as required in paragraph G–1.

c. Walls. Walls will be as required in paragraph G–1, except that in addition to those construction types, 12-inch unreinforced, solid brick interlocked between the inner and outer courses will be allowed. In addition, where walls do not meet that standard or the standards in paragraph G–1, they may be reinforced per paragraph G–2f.

d. Ceilings and roofs. Ceilings and roofs of existing facilities will be reinforced concrete where possible in accordance with paragraph G–1. Where ceilings and roofs do not meet the standards in paragraph G–1, they may be reinforced per paragraph G–2f.

e. Floors. Floors, if on grade, will meet the standards in paragraph G–1. Where the floor slab acts as the ceiling of an under-lying room or area, the ceiling standards in paragraph G–2d apply. Where such floors do not meet the standards in paragraph G–1, they may be reinforced per paragraph G–2f.

f. Existing wall, ceiling, roof, or floor reinforcement. Walls, ceilings, roofs, and floors that do not meet the structural criteria above will be reinforced by 1 of the following methods. When any of these reinforcing materials are used, they will be applied and fastened to the existing structure so that destruction of the existing and reinforcing materials is required to remove them.

(1) Steel bars. Three-eighth inch steel bars, 4 inches apart with bars in 1 direction welded to the bars in the opposite direction so that the openings do not exceed 32 square inches. Ends of the steel bars will be embedded securely in the structure of the building or welded to a steel frame securely fastened to the building.

(2) Steel landing mat. Marsten, Irving, or pierced steel planking.

(3) Expanded metal. Three-sixteenth-inch with a maximum grid opening of 1 inch by 3 inches and weighing a minimum of 4.27 pounds per square foot.

(4) Steel plate. One-fourth-inch steel plate.

(5) Steel mesh. Number 8-gauge high carbon manganese steel, or for existing facilities, number 6-gauge cold drawn steel wire with a grid of not more than 2 inches center to center. The number 6-gauge material is not authorized for future upgrading.

(6) Sheet metal. For existing facilities, 16-gauge steel sheets or plates securely fastened together. This material is not authorized for future upgrading.

G–3. New facility criteria for the storage of all categories of ammunition and explosives

Storage structures approved for storage in DA Pam 385–64 will be considered to comply with this regulation subject to the additional security requirements in chapter 5.
G–4. Existing facility criteria for the storage of ammunition and explosives
Existing storage structures approved for storage in DA Pam 385–64 will be considered to comply with this regulation subject to the additional security requirements in chapter 5.

G–5. Portable explosives magazines
Portable explosives magazines as specified in Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center Technical Data Sheet 2078–SHR (TDS–2078–SHR) are authorized for the storage of limited quantities of Category II through Category IV ammunition and explosives. Quantities of the ammunition and explosives to be stored inside the magazine will be coordinated with the installation Army Safety Office. Additional PS measures in paragraph 5–2, above, apply for the category of the ammunition and explosives stored (that is, IDS, security lighting, fencing, and so on).

G–6. GOLAN–10 explosives container
The GOLAN–10 container is authorized for the storage of training quantities of explosives for the training of military working dogs. Refer to the DOD Safety Board approval memo for restrictions and conditions associated with the use of the GOLAN–10. If this container is used, the following additional controls will be implemented:

a. Intrusion Detection System. GOLAN–10 containers storing Category II through IV A&E will be provided with approved IDS. Facilities without operational IDS require constant surveillance by armed guards.

b. Security patrols. Containers will be checked by a security patrol periodically as dictated by any threat and by the vulnerability of the facility. The intervals between checks will not exceed 8 hours.

c. Security lighting. Exterior lighting will be provided for all GOLAN–10 containers. The lighting will be sufficient to allow guards or individuals responsible for maintaining surveillance to see illegal acts such as forced entry or the unauthorized removal of AA&E during hours of reduced visibility. Lighting will provide a minimum of 0.2 foot–candles (2 lux) illumination measured on the horizontal plane at ground level.

d. Locks and hasps. Doors used to access GOLAN–10 containers will be locked with an approved high security locking device or high security padlock and hasp providing comparable protection to the locks.

Appendix H
Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Conventional Ammunition and Explosives During Production, Manufacturing, Renovation, and Demilitarization Operations at Government Facilities

H–1. General information
This appendix presents the minimum PS standards for ammunition and explosives during production, manufacturing, renovation, and demilitarization operations at Government facilities.

a. In–depth security will be attained by applying the PS standards of this appendix for production, manufacturing, renovation, and demilitarization operations.

b. Sensitive ammunition and explosives will be protected according to their sensitivity categories.

c. Different degrees of sensitivity may apply to ammunition and explosives during various stages of manufacture, renovation, or demilitarization. Commanders will pay special attention to the safeguarding of inventory items by judiciously implementing and monitoring PS measures.

d. Control of sensitive ammunition and explosives will conform to normally prescribed accountability procedures and inventory requirements. Commanders must establish local accountability systems that will identify shortages or losses if there are indications of unauthorized access to the production, manufacturing, renovation, and demilitarization areas during non–operational hours. Commanders will also establish procedures that will verify that the end–of–shift, beginning–of–shift counts, match for all munitions/sub–munitions.

H–2. Standards

a. Key and lock control standards will comply with the standards of this regulation.

b. All buildings used in production, manufacturing, renovation, and demilitarization operations will be within a designated and posted restricted area and during non–operational hours. All primary entrance and emergency doors will be secured with padlocks meeting Commercial Item Description (CID) A–A 59487. All other doors may be secured from the inside with bars or dead bolt locking devices. Windows, glass door panels, and similar man passable openings less than 12 feet from the ground level will be protected with security screening equivalent to 9–gauge chain–link material when the area is not separately fenced with FE–5 or equivalent chain–link fencing.

c. Service magazines must meet the construction requirements described in chapter 5 of this regulation. Service magazines will be secured with high security padlocks and hasps that meet the requirements of this regulation. Scrap cages will also be secured with approved padlocks. (The above requirements are not mandatory when sensitive items are under constant surveillance during operating hours and are removed to proper storage during non–operating hours.)
d. Installation of IDS is optional on production buildings or service magazines unless used for unattended storage of Categories I and II items.

e. Vans and rail cars used to support production, manufacturing, renovation, and demilitarization operations will be secured with 5–gauge wire twists or low security padlocks meeting CID A–A 59487 and controlled with serial numbered seals.

f. Badges or pass systems will be used for access control and will be administered through security or operations personnel. All packages and vehicles entering and departing the area will be inspected.

g. Personnel authorized unaccompanied access to production, manufacturing, renovation, and demilitarization operations will meet the command developed background check standards specified in chapter 2 of this regulation.

h. Security patrols are required as follows:
   (1) Category I and II—
      (a) Operating hours— none.
      (b) Non–operating hours— 24–hour intervals when protected by IDS. Category I and II items will not be left unattended. When these items are not in proper storage and protected by IDS, they will remain under constant surveillance.

   (2) Category III and IV—
      (a) Operating hours— none.
      (b) Non–operating hours— none required when protected by IDS. At least 1 patrol every 24 hours if IDS is not present. Patrols will be more frequent if local vulnerability and threat assessments warrant increased security.

   (3) Security Patrols for Service Magazines are as required for magazines in chapter 5 of this regulation.

i. Protective Lighting is required for primary and emergency entrances of production, manufacturing, renovation and demilitarization operations and all service magazines. If protective lighting is inoperable, security patrols will physically check primary and emergency entrances a minimum of once per hour for Category I and II items and once per 8–hour security guard shift (or 3 times per 24–hour time period) for Category III and IV.

j. If the production, manufacturing, renovation and demilitarization operations are not a part of an ammunition and explosive storage area, Privately–owned vehicles may be parked inside the production, manufacturing, renovation, and demilitarization operations area provided they are inspected on entry and exit and are not parked within 30 feet of any structure or 100 feet of any service magazine.

k. Munitions undergoing test or quality production related cycling may remain in designated production line buildings the minimum time necessary in accordance with safety criteria identified in DOD 6055.9 STD.

l. In–process explosives/ammunition items and/or explosives that are required for initial daily start–up operations that must remain in buildings when not attended will be secured and/or marked in such manner as to provide positive accountability and inventory controls. Magazine data cards or equivalent may be used for this purpose.

m. Positive means to detect unauthorized loss of explosives scrap material (such as accumulated explosives dusts from vacuum collection systems, bag house, or riser scrap/flake/powder explosive material, and so on) from production processes must be instituted. Positive means may include regular, periodic, unannounced, and/or random inspections of personnel lockers, vehicles, lunch boxes, brief cases, and so on. In creating such inspection programs, commanders should coordinate with their servicing staff judge advocate.

Appendix I
Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Guide

I–1. Application
This appendix provides a guide that may be used to quickly check for compliance with PS requirements. The guide—

   a. Is not intended to be used in place of applicable regulations.
   b. Is only a guide.
   c. Does not cover all security requirements for AA&E.

I–2. Physical Security Compliance

Location: (Enter location)
Unit: (Enter unit)
Date: (Enter date)

   a. Arms room.
      (1) Was the arms storage facility designated as a mission essential/vulnerable area (AR 190–13, para 2–4d(1))? 
      (2) Was the storage facility wherein arms were stored, designated and posted as a restricted area (AR 190–11, para 4–15 and AR 190–13, para 6–3 and 6–4)?
(3) Was security lighting at the entrance or issue window of the arms room (AR 190–11, para 4–2c)?
(4) Were switches for exterior lights located in such a place as to be inaccessible to unauthorized personnel (AR 190–11, para 4–2c)?
(5) Was the most secured door to the arms storage facility secured with a high security padlock and hasp (AR 190–11, para 4–2e(1))? 
(6) Did the arms room maintaining IDS have signs displaying the fact that IDS was present (AR 190–11, para 4–16)?
(7) Were PS inspections conducted at least every 18 months (AR 190–11, para 2–6a; and AR 190–13, para 2–11b)?
(8) Was the arms room, not continuously manned or under constant surveillance, protected by IDS (AR 190–11, para 4–2e)?
(9) Was the arms room protected by at least 2 types of sensors, one of which is a volumetric sensor (AR 190–11, para 3–6c)? (Have armorer conduct test.)
(10) Were bimonthly operational checks to IDS being conducted and recorded. (AR 190–11, para 3–6c)?
(11) Check the IDS agreement. Does it require either a response by security personnel or law enforcement authorities to respond within 15 minutes (AR 190–11, 3–6b)?
(12) Have qualified engineer personnel verified the structural composition of the arms room on DA Form 4604, indicating thereon the highest construction Category met (AR 190–11, para 2–2d)?
(13) Is the AA&E storage facility approved for the storage of the highest category of AA&E stored therein? If not, has a waiver been approved (AR 190–11, para 4–2(a)(2))? 
(14) Was DA Form 4604 posted in each AA&E storage facility and readily available for inspection (AR 190–11, para 2–2d)?
(15) Was DA Form 4604 revalidated by qualified engineer personnel at least every 5 years (AR 190–11, para 2–2d)?
(16) In the arms room, a facility not continuously manned, were weapons stored in racks/containers weighing more than 500 pounds or were the racks/containers fastened to the structure or fastened together in groups totaling more than 500 pounds (AR 190–11, para 4–2b(4))? 
(17) Were locally fabricated racks in use certified by engineers as meeting construction specifications (AR 190–11, para 4–2b(2))? 
(18) Was ammunition authorized for retention in the unit arms room stored separately in banded or sealed cartons or locked containers (AR 190–11, para 5–8c(1)(a))?
(19) Were ammunition containers in the unit arms room weighing less than 500 pounds fastened to the structure or fastened together, with bolts or chains equipped with secondary padlocks, in groups totaling more than 500 pounds (AR 190–11, para 5–8c(1)(a))? 
(20) Were weapons stored in the arms room inventoried by serial number monthly (AR 190–11, para 2–6d; AR 710–2, para 1–13d; para 2–12 d, and table 2–1, para j; and DA Pam 710–2–1, para 9–11b)? As part of this inspection, check physical count of M16 rifles with the armorer’s hand receipt. If the count is off, conduct a 100 percent inventory of the weapons.
(21) Had the same individual conducted consecutive inventories of weapons (AR 190–11, para 2–6d; AR 710–2, para 1–13d, 2–12d, and table 2–1, para j; and DA Pam 710–2–1, para 9–11b)?
(22) Did records of monthly inventories reflect those weapons that were signed out or in maintenance at the time of the inventories (AR 190–11, para 2–6d; AR 710–2, para 1–13d; and DA Pam 710–2–1, para 9–11b(4))? 
(23) Were individuals drawing their weapons from the arms room turning in DA Form 3749 (AR 190–11, para 2–6d; AR 710–2, para 1–13d; and DA Pam 710–2–1, para 5–5d(3))? 
(24) When weapons were issued for periods of 24 hours, did individuals—
(a) Enter their signature in ink, as it appeared on DA Form 3749, Equipment Receipt?
(b) Enter the nomenclature and serial number of the weapon drawn?
(c) Enter the date/time of the transaction on the issue sheet/log (AR 190–11, para 2–6d; AR 710–2, para 1–13d; and DA Pam 710–2–1)?
(25) When weapons were returned to the arms room, were entries on the issue sheet/log voided? Did the individual receiving the returned weapons enter the date/time, and his/her initials on the issue sheet/log (AR 190–11, para 2–6d; AR 710–2, para 1–13d; and DA Pam 710–2–1, para 5–5d(4))? 
(26) Had individuals authorized unaccompanied access to receive, store, or issue arms, undergone a command security screening/background check (AR 190–11, para 2–11b)?
(27) Had persons not authorized unaccompanied access to the arms room been allowed access to the IDS keys (AR 190–11, para 3–8b)?
(28) Is the unaccompanied access list (by name, duty position) signed by the unit commander and posted inside the arms room (AR 190–11, para 4–19a)?
(29) In the unit arms room, were privately–owned weapons or authorized war trophies stored in a locked container separate from military weapons (AR 190–11, para 4–5a(1))?
(30) In the unit arms room, were privately-owned weapons inventoried in conjunction with, and at the frequency of the inventory of Government weapons (AR 190–11, para 4–5a(2)(b))?

(31) Has a DA Form 3749 been issued for each privately owned weapon stored in the arms room (AR 190–11, para 4–5a(2)(a))?

(32) Is the DA Form 3749 retained in the arms room when the weapon is in the possession of the individual owner (AR 190–11, para 4–5b(3))?

(33) Are privately-owned weapons withdrawn from the unit arms room only upon approval of the unit commander or the commander’s designated representative (AR 190–11, para 4–5b(4))?

(34) Are applicable local regulations and State and local law information on ownership, registration, and possession of weapons and ammunition posted on unit bulletin boards (AR 190–11, para 4–5a(3))?

(35) Is the retention and storage of incendiary devices and explosives prohibited in the unit arms room (AR 190–11, para 4–5a(6))?

b. Ammunition and explosives storage areas.

(1) Are Category I and II ammunition and explosives stored in earth-covered magazines and igloos (AR 190–11, para 5–2a(1))?

(2) Are Category I and II ammunition and explosives protected by an intrusion detection system (IDS) (AR 190–11, para 5–2a(2)(a))?

(3) In the event of IDS failure, are armed guards posted 24 hours each day to maintain constant, unobstructed observation of the Category I and II storage facilities (AR 190–11, para 5–2a(2)(a))?

(4) Are security checks conducted once every 24 hours for IDS protected Category I and II facilities (AR 190–11, para 5–2a(2)(b))?

(5) Are security checks conducted at irregular hours not to exceed 48 hours for Category III and IV facilities (72 hours, IDS protected) (AR 190–11, para 5–2b)?

(6) Are Category I and II storage facility protected by security fencing (AR 190–11, para 5–3)?

(7) Are unmanned gates to ammunition and explosives storage areas locked (AR 190–11, para 5–3g)?

(8) Do clear zones extend 12 feet on the outside and 30 feet on the inside of the perimeter fence for Category I and II AA&E (para 5–3j)?

(9) Are clear zones for Category I and II free of all obstacles, topographical features and vegetation exceeding 8 inches in height (AR 190–11, para 5–3j)?

(10) Is security lighting provided for Category I and II storage facilities (AR 190–11, para 5–4)?

(a) Switches installed so that they are not accessible?

(b) Lights covered with wire mesh screen?

(11) Are the ammunition and explosives storage facilities secured by a high security lock and hasp (AR 190–11, para 5–6a)?

(12) Upon entering and exiting ammunition and explosives storage areas, are personnel and vehicles checked for unauthorized material (AR 190–11, para 5–9a)?

(13) Are Privately Owned Vehicles prohibited from ammunition and explosives storage areas (AR 190–11, para 5–9a)?

(14) Are persons requiring frequent recurring entrance to ammunition and explosives areas listed on an entry control roster or issued a photographic security badge (AR 190–11, para 5–9a)?

(15) Are doors used for access to Category I storage facilities locked with 2 locking devices, one of which is a high security lock and hasp (AR 190–11, para 5–6c)?

(16) Are Category I missiles and rockets stored in open storage (AR 190–11, para 5–8d)?

(17) When Category I missiles in open storage at vehicle holding areas, aircraft cargo holding areas, or unit storage, are they stored in an approved container or in a totally enclosed storage structure (AR 190–11, para 5–8e)?

c. Key and lock control.

(1) Are keys to arms storage buildings, rooms, racks, and containers maintained separately from other keys and accessible only to those individuals whose official duties require access to them (AR 190–11, para 3–8)?

(2) Is a current roster of these individuals kept within the unit (AR 190–11, para 3–8)?

(3) Is the key control register kept in a locked container (AR 190–11, para 3–8)?

(4) Are padlocks and their keys inventoried by serial number semi-annually (AR 190–11, para 3–8)?

(5) Are combinations to locks on vault doors or GSA approved Class 5 or Class 6 security containers changed annually or upon change of custodian or armorer (AR 190–11, para 3–8)?

(6) Is the key and lock custodian appointed in writing (AR 190–11, para 3–8)?

(7) Is the DA Form 5513 being utilized to sign out keys and is the form properly filled out (AR 190–11, para 3–8)?
Appendix J
Joint–Services Interior Intrusion Detection System Operational Checks

J–1. Joint–Services Interior Intrusion Detection System Operational Test
Arms room ID number:
Date:

a. The following test procedures have been developed specifically for the Joint–Services Interior Intrusion Detection System (J–SIIDS) and are directly applicable for J–SIIDS installations. For installations having commercial intrusion detection systems, it may be necessary to modify these procedures to reflect differences in commercial equipment operation.
b. Follow the basic test procedure below for each protected area.
   (1) Basic test procedure—
      (a) Contact the MP desk prior to conducting the operational tests. Identify yourself, your location (for example, building name/number and room number), and the purpose of the test. Inform them that multiple alarms will be generated during the test.
      (b) Before conducting the J–SIIDS operability tests, it will be necessary to close all doors and openings equipped with balanced magnetic switches and it will be necessary to mask ultrasonic motion sensors, passive infrared motion sensors, and passive ultrasonic sensors so the tester can test each individual sensor without generating unintentional alarms from the other sensors in the protected area. Close doors/drawers or otherwise secure protected objects equipped with the capacitance proximity sensor. Allow 1 minute for the system to stabilize.
      (c) Set the control unit mode switch to the test/reset position.
      (d) Conduct J–SIIDS Operational Tests #1 – #6 for applicable sensors.
      (e) Unmask all sensors.
      (f) Contact the MP desk. Identify yourself, your location (for example, building name/number and room number). Verify that they received multiple alarms during the test period. If the protected area is equipped with an alarm latching switch which must be tested, inform the MP desk that this test will be conducted. Place the control unit mode switch in the access position. Verify with the MP desk that the zone status is access.
      (g) Conduct J–SIIDS Operational Test #7 for the alarm latching switch (If so equipped).
      (h) Contact MP desk. Verify that the zone status is access. Inform them of test completion.
   (2) Test/inspection guide—
      (a) This arms room passed:
      (b) This arms room failed: (contact maintainer for service)
      (c) Tester name:
      (d) Signature:

J–2. J–SIIDS operational test #1—balanced magnetic switch

a. The balanced magnetic switch consists of a magnet assembly and a reed switch assembly enclosed in individual housings. The switch assembly is mounted to the moveable door or window. With the door or window closed, the magnet assembly acts on the switch assembly holding it closed to complete a circuit. When the door or window is opened, the magnet moves away from the switch releasing it. As the switch is released, it opens the circuit causing a alarm. Balanced magnetic switches (BMS) are used to detect the opening and closing of doors, windows, skylights, and other similar moveable entryways.
b. Test procedure:
   (1) Verify the control unit mode switch is in the test/reset position.
   (2) With the door/window closed and locked, attempt to rattle or move the door/window. Alarm should not activate. If an audible signal initiates from the control unit, contact maintainer for adjustment.
   (3) Slowly open the door, gate, or window. An audible alarm should initiate immediately from the control unit when the latching edge of the opening has moved not more than 1–1/4 inches from the closed position.
   (4) Close the door, date, or window. After 10 seconds, the audible alarm will stop at the control unit.
   (5) Repeat steps 2, 3, and 4 for each BMS installed in the protected area.
c. Test/inspection guide:
   (1) Number of BMS in this room:
   (2) Number of BMS in this room passed:
   (3) Number of BMS in this room failed (contact maintainer for service):

a. The capacitance proximity sensor (CPS) establishes an electrical field around the protected objects, which must be metallic and insulated from ground. An intruder approaching or touching the protected object disturbs the field causing a change in system capacitance, resulting in an alarm.

b. Test procedure:
   (1) Verify the control unit mode switch is in the test/reset position.
   (2) Slowly approach the protected area. An audible alarm should sound at the control unit immediately either just prior, or as you touch the object.
   (3) After the audible signal initiates, move away from the object. The control unit audible signal will stop within 1 minute.
   (4) Repeat steps 2 and 3 for each protected object.

c. Test/inspection guide:
   (1) Number of objects protected by CPS in this room:
   (2) Number of objects protected by CPS in this room passed:
   (3) Number of objects protected by CPS in this room failed: (contact maintainer for service)
   (4) Tester name:
   (5) Signature:

J–4. J–SIIDS operational check #3–passive infrared motion sensor

a. All objects radiate infrared energy to some degree. The intensity of infrared energy emitted is dependent on the temperature, color, and surface texture of the object. Infrared energy is always present, and its intensity changes as the temperature of the object changes. The passive infrared motion detector is able to detect an intrusion because the entry of an intruder into the detection field abruptly changes the background level of infrared energy being sensed by the detector, and an alarm signal is generated.

b. Test procedure:
   (1) Verify the control unit mode switch is in the test/reset position.
   (2) Unmask the passive infrared motion sensor (PIMS) being tested.
   (3) Allow 1 minute for system to stabilize.
   (4) Conduct a walk test by beginning at a point outside the protected area or at the doorway to the protected area moving along likely intruder paths until audible alarm is activated at the control unit.
   (5) Re–mask the sensor.
   (6) Repeat steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 for each PIMS in the protected area.

c. Test/inspection guide:
   (1) Number of PIMS in this room:
   (2) Number of PIMS in this room passed:
   (3) Number of PIMS in this room failed (contact maintainer for service):
   (4) Tester name:
   (5) Signature:

J–5. J–SIIDS operational test #4–passive ultrasonic sensor

a. The passive ultrasonic sensor (PUS) is a microphonic type device which detects the ultrasonic energy frequencies produced by breaking construction materials such as wood, glass, masonry, cinder block, brick, or metals. Different structural materials transmit different specific frequencies, thus, the range, detection characteristics, and effectiveness are variable from surface to surface.

b. Test procedure:
   (1) Verify the control unit mode switch is in the test/reset position.
   (2) Unmask the passive ultrasonic sensor to be tested.
   (3) Allow 1 minute for system to stabilize.
   (4) Use a set of metallic keys (6 or more) on a ring to generate noise. Jingle the keys 4 to 6 times at 1–second intervals. Testing should take place along the walls or other protected surfaces where intrusion is likely, not in the middle of the room. At the end of the fourth to sixth jingle, an audible signal should initiate immediately at the control unit. The audible alarm will stop at the control unit 10 seconds after the sensor is out of alarm.
   (5) Re–mask the sensor.
   (6) Repeat steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 for each passive ultrasonic sensor in the protected area.

c. Test/inspection guide:
J–6. J–SIIDS operational test #5–vibration signal detector

a. Vibration signal detectors (VSD) are typically mounted directly on expanded metal cages, walls, and ceilings. Attempts to penetrate structural materials generate shock waves which are transmitted through the structural material to the sensor. Different structural materials transmit different specific frequencies, thus, the range, detection characteristics, and effectiveness are variable from surface to surface.

b. Test procedure:
   (1) Verify the control unit mode switch is in the test/reset position.
   (2) Allow 1 minute for system to stabilize.
   (3) Tap the protected surface with a solid object several times in succession. An audible signal should initiate from the control unit when the required number of taps or pulses have been received within the proper time interval. The audible signal will stop at the control unit 10 seconds after the detector is out of alarm.
   (4) Repeat steps 2 and 3 for each vibration signal detector in the protected area.

c. Test/inspection check list:
   (1) Number of VSD in this room:
   (2) Number of VSD in this room passed:
   (3) Number of VSD in this room failed: (contact maintainer for service)
   (4) Tester name:
   (5) Signature:

J–7. J–SIIDS operational test #6–ultrasonic motion sensor

a. Ultrasonic motion sensor (UMS) detection operates on the Doppler frequency shift principle. A pattern of inaudible sound waves, generally in the 20 to 45kHz range are transmitted into the room and monitored by the system receiver(s). Intruder motion within the room disturbs the sound wave pattern, altering its frequency. The change in frequency or Doppler shift is detected and an alarm is generated.

b. Numerous configurations of the sensor and detection pattern are available, including wall mounts, ceiling mounts, and covert mounts where the sensor is disguised as an everyday office or home object. Sensors are available as transceivers where both transmitter and receiver are mounted in the same housing, or as split head systems where individual transmitters and receivers are utilized. The type and location of the transmitters and receivers determine the detection pattern and extent of coverage.

c. Test procedure:
   (1) Verify the control unit mode switch is in the test/reset position.
   (2) Unmask the ultrasonic motion sensor to be tested.
   (3) Allow 1 minute for system to stabilize.
   (4) Conduct a walk test by beginning a point outside the protected area or at the protected area boundary and moving along likely intruder paths until an audible signal is initiated at the control unit. The audible alarm will stop at the control unit 10 seconds after the sensor is out of alarm.
   (5) Re–mask the sensor.
   (6) Repeat steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 for each ultrasonic motion sensor installed in the protected area.

d. Test/inspection guide:
   (1) Number of UMS in this room:
   (2) Number of UMS in this room passed:
   (3) Number of UMS in this room failed: (contact maintainer for service)
   (4) Tester name:
   (5) Signature:

J–8. J–SIIDS operational check #7–alarm latching switch

a. The alarm latching switch (ALS) is incorporated into the intrusion detection system to provide individuals with a means of signaling, in a covert manner, that they have been placed under duress. Is intended to be foot operated and located in such a way that it can be easily reached and covertly operated during duty hours. For the protection of the user, the alarm latching switch must never annunciate in the area where they are located.

b. Test procedure:
(1) Activate the alarm latching switch to be tested. Test should be accomplished with the control unit in the access position.

(2) Call the MP desk and verify that they received an alarm from the zone under test. If no alarm was received, contact the maintainer for service.

(3) Reset the sensor by removing the switch cover and depressing the red reset switch. Install the cover.

(4) Reset the control unit by placing the control unit mode switch to the secure position momentarily and then setting the mode switch to the access position.

(5) Contact MP desk and verify that the zone status is access.

(6) Repeat steps 1 through 5 for each alarm latching switch to be tested.

c. Test/inspection guide:

(1) Number of ALS in this room:

(2) Number of ALS in this room passed:

(3) Number of ALS in this room failed: (contact maintainer for service)

(4) Tester name:

(5) Signature:
Glossary

Section 1
Abbreviations

AA&E
arms, ammunition, and explosives

ACOM
Army Command

ALS
alarm latching switch

AMC
U.S. Army Materiel Command

AMC (R&D)
U.S. Army Materiel Command, Research and Development

AMDF
Army Master Data File

AR
Army regulation

ARNG
Army National Guard

ASCC
Army Service Component Command

ASP
ammunition supply point

BATF
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

BMS
balance magnetic switch

BPA
Blanket Purchase Agreement

CCTV
closed circuit television

CDA
catalog data activity

CID
commercial item description

CMS
central monitoring station

CG
commanding general

COE
Chief of Engineers
CONNEX
container express

CONUS
continental United States

CPS
capacitance proximity sensor

CRC
Crime Records Center

CS/CN
tear gas/chloroacetophenone

CSS
Constant Surveillance Service

DA
Department of the Army

DES
Director, Emergency Services

DLF
decision logic formulas

DOD
Department of Defense

DODD
Department of Defense directive

DODI
Department of Defense instruction

DRMO
Defense Reutilization Marketing Offices

DRU
Direct Reporting Unit

ES–SALD
Executive Agent for Small Arms Logistics and Demilitarization

FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Fed Spec
GSA Federal specification

FLOSA
field level munitions storage area

FM
field manual

FMS
foreign military sales
FPCON
Force Protection conditions

GBL
Government bill of loading

GSA
General Services Administration

HAZMAT
hazardous materials

HQDA
Headquarters, Department of the Army

IDS
Intrusion Detection System

IET
initial entry training

INSCOM
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

IMCOM
U.S. Army Installation Management Command

J–SIIDS
Joint–Service Interior Intrusion Detection System

LEA
law enforcement activity

MAL
master authorization list

MHE
materials handling equipment

MI
Military Intelligence

MILVAN
military van

MP
military police

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NFESC
Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center

NCIC
National Crime Information Center

NSN
national stock number
Section II

Terms

Access (when pertaining to a restricted area or CCI)
Personnel movement within a restricted area that allows the chance for visual observation of, or physical proximity to, either classified or protected materiel. It is also the ability and opportunity to obtain detailed knowledge of CCI through uncontrolled physical possession. External viewing or escorted proximity to CCI does not constitute access.

Army Command (ACOM)

Aggressor
Any person seeking to compromise an asset. Aggressor categories include criminals, terrorists and protestors.

Ammunition
A device charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition, riot control agents, chemical herbicides, smoke and flame, for use in connection with defense or offense, including demolition. Excluded from this definition are devices charged with chemical agents defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub. 1 and nuclear or biological materiel. Ammunition includes cartridges, projectiles, including missile rounds, grenades, mines, and pyrotechnics together with bullets, shot and their necessary primers, propellants, fuses, and detonators individually or having a unit of issue, container, or package weight of 100 pounds or less. Blank, inert training ammunition and caliber .22 ammunition are excluded.

Antiterrorism
Defensive measure used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by military forces.

Armed guard surveillance
A service that provides armed guards to maintain constant and specific surveillance of shipments for which the service is requested. Armed is defined as having a firearm and appropriate ammunition readily available for immediate use. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Arms
A weapon included in AR 190–11, appendix A, that will or is designated to expel a projectile or flame by the action of the explosive, and the frame or receiver of any such weapon.

Army Service Component Command
Asset
Any resource requiring protection.

Aviation facility
A department of the Army activity or area collocated with facilities for the takeoff and landing of aircraft. The facility 
has the mission of command and control of administrative, operational, training, and/or logistical support of Army 
aviation.

Badge
A security credential that is worn on the possessor’s outer garment and validates (his or her) authority for access to a 
restricted area.

Bulk storage
Storage in a facility above the using or dispensing level specifically applicable to logistics warehouse and depot stocks. 
This applies to activities using controlled medical substances and items (such as pharmacies, wards, or clinics) only 
when a separate facility (building or room) is used to store quantities that exceed normal operating stocks.

Cable seal lock
A seal in which the cable is passed through the locking hardware of a truck trailer or railcar door and the bullet nose is 
inserted into the barrel and the end of the cable until securely anchored. Once locked any force exerted to separate the 
lockpoint from the lockbody will strengthen its connection. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Carrier custodian
An employee who has been assigned responsibility for controlled shipments containing SECRET material by the carrier 
and who has been issued a personnel security clearance by the Government. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Certification
The process whereby a patrol or detector dog’s and handler’s proficiency is verified to be in compliance with minimum 
training standards.

Chains
Chains used to secure racks or containers will be of heavy-duty, hardened steel chain, welded, straight-link steel that 
meets Federal Specification RR–C–271D. The steel will be galvanized of at least 5/16-inch thickness or of equal 
resistance required to force, to cut, or break an approved low security padlock. An example of such a chain is Type 1, 
Grade C, Class 4 NSN 4010–0–149–5583.

Closed circuit television
Television that serves a number of different functions, one of which is PS. As it pertains to the field of PS, CCTV is 
used to augment, not replace, existing IDS or security patrols. It is not used as a primary sensor, but rather as a means 
of assessing alarms. A CCTV also may be used as a surveillance means, but if used in this way, it will augment, not 
replace, existing IDS.

Closed post
An Army installation or activity to which ground and water access is controlled at all times by perimeter barriers with 
limited, manned entry control points.

Closed vehicle or equipment
A conveyance that is fully enclosed with permanent sides and a permanent top, with installed doors that can be locked 
and sealed. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Combatting terrorism
Actions, including AT and CT, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Commercial–type vehicle
A vehicle designed to meet civilian requirements, and used without major modifications, for routine purposes in 
connection with the transportation of supplies, personnel, or equipment.

CONNEX
A reusable container for shipment of troop support cargo, quasi–military cargo, household goods, and personal 
baggage.
Constant surveillance service
A service that is an integral part of the provisions of 49 CFR 397 (reference (b)) that a carrier must apply when transporting hazardous or Class A and B explosive materials. It provides constant surveillance over a shipment. The transporting conveyance containing the shipment must be attended at all times by a qualified representative of the carrier. A motor vehicle is “attended” when the person in charge of the vehicle is awake and not in a sleeper berth and is within 100 feet of the vehicle, provided the vehicle is within the person’s obstructed field of vision. The qualified representative “attending” the vehicle must—
   a. Be aware of the nature of the material contained in the vehicle.
   b. Have been instructed on procedures to follow in case of emergency.
   c. Be authorized to move the vehicle and have the means and capability to do so. The CSS does not include a signature and tally service as provided under signature security service (SSS) (see DOD 5100.76–M).

Container Express
A reusable container for shipment of troop support cargo, quasi–military cargo, household goods, and personal baggage.

Containerization
A box or other device in which a number of packages are stored, protected, and handled as a unit in transit; for example, CONEX, MILVAN, and SEAVAN. This term also refers to the shipping system based on large cargo–carrying containers that can be easily interchanged between trucks, trains, and ships, without rehandling of contents. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Container on a flat car
A large box–like demountable body without undercarriage used to transport cargo that is mounted on a railroad flat car. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Constant surveillance
Observing or protecting a storage facility containing AA&E by a human, intrusion detection system, closed circuit television, or combination, to prevent unobserved access, or make known any unauthorized access to the protected facility.

Continuous surveillance
Constant unobstructed observance of items or an area to prevent unauthorized access. Continuous surveillance may be maintained by dedicated guards, other on–duty personnel, or intrusion detection systems and those enhanced by closed–circuit television.

Controlled area
See restricted area.

Controlled cryptographic item
A secure telecommunications or information handling equipment ancillary device, or associated cryptographic component, which is unclassified but is controlled.

Controlled medical substance
A drug or other substance, or its immediate precursor, listed in current schedules of 21 USC 812 in medical facilities for the purpose of military treatment, therapy, or research. Categories listed in this section are narcotics, amphetamines, barbiturates, and hallucinogens.

Counterterrorism
Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Crime analysis
The process used to determine the essential features of a criminal act. It is a mandatory part of any crime prevention program.

Crime prevention
The anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk, and initiation of some action to remove or reduce it. Crime prevention is a direct crime control method that applies to before–the–fact efforts to reduce criminal opportunity, protect potential human victims, and prevent property loss.
Crime prevention inspection
An on–site evaluation of the crime prevention program of a unit, section, office, or other facility.

Crime risk management
The development of systematic approaches to reduce crime risks.

Crisis management team
A team found at a major command or installation level. A crisis management team is concerned with plan, procedures, techniques, policies, and controls for dealing with terrorism, special threats, or other major disruptions occurring on Government installations and facilities. A crisis management team considers all aspects of the incident and establishes contact with the AOC.

Critical communications facility
A communications facility that is essential to the continuity of operations of the National Command Authority during the initial phases of national emergencies, and other nodal points or elements designated as crucial to mission accomplishment.

Cryptographic component
The embodiment of a cryptographic logic in either hardware or firmware form, such as a modular assembly, a printed circuit board, a microcircuit, or any combination of these.

Cryptographic equipment
Any equipment employing a cryptographic logic.

Cryptographic logic
A deterministic logic by which information may be converted to an unintelligible form and reconverted to an intelligible form. Logic may take the form of engineering drawings, schematics, hardware, or firmware circuitry.

Day gate
Any barriers, used in a doorway or entrance to pharmacy or medically sensitive item storage areas, that prevents unauthorized personnel access during operating hours. Such barriers normally are not the sole protection afforded the entrance during non–operating hours; however, during operating hours, the barrier ensures positive entry control by on–duty personnel (for example, electronic buzzer control entry to the area after positive identification by receptionist or on–duty personnel).

Dedicated guards
Individuals charged with performing the primary task of safeguarding designated facilities, material, and personnel within a defined area during a tour of duty. A dedicated guard may perform this function as a static post. He or she remains within or on the perimeter of a protected area and maintains continuous surveillance over that which is being protected during the tour of duty.

Defense Transportation System
Consists of military controlled terminal facilities, Military Airlift Command controlled airlift, Military Sealift Command controlled or arranged sealift, and Government controlled air or land transportation. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Demilitarization
The act of destroying the offensive or defensive characteristics inherent in certain types of equipment and materiel. The term comprehends mutilation, scrapping, burning, or alteration designed so as to prevent the further use of such equipment and materiel for its originally intended military or lethal purpose.

Direct Reporting Unit

Double–locked container
A steel container of not less than 26–gauge which is secured by an approved locking device and which encases an
inner container that also is equipped with an approved locking device. Cabinet, medicine, combination with narcotic
locker, NSN 6530–00–702–9240, or equivalent, meets requirements for a double–locked container.

Dromedary
A freight box carried on and securely fastened to the chassis of the tractor or on a flatbed trailer. The dromedary is
demountable by the use of a forklift truck, is protected by a plymetal shield, and is equipped with doors on each side
that may be locked with seals or padlocks. All explosive items carried in the dromedary must be compatible and in
compliance with 49 CFR 177 (ref (c)) or host nation regulations (DOD 5100.76–M).

Dual driver protective service
A service requiring SSS plus continuous attendance and surveillance of the shipment through the use of 2 drivers.
   a. The vehicle containing the shipment must be attended at all times by 1 of the drivers. A vehicle is attended when
      at least 1 of the drivers is in the cab of the vehicle, awake, and not in a sleeper berth or is within 10 feet of the vehicle.
   b. An SSS signature and tally requirements are not required between the same pair of drivers for a particular
      movement (DOD 5100.76–M).

Duress alarm system
A method by which authorized personnel can covertly communicate a situation of duress to a security control center or
to other personnel in a position to notify a security control center (DOD 5100.76–M).

Duress or holdup alarms
Devices which allow personnel on duty to transmit a signal to the alarm monitoring station from which an armed
response force can be dispatched if a holdup or a duress situation occurs.

Emergency aircraft
An aircraft designated by the commander to respond to emergency situations and provide lifesaving and property–sav-
ing services. Normally, such aircraft has special equipment and markings. Air ambulances and fire fighting aircraft are
examples.

Emergency vehicle
A vehicle designated by the commander to respond to emergency situations and provide lifesaving and property–saving
services. Normally, the vehicle has special equipment and markings. Ambulances and fire fighting and military or
security police vehicles are examples.

Enclosed vehicle or equipment
A conveyance that is fully enclosed with permanent sides and permanent top, with installed doors that can be locked
and sealed.

Entry control (when pertaining to a restricted area)
Security actions, procedures, equipment, and techniques, employed within restricted areas to ensure that persons who
are present in the areas at any time have authority and official reason for being there.

Escorted personnel (when pertaining to a restricted area)
Those persons authorized access to a restricted areas who are escorted at all times by a designated person.

Escorts and couriers
Military members, U.S. civilian employees, or DOD contractor employees responsible for the continuous surveillance
and control over movements of classified material. Individuals designated as escorts and couriers must possess a
Government–issued security clearance at least equal to that of the material being transported.

Exception
An approved permanent exclusion from specific requirements of this regulation. Exceptions will be based on a
case–by–case determination and involve unique circumstances which make conformance to security standards impossi-
ble or highly impractical. An exception can also be an approved permanent deviation from the provisions of this
regulation.

Exclusion area
See restricted area.
**Exclusive use**
A conveyance unit or vehicle that is used only for a shipment from origin to destination without transfer of lading, and that permits locking of the unit and use of seals.

**Explosives**
Any chemical compound, mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion. The term includes, but is not limited to, individual land mines, demolition charges, blocks of explosives (dynamite, trinitrotoluene, C–4, and other high explosives), and other explosives consisting of 10 pounds or more; for example, gunpowder or nitroguanidine.

**Facility**
Any single building, project, or site.

**Force Protection**
Security program developed to protect Soldiers, civilian employees and family members, facilities and equipment, in all locations and situations. This is accomplished through the planned integration of combating terrorism, PS, operations security, protective services and law enforcement operations, all supported by foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs.

**Greater security**
A seal tracing and inspection rail service for unclassified sensitive cargo that includes a military traffic expending service and provides—
\[\begin{align*}
   a. & \text{ Inspection of railcars at major terminals by railroad personnel for evidence of forced entry or tampering with seals or security devices.} \\
   b. & \text{Name of carrier reporting.} \\
   c. & \text{Time of inspection; that is, a.m. or p.m.} \\
   d. & \text{Actual arrival and actual departure time from inspection terminal (DOD 5100.76–M).}
\end{align*}\]

**Handler**
A military police person or DOD civilian guard or police person who has been qualified by training and certification to care for, train, and employ a military working dog.

**Handling**
Controlled physical possession without access.

**High risk personnel**
Personnel who, by their grade, assignment, value, location, or specific threat, are more likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets.

**Independent power source**
A power source, normally battery, independent of any other source (DOD 5100.76–M)

**Industrial and utility equipment**
Equipment used in the manufacture or in support of the manufacture of goods and equipment used to support the operation of utilities such as power and water distribution and treatment.

**In flight**
The condition of an aircraft from the moment when all external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened for disembarkation.

**Installations**
Such real properties as Reserve centers, depots, arsenals, ammunition plants (both contractor–operated and Government–operated, hospitals, terminals, and other special mission facilities, as well as those used primarily by troops (see also JCS Pub. 1)

**Internal controls (when pertaining to a restricted area)**
Security actions, procedures, and techniques employed within restricted areas to ensure persons who are present in these areas at any time have authority and official reason.

**Intrusion detection system**
The combination of electronic components, including sensors, control units, transmission lines, and monitoring units
integrated to be capable of detecting 1 or more types of intrusion into the area protected by the system and reporting
directly to an alarm monitoring station. The IDS will be an approved DOD standardized system such as the Integrated
Commercial Intrusion Detection System or command–approved commercial equipment.

**Justification for major system new start**
A requirement document that the combat developer prepares with the material developer, training developer, manpower
and personnel planner, and logistician. A justification for major system new start is prepared to describe the mission
need and justifies the acquisition of a major new system at program initiation in the acquisition cycle.

**Kennel facilities**
The buildings, the kennels, the runs, and the exercise and training areas which are used to house, care for, and train
military working dogs.

**Key and lock control system**
A system of identifying both locks and their locations and personnel in possession of keys and/or combinations.

**Keying**
The process of establishing a sequence of random binary digits used to initially set up and periodically change
permutations in cryptographic equipment for purpose of encrypting or decrypting electronic signals, for controlling
transmission security processes, or for producing other keys.

**King Tut block**
A King Tut block is a specially designed large concrete block. It is placed in front of an igloo or magazine entrance
with a fork lift. Access to the igloo or magazine therefore requires a fork lift to move the block. The King Tut block is
of sufficient weight to prevent removal without a fork lift.

**Letter of agreement**
A document jointly prepared and signed by the combat and materiel developers when a potential materiel system need
has been identified and it has been determined that 1 or more technological approaches may satisfy the need. Even
though it may be in an early stage of development, the letter of agreement will address the materiel system from the
Total System Management standpoint. The letter of agreement describes operational, technical, training, personnel, and
logistical system unique events that must be undertaken to produce the total system.

**Lightweight construction**
Building construction other than reinforced concrete or masonry (concrete block or clay brick) such as wood or metal
siding.

**Limited area**
See restricted area.

**Locked container**
A container or room of substantial construction secured with an approved locking device. For pharmacy operating
stocks, lockable automated counting systems meet requirements for a locked container.

**Locks**
Locks should be considered as delay devices only, not as positive bars to unauthorized entry, since any lock can be
defeated by expert manipulation or force.

a. **Padlocks.**
(1) **High security padlock.** A key–operated padlock that meets military specification MIL–DTL–43607H, NSN:
5340–01–510–2351, designed to resist forced entry and surreptitious entry.
(2) **Internal locking device.** A DOD–approved key–operated locking system affixed to AA&E Category I and II
storage structures. Can be used as “an alternative to the current high security padlock and hasp requirement.” The dual
cylinder model meets the 2 person integrity requirements. Information on procurement and installation of the internal
locking device may be obtained from the NFESC, Port Hueneme, CA 93043–5000, (805) 982–3542 (DSN 551–3542)
(3) **General field service padlock.** A key–operated padlock that meets GSA Fed Spec FF–P–2827. This padlock is
recommended in applications where padlocks are exposed to grit, corrosive environments or freezing conditions.
(4) **Medium security padlocks.** Military Specification MIL–P–43951, open shackle with clevis and chain, NSN
5340–00–799–8016. Authorized for continued use to secure Categories III and IV AA&E only until stocks are depleted
or replaced.
(5) **Low security padlocks.** Commercial Item Description A–A–1927, hardened steel shackle and case, without chain,
(6) Contact. Any questions regarding the above specifications will be addressed to the DOD Lock Program Technical Manager, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, Code C66, 560 Center Drive, Port Hueneme, CA 93043–4328 (DSN 551–1567 or 551–1212).

b. Hasps.

(1) **High security hasp.** A high security hasp (NAPEC hasp) is a shrouded hasp that meets military specification MIL–DTL–29181C. It is approved for use with the high security padlock to secure all categories of AA&E. The hasp has a cover that protects the lock from cutting or hammer tools and inclement weather. It should be used to secure Category I and II AA&E storage facilities. When replacement of a hasp on Category III, IV or uncategorized AA&E is necessary, this hasp should also be used.

(2) **Hasp, pin–type, locking T.** This hasp that was authorized previously to secure ammunition storage magazines. Magazines were secured using the installed locking bar in conjunction with a T pin and high security padlock. The locking T hasp does not provide adequate security for sensitive AA&E. It must be replaced with a high security hasp to enhance security. It will not be used to secure AA&E storage facilities.

(3) **Built–in combination locks.** Built–in combination locks, meeting Underwriters Laboratories Standard 768, Group 1 (NSN 5340–01–375–7593) are approved for use on GSA approved Class 5 vault doors and GSA approved Class 5 weapons containers storing unclassified material and unclassified AA&E.

**LOGAIR**

Long–term contract airlift service within CONUS for the movement of cargo in support of the logistics system of the military Services (primarily the Army and Air Force) and Defense agencies (DOD 5100.76–M).

**Major disruption on installations**

Acts, threats, or attempts to commit such acts as kidnapping, extortion, bombings, hijackings, ambushing, major weapons thefts, arson, assassination, and hostage taking on a military installation. These acts that have potential for widespread publicity require special response, tactics, and management.

**Military traffic expediting service**

A service providing for movement from origin to destination in the shortest time possible for specifically identified rail shipments, and which is required for the shipment of firearms and other sensitive shipments. This service, which uses electrical communications between members of the Association of American Railroads, is available for either single–line haul or joint–line movements and provides progress reports as required (DOD 5100.76–M).

**Military van (MILVAN)**

Military–owned demountable container, conforming to U.S. and international standards, operated in a centrally controlled fleet for movement of military cargo (DOD 5100.76–M).

**Military working dog**

Dogs required by the using DOD component for a specific purpose, mission, or combat capability. Military working dogs include patrol, patrol and narcotic/contraband, and patrol and explosive detector dogs.

**Military working dog team**

The military working dog and its appropriately qualified and assigned handler.

**Mission–critical personnel**

Personnel who are essential to the operation of an organization of function.

**Mission essential and vulnerable areas**

Facilities or activities within the installation that, by virtue of their function, are evaluated by the commander as vital to the successful accomplishment of the installation’s State National Guard, or MUSARC mission. This includes areas non–essential to the installation’s/facility’s operational mission but which, by nature of the activity, are considered vulnerable to theft, trespass, damage, or other criminal activity.

**Motor pool**

A group of motor vehicles used as needed by different organizations or individuals and parked in a common location when not in use. On an Army installation, a non–tenant Army activity with 10 or less assigned commercial–type vehicles but no local organizational maintenance support does not have a motor pool, under this regulation, even though the vehicles are parked together.

NSN 5340–00–158–3805; with chain, NSN 5340–00–158–3807. Authorized for continued use to secure Categories III and IV AA&E only until stocks are depleted or replaced.
**Motor vehicle**
A self–propelled, boosted, or towed conveyance used to transport a burden on land. This includes all Army wheeled and track vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers, but not railroad locomotives and rolling stock.

**National Defense Area**
An area set up on non–Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions or territories, to safeguard classified defense information or DOD equipment or materiel. Establishment of a National Defense Area temporarily places such non–Federal lands under the effective control of DOD and results only from an emergency event.

**Negotiations**
A dialogue between authorities and offenders which has as the ultimate goal for the safe release of hostages and the surrender of the offenders.

**One dog–1 handler**
The concept that each military working dog will have only 1 handler. Personnel shortages may necessitate assigning a handler responsibility for more than 1 dog. However, 2 or more handlers cannot handle the same dog.

**Open post**
Installations or activities that do not qualify as closed or limited access posts. Access to the installation or activity is not controlled during or after normal duty hours.

**Perimeter fence**
Fences for the security of unclassified, nonsensitive items that meet the requirements of USACE STD design drawing code 872–90–00 series. The minimum height will be 6 feet with or without an outrigger. Use of NATO standard design fencing is also authorized.

**Perimeter wall**
Any wall over 6 feet tall which delineates a boundary and serves as a barrier to personnel and/or vehicles. These walls may be constructed of reinforced concrete, masonry, or stone.

**Physical protective measures**
Physical security measures used to counter risk factors that usually do not change over a period of time such as mission impact, cost, volume, and criticality of resources and vulnerabilities. The measures are usually permanent and involve expenditure of funds.

**Physical security**
That part of the Army security system, based on threat analysis, concerned with procedures and physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, property, and operations; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, materiel, and information; and to protect against espionage, terrorism, sabotage, damage, misuse, and theft. Operations security and security targeted against traditional criminal activity are included.

a. Physical security procedures include, but are not limited to, the application of physical measures to reduce vulnerability to the threat; integration of PS into contingency, mobilization, and wartime plans; the testing of PS procedures and measures during the exercise of these plans; the interface of installation operations security, crime prevention and PS programs to protect against the traditional criminal; training of guards at sensitive or other storage sites in tactical defense against and response to attempted penetrations; and creating PS awareness.

b. Physical security measures are physical systems, devices, personnel, animals, and procedures employed to protect security interests from possible threats and include, but are not limited to, security guards; military working dogs; lights and physical barriers; explosives and bomb detection equipment; protective vests and similar equipment; badging systems; electronic entry control systems and access control devices; security containers; locking devices; electronic intrusion detection systems; standardized command, control, and display subsystems; radio frequency data links used for PS; security lighting; delay devices; artificial intelligence (robotics); and assessment and/or surveillance systems to include closed–circuit television. Depending on the circumstances of the particular situation, security specialists may have an interest in other items of equipment such as armored sedans.

**Physical security equipment**
A generic term for any item, device, or system that is used primarily to protect Government property, including nuclear, chemical, and other munitions, personnel, and installations, and to safeguard national security information and
material, including the destruction of such information and material both by routine means and by emergency destruct measures.

   a. Interior PS equipment. Physical security equipment used internal to a structure to make that structure a secure area.

   b. Exterior PS equipment. Physical security equipment used external to a structure to make the structure a secure area.

   c. Intrusion detection system. See glossary definition, above.

**Physical security inspection**
A formal, recorded assessment of physical procedures and measures implemented by a unit or activity to protect its assets.

**Physical security measures**
See physical security.

**Physical security plan**
A comprehensive written plan providing proper and economical use of personnel, land, and equipment to prevent or minimize loss or damage from theft, misuse, espionage, sabotage, and other criminal or disruptive activities.

**Physical security procedures**
See physical security.

**Physical security program**
The interrelationship of various components that complement each other to produce a comprehensive approach to security matters. These components include, as a minimum, the PS plan; PS inspections and surveys; participation in combating terrorism committees and fusion cells; and a continuing assessment of the installation’s PS posture.

**Physical security resource plan**
Plan developed by the PS officer that identifies PS needs, and shows proposed programmed procurement of those needs.

**Physical security survey**
A formal, recorded assessment of the installation PS program.

**Physical security system architecture**
A system ensuring that IDS components designed by the various services are compatible when used together. The Air Force is responsible for systems architecture.

**Pier service**
Ocean carrier booking is restricted over ocean movement from port of embarkation to port of debarkation. It precludes prearranged–through–booking employing surface transportation to inland destinations (DOD 5100.76–M).

**Pilferable assets**
Any asset which can be stolen and which does not fall under the other asset categories discussed in this publication.

**Pilferage–coded items**
Items with a code indicating that the material has a ready resale value or civilian application and, therefore, is especially subject to theft.

**Portable**
Capable of being carried in the hand or on the person. As a general rule, a single item weighing less than 100 pounds (45.34 kilograms) is considered portable.

**Primary electrical power source**
That source of power, either external (commercial) or internal, that provides power to site facilities on a daily basis (DOD 5100.76–M).

**Protection in depth**
A system providing several supplementary security barriers. For example, a perimeter fence, a secure building, a vault, and a locked container provide 3 layers of protection. (DOD 5100.76–M)
Protective layer
Any envelope of building components which surrounds an asset and delays or prevents aggressor movement toward the asset or which shields the asset from weapons and explosives effects.

Protective security service
A service to protect shipments. Protective security service involves a transporting carrier that must be a cleared carrier under provisions of DOD 5220.22–R, paragraph 1–702.a (ref (d)). A shipment must be under the constant surveillance of designated carrier employees, unless it is stored in containers or an area approved by the cognizant Defense Investigative Service regional office. The designated carrier employees providing constant surveillance when protective security service is required must possess a Government–issued SECRET clearance and a carrier–issued identification (DOD 5100.76–M).

QUICKTRANS
Long–term contract airlift service within the CONUS for the movement of cargo in support of the logistic system for the military Services (primarily the Navy and Marine Corps) and Defense agencies (DOD 5100.76–M).

Rail surveillance service
An inspection service of rail shipments. An inspection is made within 1 hour after each stop, if the trailer containing a shipment remains at a halt. Reinspection is made at a minimum of once each hour, as long as the railcar containing the shipment remains at a halt (DOD 5100.76–M).

Report of Shipment
An advanced report furnished by message or telephone immediately upon dispatch of a shipment within CONUS for domestic shipments. A report goes to both Water Terminal Clearance Authority and the water port trans–shipping facility for surface export shipments, or to the Military Air Traffic Coordinating Officer for air export shipments. The advance notice of shipments will include the following applicable data:

a. For domestic shipments, see AR 55–355/NAVSUPINST 4600.70/AFM P4600.14A/DLAR 4500.3, Routing Instruction Note 146, appendix L (reference (e)).

b. For export shipments, see DOD 4500.32–R (reference (f)), chapter 4 (DOD 5100.76–M).

Required operational capability
A requirements document that the combat developer prepares with input from the training developer in coordination with the material developer, logistician, and manpower and personnel planner. The required operational capability is a concise statement of the minimum essential operational; reliability, availability, and maintainability; technical; personnel and manpower; training, safety; health; human factors engineering; logistical, and cost information to start full scale development or procurement of a material system.

Restricted area
Any area to which entry is subject to special restrictions or control for security reasons or to safeguard property or material. This does not include those designated areas over which aircraft flight is restricted. Restricted areas may be of different types. The type depends on the nature and varying degree of importance, from a security standpoint, of the security interest or other matter contained therein.

a. Exclusion area. A restricted area containing—

(1) A security interest or other matter of such nature that access to the area constitutes, for all practical purposes, access to such security interests or matter.

(2) A security interest or other matter of such vital importance that proximity resulting from access to the area is treated equal to (1), above.

b. Limited area. A restricted area containing a security interest or other matter, in which uncontrolled movement will permit access to such security interest or matter; access within limited areas may be prevented by escort and other internal restrictions and controls.

c. Controlled area. That portion of a restricted area usually near or surrounding an exclusion or limited area. Entry to the controlled area is restricted to authorized personnel. However, movement of authorized personnel within this area is not necessarily controlled. Mere entry to the area does not provide access to the security interest or other matter within the exclusion or limited area. The controlled area is provided for administrative control, safety, or as a buffer zone for security in depth for the exclusion or limited area. The proper commander establishes the degree of control of movement.

Ride awhile–walk awhile method
A law enforcement or security patrolling technique. The military working dog team patrols for a period of time in a vehicle and then dismounts for an appropriate period of time to patrol an area on foot. This method increases the
potential area the team can cover, as well as allowing the team to concentrate their foot patrols in especially critical areas.

**Risk**
The degree or likelihood of loss of an asset. Factors that determine risk are the value of the asset to its user in terms of mission criticality, replaceability, and relative value and the likelihood of aggressor activity in terms of the attractiveness of the asset to the aggressor, the history of or potential for aggressor activity, and the vulnerability of the asset.

**Risk analysis**
Method of examining various risk factors to determine the risk value of likelihood of resource loss. This analysis will be used to decide the level of security warranted for protection of resources.

**Risk factors**
Elements that make up the total degree of resource loss liability. Factors to be considered in a risk analysis include the importance of the resource to mission accomplishment; the cost, volume, criticality and vulnerabilities of the resources; and the severity of threats to the resources.

**Risk level**
An indication of the degree of risk associated with an asset based on risk analysis. Risk levels may be Levels I, II, or III, which correspond to low, medium, and high.

**Risk value**
Degree of expectation or likelihood of resource loss. The value may be classified as low, medium, or high.

**Safe**
A GSA Class 5 map and plans security container, Class 6 security filing cabinet or refrigerator or freezer, secured with an approved locking device and weighing 500 pounds or more, or secured to the structure to prevent removal.

**Seal**
A device to show whether the integrity of a shipment has been compromised. Seals are numbered serially, are tamper proof, and will be safeguarded while in storage. The serial number of a seal will be shown on GBL. A cable seal lock provides both a seal and locking device.

**Sealed containers**
Wooden boxes, crates, metal containers, and fiber containers sealed in a way to show when the containers are tampered with after sealing. The method of sealing depends of the type of construction of the containers. Sealing may be by metal banding, nailing, airtight sealing, or wax dripping (for fiber containers). In key control, a sealed container is also a locked key container or a sealed envelope containing the key or combination to the key container.

**Sealed protection**
A container or an area enclosed by a plastic or soft metal device which is opened easily without the use of a key or combination.

**SEAVAN**
A commercial, Government-owned or leased shipping container and without bogey wheels attached that is moved by ocean transportation and must be lifted on and off the ship (DOD 5100.76–M).

**Security card**
An official distinctive identification (pass or card) that identifies and authorizes the possessor to be physically present in a U.S. Army designated restricted area.

**Security engineering**
The application of engineering principles to the protection of assets against various threats through the application of construction and equipment application.

**Security lighting**
The amount of lighting necessary to permit visual surveillance by security police or by supervisory personnel.

**Security procedural measures**
Physical security measures to counter risk factors that will periodically change over a period of time such as criminal,
terrorist, and hostile threats. The procedures can usually be changed within a short amount of time and involve manpower.

**Sensitive conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives**
See categorization of such items in appendix A.

**Sensitive items**
Material requiring a high degree of protection to prevent unauthorized acquisition. This includes arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs, precious metals, or other substances determined by the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration to be designated Schedule Symbol II, III, IV, or V under the Controlled Substance Act of 1970.

**Signal intelligence**
Intelligence derived from communications means (such as telephone, telegraph, radio), electronic signal emitters (such as navigation radar, identification friend or foe, and weapons guidance devices) and instrumentation signals (such as telemetry and beaconry).

**Signature Security Service**
A service designed to provide continuous responsibility for the custody of shipments in transit. A signature and tally record is required from each person responsible for the proper handling of the shipment at specified stages of its transit from origin to destination.

  a. The initial signature on the signature and tally record should be the same as that of the carrier’s agent on the GBL. When SSS is used in conjunction with dual driver protective service, both drivers in each pair of drivers will sign the signature and tally record when that pair assumes responsibility for the shipment.

  b. Commercial carriers offering SSS must be able to trace a shipment in less than 24 hours. The following forms will be used to obtain SSS:

    1. **Surface shipments.** DD Form 1907 (Signature and Tally Record) will accompany every surface shipment of classified or protected material accorded a signature and tally service by surface commercial carriers. Carrier tariffs and tenders may describe this type of service under different titles for example, Hand–to–Hand Signature Service or Signature Service.

    2. **Commercial air shipments.** The air industry shall use the DD Form 1907 to obtain the signature and tally record. No receipt is required from the flight crew or attendants while the aircraft is in flight. A signature and tally record is required; however, from air carrier personnel whenever the aircraft is on the ground and access to the cargo compartment containing the sensitive AA&E is available for any purpose. A signature and tally record is also required from pickup and delivery carriers used by the airlines for such purposes.

    3. **Military air shipments.** The DD Form 1907, or similar document, will be used to provide hand–to–hand receipt control for sensitive and classified shipments being transferred in the Defense Transportation System.

**Steel bar**
A flat bar, 3/8–inch by 1–inch minimum; or round bar 1/2–inch diameter minimum.

**Steel mesh**
High carbon, manganese steel not less than 15/100–inch (8–gauge) in thickness, and a grid of not more than 2 inches center to center.

**Storage**
Any area where AA&E are kept. Storage does not include items in process of manufacture, in use, or being transported to a place of storage or use.

**Survivability**
The ability to withstand or repel an attack, or other hostile action, to the extent that essential functions can continue or be resumed after the hostile action.

**Tactics**
The specific methods of achieving the aggressor’s goals to injure personnel, destroy Army assets, or steal Army materiel.

**Tactical vehicle**
A vehicle with military characteristics designed primarily for use by forces in the field in direct connection with, or support of, combat or tactical operations, or the training of troops for such operations.
Tenant activity
A unit or activity of 1 Government agency, military department, or command that occupies facilities on an installation of another military department or command and that receives supplies or other support services from that installation.

Terrorism
The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals, that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

Terrorism counteraction measures
Term used previously for combatting terrorism (see definition of this term).

Terrorist group
A politically, religious, or ideologically oriented group which uses terrorism as its prime mode of operations.

Threat management force
An action force from the installation that responds to major disruptions on installations. The threat management force should be of sufficient size to manage the disruption and will usually involve a command element, security element, negotiation team, special reaction team, and logistical element.

TOW
A tube–launched, optically tracked, wire–guided missile designed as an antitank weapon system (DOD 5100.76–M).

Two–person concept
A system designed to prohibit access by an individual to nuclear weapons and certain designated components by requiring the presence at all times of at least 2 authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed. (Also referred to as the 2–man rule, 2–man policy, or 2–person rule.)

Upper rail lock
A set screw operated variation of a C clamp designed for gripping the upper sliding rail which supports or guides the weight of some styles of railroad boxcar doors. Gripping the upper sliding rail, the lock blocks and prevents the door’s roller hangers or carriers from sliding past, thereby effectively preventing the door from being moved (DOD 5100. 76–M).

Waiver
Temporary relief from specific standards imposed by this manual (regulation) pending actions accomplishment of actions that will conform to the standards required. Compensatory measures are required.

Section III
Special Abbreviations and Terms
There are no entries in this section.